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Abstract 
 
In the literature on Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR), security 
problems in post-conflict settings are too readily attributed to the personality traits or 
economic ambitions of the ex-combatants. Alternatively, this thesis analyses the 
challenges and dilemmas they have to face as part of the reintegration process. Drawing 
on the DDR process that took place in Colombia under Alvaro Uribe's government 
(2002-2010), this research questions how the Colombian Agency for Reintegration 
(ACR) contributed to the economic, social and political reintegration of former guerrilla 
and paramilitary members. The thesis is divided into two parts: the first aims to 
understand how the Colombian DDR originated and evolved. The third chapter 
illustrates how the initial DDR design responded to a national security strategy that 
established differential treatment towards the guerrillas and paramilitaries, yet neglected 
the long-term reintegration of rank-and-file ex-combatants and the need for assistance to 
the receiving communities. Moreover, the entire DDR policy was fiercely contested and 
adjusted by the country‟s judicial institutions, which pushed the ex-combatants into 
both legal and institutional uncertainty. The fourth chapter highlights the extent to 
which responsibility for the reintegration was assumed by the municipal authorities of 
Medellín and Bogotá, which in turn encouraged and underpinned the creation of a DDR 
programme beyond its initially narrow, security-centric goals. The second part of this 
thesis explores the personal experiences of ex-combatants across three key dimensions: 
although the ACR programme seems to have had little success in terms of economic 
reintegration, social reintegration emerges as a more important organising element 
thanks to the creation of social fabric between the families, the communities and the 
overarching ACR bureaucracy. In particular, a positive experience with the reintegration 
officers had a ameliorative effect on political reintegration: by facilitating access to the 
mechanisms of democracy, new forms of interacting with the state were opened up to 
the ex-combatants, which would ultimately contribute to their forging of a new identity 
as citizens. 
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Introduction  
At the beginning of this research, when talking to others about my interest in analysing 
the process of ex-combatant reintegration in Colombia, there was much scepticism 
about any real willingness or capacity among the demobilised to abandon their life in 
the armed groups: “You cannot take the wild out of the tiger”, as the saying goes. 
Throughout the development of this thesis I have found these assumptions in folk and 
expert knowledge alike: stemming from assumptions rooted in neoclassical economic 
theories, fighters are often deemed to be “irrational” in their actions and inevitably 
“greedy” in their motivations, which subsequently drives them towards violence in the 
form of criminality or their recruitment into rebel groups. By consequence, war and 
political conflict are commonly attributed to the personality traits of individuals, while 
the social arrangements and interactions that cause and reproduce political conflict are 
neglected (Martín-Baró, 1990:27).  
Liberal and neoclassical doctrines
1
 understand war as “development in reverse” (Collier, 
2004:2) and have highlighted the primacy of economic factors as causes of political 
violence. Baas has argued that the recurrent emphasis on greed as explanation for 
violence has two different ontologies: while Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 2004) state the 
universality and priority of economic motivations across time and cultures, Kaldor 
(2010:2) accepts that the causes of conflict may change, but assumes that all civil 
conflicts that started in the dawn of the 20
th
 century have replaced their political 
motivations with criminal aims driven by mere economic profit (Baas, 2012:16). 
Gutierrez Sanin has similarly indicated two major pitfalls in these theories: on the one 
hand, it is assumed that all wars are alike, that all armed groups are similarly greedy and 
that all rebels are utility-maximisers by nature; on the other, political conflicts are 
understood as ultimately criminal endeavours: “[a]s Collier and associates did, to study 
rebellion as a form of criminality, that can be explained as a confluence of rent seeking 
actions by the leadership and the existence of a labour market for armed action” 
(2008:5).  
Additionally, there is a romanticised view of conditions pre-war and an assumption the 
combatants broke some sort of golden or halcyon order, ignoring the social and political 
                                                 
1
 Especially those by Collier and Hoeffler (2004); Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2008) and Kaldor (2006). 
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causes that ignited the conflict in the first place, such as poverty, inequality or 
totalitarian rule. Such assumptions are evidenced in the following statement by the 
World Bank:  
“[DDR contributes to the] restoration of civil society and peaceful return to 
productive civilian life of hitherto destabilizing forces.”  
(Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer 1996:72, emphasis mine)  
On the contrary, research has shown that war and political violence are closely 
connected to progress and development (Cramer, 2006:45): on the one hand, rebellion 
and its contestation were forces that underpinned the formation of modern development 
states by transforming bygone feudal structures and bringing about industrialisation and 
democratisation (Weber, 1920:324; Moore, 1966; Tilly, 1985). In turn, much of the 
violence that takes place in times of political conflict is in fact controlled and addressed 
to specific and rational aims, thus greediness is but one of many reasons behind war-like 
behaviours (Keen, 1994; Cramer, 2006; Mitton, 2012).  
Subsequently, the demobilisation of troops and the reintegration of ex-combatants back 
into society constitute an important part of the historical process that has shaped modern 
civilisation. When conflicts come to an end, breaking the military structure of the 
warring factions – and the decision to reallocate the soldiers into new military structures 
or to simply send them home – constitutes an important part of the new security and 
political arrangements in post-conflict societies. Questions on what to do with the 
surplus of soldiers left after the conflict, on the adverse effects of their military-like 
behaviours, as well as doubts and fears on their capabilities or willingness to go back to 
civilian life can be traced back to the Napoleonic wars, the World Wars or the Vietnam 
War (Söderström, 2011:16; Kriger, 2003:21). As Tilly has pointed out:  
In royal service, soldiers and sailors were often expected to provide for 
themselves by preying on the civilian population: commandeering, raping, 
looting, taking prizes. When demobilised, they commonly continued the same 
practices, but without the same royal protection; demobilised ships became pirate 
vessels, demobilised troops bandits. It also worked the other way: A king's best 
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source of armed supporter was sometimes the world of outlaws. Robin Hood's 
conversion to royal archer may be a myth, but the myth records a practice. 
(Tilly, 1985:173) 
Certainly, people make choices, but they do so limited by their circumstances and in 
response to different institutional contexts (Putnam, 1995; Foucault, 1982:790; Cramer, 
2002:1847). Rather than entering into the debate of whether fighters are wild and savage 
bandits or freedom-fighters and heroes, this thesis problematises the assumptions of 
some nascent and natural proclivity to the use of violence, This study also questions the 
tendency of categorising the ex-combatants as an automatic security risk due to an 
allegued tendency to returning to their groups or by joining criminality, exploring 
instead the difficulties, challenges and dilemmas combatants may have in integrating 
within a post-conflict society and switching to the citizen identity. 
International DDR programmes and the Colombian DDR process 
The first UN peace operations to include an explicit mandate to assist in the 
demobilisation of troops took place in 1989 in Nicaragua (UNPKOa, 2010:18) and 
Namibia (Muggah, 2009:5). Since then, there have been UN-led DDR missions to El 
Salvador, Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Central African 
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Sudan, Nepal, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and Côte d‟Ivoire (UNPKOa, 2010; UNPKOb, 2010; Caramés and Sanz, 
2009; Özerdem, 2008; Mcmullin, 2013). In a similar vein, in the 1990s the World Bank 
provided technical and financial assistance through Demobilisation and Reconstruction 
Programmes (DRP)
2
 to Mozambique, Rwanda and Uganda; it had also expected to 
provide more assistance to around a dozen more countries (Colletta, Kostner and 
Wiederhofer, 1996:vi). From 2002 to 2009, the World Bank then implemented a 
multilateral DDR programme in seven countries transitioning from war to peace: 
Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic 
of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda (MDRP, 2010:1).  
Independent from the UN or the World Bank mandates, additional processes of 
demobilisation and reintegration have taken place as part of nation-led processes in 
                                                 
2
 In more recent literature, the acronym DRP has been replaced by DDR. 
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Ethiopia, Eritrea, Russia and the Philippines (Muggha, 2009:5), Northern Ireland 
(Rolston, 2007), Tajikistan (Torjesen and MacFarlane, 2007), Lebanon (Karamé, 2009) 
and Colombia.  
As part of an effort to operationalise the empirical experience amassed from almost two 
decades of peace-building operations, the UN published the International Standards on 
DDR (IDDRS) in 2006. Although the IDDRS originally addressed the planning, 
management and implementation of UN operations, it soon became a benchmark in the 
literature: its concepts and terminology have been largely adopted by policy-makers, 
practitioners and scholars. This thesis also adopts the definitions stated in the IDDRS:  
DDR is understood as “a process that contributes to security and stability in a post-
conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking 
the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and 
economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods”. In turn, demobilisation is 
defined as “the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces 
or other armed groups”, which usually comprises two stages: the cantonment of troops 
prior to the official demobilisation ceremony, and the provision of reinsertion
3
 aid and 
support. Disarmament is the removal of weapons, ammunition and explosives from the 
hands of ex-combatants, usually also including weapons management programmes for 
the general population. Finally, reintegration “is the process by which ex-combatants 
acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income” (UNDP, 
2006,1.20: 5-6). The UN differentiates between reinsertion and reintegration. The 
former is the initial assistance offered to the ex-combatants immediately after their 
demobilisation and is regarded as a transitional period prior to the longer process of 
reintegrating as civilians (IDDRS, 2004:1.10,2) 
The implementation of post war DDR programmes have become an important part of a 
wider set of policies on peace-building and models for state reconstruction pursued by 
multilateral organisations such as United Nations or the World Bank (Ottoway, 2003; 
Muggah, Berdal and Torjesen, 2009:270). The UN has stated that the DDR 
programmes‟ focus on ex-combatants is “necessary and justified in order to build 
confidence and security in war-torn societies” (UNDP, 2006, 4.30:6) by preventing the 
                                                 
3
 Some authors refer to reinsertion as a “small r” in the acronym: DDr; others have also included 
reinsertion with capital R in the acronym: DDRR.  
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transformation of combatants into self-equipped soldiers or mercenary groups. Thus, the 
aims of these programmes are twofold: the disbandment of rebel and paramilitary 
groups that jeopardise the state‟s monopoly of force and the management of ex-
combatants that are the product of these demobilisations:  
The UN sees DDR as an early step in a series of peace-building processes. DDR 
focuses on the immediate management of people previously associated with 
armed forces and groups; lays the groundwork for safeguarding and sustaining 
the communities in which these individuals can live as law-abiding citizens; and 
builds national capacity for long-term peace, security and development.   
(UNDP, 2006, 2.10:5) 
However, it has been argued that these DDR programmes prioritise the security 
concerns and economic agendas of the countries that dominate the international political 
order, while ignoring the social and political reality of the local governments and 
communities (Ottaway, 2003, Kriger, 2003:20; Cramer, 2006:258; Muggah, 2009:2). 
Likewise, Baas (2012:204) and Mcmullin (2013:7) have claimed that the debates on 
DDR literature revolve around issues concerning the practice of multilateral organisms 
when designing and implementing their DDR programmes, which are not always 
related to the needs perceived by the governments or warring factions involved in their 
actual negotiation or implementation. Furthermore, the effectiveness of these 
programmes has proved limited as many of them have failed to achieve their purposes 
(Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007, 2009; Mcmulllin, 2013:13), with about half of the 
countries in which they were implemented having suffered renewed violence 
(Stockholm, 2005:9).  
At this point, it is important to clarify the difference between DDR processes and 
programmes. The former is an overarching term referring to a series of events and 
actions that start with the disbanding of armed troops in the aftermath of conflict. The 
latter is an organised and intended set of policies, institutions and practices for the 
demobilisation and reintegration of combatants, aiming to prevent and control security 
problems that may arise from the reduction of troops in post-conflict settings (UNDP, 
2006, 1.10:1; Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer 1996:v). As such, a DDR process 
could or could not include a programme, and certainly the ex-combatants can go 
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through their own demobilisation and reintegration process regardless of their 
participation in a programme. My aim is to contribute to the literature on DDR by 
studying a programme that was built locally in Colombia and as part of a very 
contentious political DDR process, in which multilateral organisations had little 
influence.    
Some authors have established categories to classify DDR programmes and processes 
according to the context in which they are implemented. Berdal identifies three different 
categories: first, most DDR programmes and processes have been part of international 
missions to establish a peace settlement in conflicts where no side achieved a clear 
victory; second, there have been some nation-led initiatives to undertake reduction of 
military forces post conflict; third, there have also been attempts to impose the 
disarmament of fighters through the use of international military force, which in 
practice have proved ineffective and counterproductive (Berdal, 1996:10). Equally, 
DDR processes may take place against a variety of backdrops: as reductions of military 
personnel and resources in peacetime; in the transition from authoritarian regimes to 
democratic ones; and in post-conflict situations as a measure to prevent relapse into 
conflict (Rufer, 2005:17; Özerdem, 2009:13). The World Bank has also proposed four 
key political scenarios for the implementation of DDR programmes: first, situations 
where internal conflict is still on-going in the absence of or with a weak government in 
charge; second, where a government has been established but warring factions still 
maintain their military structures and compete for power; third, a post-conflict scenario 
in which the clear winner has achieved control of the government; and fourth, in the 
aftermath of civil wars, with the possible prevalence of small-scale illegal armed groups 
(quoted in Özerdem, 2009:3). Muggah has  proposed an alternative typology taking into 
account whether DDR programmes have taken place before conflict, by downsizing 
national forces as a crisis prevention measure; during conflict, as partial demobilisations 
with some reintegration activities; and post-conflict in two possible settings: following 
cross-border conflict or internal conflict, which imply total demobilisation, disarmament 
and reintegration of troops, as well as some activities for reconciliation and 
rehabilitation (Muggah, 2009:5).  
However, these typologies fail to capture the complexity of the Colombian DDR 
analysed in this thesis. Firstly, this was a nation-led process; neither the UN nor the 
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World Bank intervened. Although there was some involvement from multilateral 
organisms and foreign governments, their activities were limited to monitoring the 
demobilisation and providing financing or technical assistance to specific tasks in the 
reintegration phase. Secondly, as Muggah has noted, it was a process that took place in 
the midst of an ongoing conflict, but it was also part of a strategy of security with 
differential treatment for each armed group: the government signed deals with the 
paramilitary groups while simultaneously increasing its military attacks against the 
guerrillas and fostering the desertion of its members. Finally, the DDR was operating 
within the fundamental paradox of the Colombian state: a system of long-term 
institutions coexisting and interacting with a medium-intensity war. The Colombian 
state is neither failed nor weak, but a fully functioning democracy with a complex 
setting of institutions and democratic mechanisms. Thus, the Colombian case is atypical 
compared to those cases in Africa and Asia on which the international community bases 
its literature. Other experiences (such as El Salvador and Nicaragua) are closer in 
regional features, but these DDRs took place 20 years ago and were marked by a 
continuation of criminal violence that had important differences to the Colombian 
political conflict.  
Negotiation, Demobilisation and Reintegration, 2002-2010 
I draw my analysis from the DDR process that took place in Colombia during Alvaro 
Uribe‟s Presidency (2002-2010). The Colombian DDR was one of the pillars of Uribe‟s 
national security programme, the Policy of Defense and Democratic Security
4
, which 
included two different yet complementary strategies: the government opted for 
negotiating and establishing a peace settlement with paramilitary groups, while at the 
same time increasing its military offensive against the FARC guerrillas. In practice, the 
DDR was developed in two stages that coincide with Uribe‟s two presidential terms: the 
negotiation, demobilisation and disarmament phases (2002-2006) and the reintegration 
phase (2006-2010). 
 
                                                 
4
 Hereafter referred to as the Policy of Democratic Security. For his second mandate Uribe continued 
with this policy under the name of the „Policy of Consolidation of the Democratic Security‟. 
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Negotiation with paramilitary leaders began two months after Uribe assumed the 
Presidency in 2002. Due to the fragmentation of the paramilitary leadership, four 
different negotiating tables were created, resulting in the “collective” demobilisation of 
31,671 soldiers organised across 37 structures by 2006 (OACP, 2006:8). In 2008 there 
were also some collective demobilisations of small guerrilla structures comprising 264 
members, including the FARC group Caica Gaitana (alleged FARC dissidents), other 
FARC militias and imprisoned members, and a small dissident guerrilla force named the 
Guevarist Revolutionary Army
5
 (ODDR, 2008).  
In a parallel process, an increasing number of deserters from the guerrillas surrendered 
to the authorities as a result of sustained military operations and programmes that 
encouraged defection from rebel groups (Pinto et al, 2002). Based on a set of laws and 
legal procedures launched in the early 1990s
6
, deserter guerrilla members were entitled 
to judicial benefits and reinsertion treatment, through which they could attain the status 
of demobilised population (Villarraga, 2006:31). This type of demobilisation has been 
called “individual”, as there was no negotiation between the armed factions, and this 
was indeed a process that targeted scattered individuals, mainly combatants from two 
guerrilla forces still operating in the country: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia (FARC) and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN). During Uribe‟s 
government there were 23,001 of these individual demobilisations, of which 81.6 per 
cent were former members of the ELN or the FARC and 16.3 per cent were ex-
paramilitaries (Ministry of Defense, 2013). This policy has been maintained by current 
President Juan Manuel Santos
7
.  
 
The Colombian government orchestrated the design, administration, fundraising and 
implementation of the entire demobilisation policy. Although in 2003 Uribe launched 
an initiative to attract external aid and cooperation (ACCI, 2005:27; Acción Social, 
2006), by 2005 the national budget had financed most of the demobilisation expenditure 
(Schönrock, 2005:8). The government of the United States provided some resources 
through USAid in the form of the Plan Colombia cooperation policy (US, 2008:54), but 
                                                 
5
 Ejército Revolucionario Guevarista (ERG). 
6
 Law 104/1993, Decree 1384/1994 (Pinto et al, 2002:1; Villarraga, 2006:31).   
7
 Juan Manuel Santos was elected twice: for the periods 2010-2014 and 2014-2018. 
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the international community proved to be highly reluctant to fund the DDR process: 
both the European Union (EU) and some US Congress members raised concerns over 
the negotiations between the Government and the paramilitary leaders, including the 
clandestine involvement of drug-traffickers, the lack of advance planning for the 
reintegration phase, and the government‟s proposal of universal amnesty for crimes 
punishable by the International Criminal Court and crimes related to drug-trafficking 
(ICG, 2004; CIDH, 2006; Guáqueta, 2007:26; UN 2003; 2004).  
In 2004, at the request of the Colombian government, the Organisation of American 
States (OAS) took on an observational role by creating the Mission to Support the Peace 
Process in Colombia (MAPP). However, the international community was again reticent 
to provide funding for MAPP‟s operations: to the point that the Colombian government 
had to „donate‟ US$ 1million to get the mission off the ground (El Tiempo, 22/06/04). 
Even then, the OAS remained highly critical of Uribe‟s DDR, as evidenced in the 
reports presented by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (CIDH, 2004) 
and by MAPP itself (especially reports 7
th
, 2006 and 8
th
, 10
th
, 2007). In a more 
operational and technical role, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 
administered USAid resources and implemented an information system called SAME
8
, 
a database on the personal situation and individual progress of each of the demobilised 
within the reintegration programme. For the reintegration phase, the Colombian 
government was more successful in attracting external funding from the governments of 
Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden and Spain. 
The demobilisation of paramilitary fighters took place within two different legal 
frameworks (OACP/ACR, 2010:88). On the one hand, the rank-and-file paramilitaries 
and guerrilla deserters were treated under the same scheme: Law 782 of transitional 
justice, which covered political crimes as part of the armed conflict such as belonging to 
or collaborating with rebel groups or the use of illegal weapons and military fatigues. 
On the other hand, the paramilitary leaders were in need of a separate law of transitional 
justice that would provide amnesty or lenient treatment on gross human rights violations 
and crimes punishable under international criminal law. The approval of this law was 
                                                 
8
 Acronym in Spanish. Sistema de Alerta Monitoreo y Evaluación. SAME was implemented from from 
2003 to 2009, when the ACR developed its own software: Sistema de Información para la Reintegración 
(SIR). 
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the subject of fierce debates in Congress for two years until it was finally enacted in 
2005 under the name of Law 975 of Justice and Peace. However, both laws 782 and 975 
were subject to substantial amendments throughout the DDR process, with subsequent 
changes to the legal and political status of the paramilitaries who demobilised 
collectively, and yet further impact on those guerrilla members who demobilised 
individually.  
 
Between 2003 and 2006, the government implemented a set of reinsertion policies, 
which were initially set to last for 18 months, but were extended to nine years due to a 
variety of political circumstances that I explain below. As mentioned earlier, throughout 
the conflict the Colombian state maintained a crucial capacity to build institutions. 
Thus, during the DDR process, there was an array of offices and programmes already in 
place to manage the demobilised population: during the first phase, the collective 
negotiation and demobilisation of paramilitaries were carried out by the Peace 
Commissioner Office, while the individual demobilisations were the responsibility of 
the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry of the Interior and Justice was initially 
designated to carry out the reinsertion policies through the Programme of 
Reincorporation to the Civil Life (PRVC)
9
. In addition, at the sub-national level two 
independent programmes were created by the Mayoral Offices of the two largest and 
most important cities in the country: “Peace and Reconciliation” in Medellín and the 
“Programme of Services to the Process of Demobilisation and Reintegration” 
(PAPDRB) in Bogotá. All three programmes had different approaches to the provision 
of services to the demobilised. However, in September 2006, the PRVC was replaced 
by the High Counsellor for Reintegration (ACR)
10
, an office that reported directly to the 
President. It was at this point that the ACR consolidated and unified a reintegration 
strategy and a national reintegration programme was finally put into action. The ACR 
programme was later implemented nationwide and made compulsory to all the 
demobilised.  
                                                 
9
 Acronym in Spanish. Programa de Reincorporación a la Vida Civil. Previously Dirección Nacional para 
la Reinserción. For an account of the different institutions involved in reintegration and their 
transformations, see Pinto et al, 2002 and FIP and Alfaomega, 2003. 
10
 Acronym in Spanish. Alta Consejería Presidencial para la Reintegración Social y Económica de 
Personas y Grupos Alzados en Armas. Decree 3043/2006. On 3 November 2011, the ACR was 
transformed into the Colombian Agency for Reintegration, retaining the same acronym. Decree 
4138/2011.  
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In 2008 – five years after the first demobilisations – the National Policy of Social and 
Economic Reintegration (PRSE)
11
 was finally enacted and other minor offices or civil 
servants were delegated to specific DDR duties within fourteen Ministries and public 
offices (Rodríguez, 2006:111). However, in practice, all low-ranking paramilitaries that 
demobilised from 2003 onwards entered into a judicial limbo: they were not considered 
criminals, but there were legal impediments that prevented the ACR programme from 
setting out the requirements or deadline by which the ex-combatants could be 
considered fully reintegrated members of society. From 2006 to 2011, the demobilised 
could be classified as “inactive” with regard to the ACR programme, meaning that they 
were registered but there was no further information on their whereabouts. Following 
the election of President Santos in 2010, the ACR underwent an internal re-organisation 
and Congress enacted Law 1424 in 2011, replacing Law 782 and changing for the third 
time the legal status of the demobilised. Law 1424 at last established a procedural 
closure to the reintegration process, stating that enrolment in and satisfactory approval 
of the ACR programme was a compulsory requirement for the ex-combatants to 
complete the judicial process and graduate as citizens.  
The reintegration phase was the product of a fracture in, rather than a continuation of, 
Uribe‟s policy: chapter three will show how the initial DDR design was reconsidered 
due to strong political opposition and contestation, and the ruling of the Supreme Court 
of Justice. Chapter four, meanwhile, explores how the reintegration phase was born out 
of the crisis of the reinsertion strategy as first implemented by Uribe‟s government. In 
practice, the demobilised had to navigate their reintegration in the midst of both legal 
and institutional uncertainty. Understanding the complex legal and political milieu in 
which the Colombian DDR process and the ACR programme emerged is therefore of 
the utmost importance in analysing the personal experiences of the ex-combatants 
involved.  
As will be explained in the next section, Colombia is a country with a long history of 
peace processes, some of which have ended in peace agreements. Subsequently, the 
judicial system and the institutions have developed laws and procedures for the 
management of the former combatants of rebel groups, including the provision of 
                                                 
11
 Acronym in Spanish. Política Nacional de Reintegración Social y Económica para personas y grupos 
armados ilegales. Conpes 3554 enacted on 1 December 2008. 
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services for short-term reinsertion aid. In this particular DDR process, low-ranking 
combatants from guerrillas and paramilitaries were equally accused of the political 
crimes of sedition and rebellion, and accordingly received the benefits of the transitional 
laws: amnesty and short-term economic benefits. The differences in the demobilisation 
of both types of combatants will be discussed in detail in chapter four, suffice it to say 
that while the paramilitaries were the responsibility of civilan institutions and were sent 
home after the ceremonies, former guerrilla members were handled by military 
institutions and were allocated to temporary shelters in Bogotá. More significant was 
the difference in treatment between low-ranking paramilitaries and their leaders: the 
negotiation with and demobilisation of the paramilitary leaders required the 
modification of transitional laws and procedures, and in particular the criteria defining 
the diference between criminality and political violence. Chapter three explains the 
mobilisation of political forces for and against the treatment of paramilitaries as a 
political armed group, which was ultimately the process that defined the initial design of 
the DDR process under Uribe‟s administration.  
 
Uribe‟s strong-arm approach to the armed conflict gained him huge popularity and 
political leverage with which to make structural changes to the institutions, including 
several attempts to reform the Constitution to bring about his reelection. At the same 
time, however, his policies were heavily criticised at national and international level due 
to concerns over human rights abuses, corruption and complicity with paramilitary 
groups and drug-traffickers. The negotiations themselves raised questions about the 
over-friendly, even complicit relationship between Uribe and the paramilitary leaders
12
. 
The discussions and agreements reached during the negotiation phase, for one, were 
kept secret and never disclosed to the public, leaving many doubts over the legality and 
constitutionality of the DDR process. Moreover, the collective demobilisations were 
widely perceived as a ruse to provide amnesty to paramilitary leaders for gross human 
rights violations, and to save drug-barons from extradition to the US. In contrast, the 
low-ranking ex-paramilitaries received no such attention, and were sent home without 
access to the services appropriate for their long-term reintegration. The outcomes of the 
process, therefore, remain decidedly ambivalent: on the one hand, thousands of 
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 When Uribe was Governor of the department of Antioquia, he strongly supported a form of legal 
paramilitary groups, the CONVIVIR: cooperatives of private security.  
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members from paramilitary groups and guerrillas demobilised, and the security 
indicators for the country improved at an impressive rate; on the other, powerful 
criminal bands (known as BACRIM
13
) emerged as a by-product of the demobilisations 
in areas previously controlled by the paramilitaries.  
 
One month after the approval of Law 975, the political influence of the paramilitary 
groups within the government was uncovered in what has been called the “para-politics” 
scandal: abundant evidence revealed that many politicians, public servants and 
influential figures had engaged in unlawful alliances with these groups and other drug-
traffickers. Far from marginal, these alliances lay at the heart of many democratic 
institutions – including Congress, the National Secret Service (DAS 14) and offices 
inside the judiciary system – and hence greatly influenced the provision of services 
from an array of public institutions as well as the approval of laws, including Law 975 
(Semana, 11/09/05; López and Sevillano, 2007; Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos, 2009; 
López (ed), 2010).  
 
By 2015, and as a result of fierce political and legal battles, 20 of Uribe‟s close advisers 
had been removed from office and/or were in jail or fugitives from the Colombian law, 
including four ex-ministers, two former DAS directors, two of his personal secretaries, 
his security chief, and sixty members of Congress, most of them belonging to Uribe‟s 
political coalition (Silla Vacia, 16/04/15; Verdad Abierta, 28/08/13). Significantly for 
this research, a legal investigation was opened against Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos 
Restrepo, who had been delegated by the government to head the negotiation and 
demobilisation of the paramilitary groups. Criminal charges were filed against him for 
his involvement in the demobilising of the FARC Cacica Gaitana, a group that was later 
discovered to be fake. Restrepo was summoned to testify by the Colombian authorities 
but fled the country (BBC 09/02/12), and attempts to call him to trial have so far been 
unsuccessful.  
                                                 
13
 The term BACRIM was coined in Colombia to describe the criminal bands (in Spanish, Bandas 
Criminales) that remained or were created after demobilisation. There is still much debate as to whether 
the BACRIM were new criminal structures looking to control the areas of drug-trafficking or the 
continuation of certain paramilitary groups (Árias and Guáqueta, 2008:5; Ávila, 2010:157).  
14
 Acromyn in Spanish. Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad. 
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Many demobilisations but no peace  
The modern Colombian state is the product of the Civil War that took place from 1949 
to 1953 between the Liberal and Conservative parties. After a transitional period of five 
years in which a military junta governed, democracy was established in 1957 under a 
peace settlement that restricted the participation in elections – and thus the sharing of 
power at any level – to those two parties alone (Tirado, 1996). These restrictive power 
arrangements produced the conditions for guerrilla warfare: first with the creation of the 
FARC and ELN guerrillas in the 1960s, and then with the emergence of another five 
guerrilla groups in the 1970s and 1980s (Villarraga, 2006:18; Guáqueta, 2007). 
Paradoxically, then, the growth of democracy in Colombia has been inextricably linked 
with political turmoil: the conflict has lasted as long as the democratic institutions and 
has been particularly strong in areas where the public institutions have a significant 
presence, for instance in the department of Antioquia and its capital Medellín
15
.  
By consequence, Colombia has a tradition of successful peace processes and 
demobilisations that still have not brought the conflict to an end: at least nine different 
peace agreements between the government and different guerrillas, paramilitary groups 
and militias took place from 1953 to 2002, with subsequent demobilisations and ex-
combatant reintegration (Villarraga, 2006; Rodríguez, 2006:112). For this research I 
refer as context to the demobilisations that occurred in the mid-1980s and 1990s, when 
a conservative president took power yet chose to forward some very liberal ideas: 
President Betancur
16
 understood the guerrilla struggle as the by-product of widespread 
social inequality and restricted political participation (Villarraga, 2006; Turriago and 
Bustamante, 2003). This discourse of reconciliation rather than confrontation continued 
with the next president, Virgilio Barco, and led to the demobilisation of five guerrilla 
movements that were subsequently transformed into political parties or civic 
organisation
17
. The institutions and policies for reintegration are seen to develop from 
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 For a detailed account of the relationship between the violence in Medellín and local institutions, see 
the esssays collected in Hincapie, 2006; Gutierrez and Jaramillo, 2004; and Gutierrez et al, 2009. 
16
 Belisario Betancur (1982-1986); Virgilio Barco (1986-1990).  
17
 The M-19 demobilised in 1990, Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL), Movimiento Revolucionario de 
los Trabajadores (MRT) and Movimiento Quintín Lame (MQL) in 1991, and Corriente de Revolución 
Socialista (CRS) in 1994. The FARC, ELN and EPL made their own attempts to create political parties 
from 1985 to 1990. 
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the Betancur government onwards, when the PRVC and other related offices were 
created to support ex-guerrilla members in their transition to civilian life
18
. 
These demobilisations transformed the political landscape: the peace settlement 
between the government and the rebels demanded the enshrining of a new Constitution, 
as well as various institutional arrangements, that allowed the participation of new 
political parties. Additionally, the entire process prompted the introduction of 
democratic institutions that increased and facilitated state access, control and 
accountability at the national and sub-national levels, including the creation of the 
Fiscal Office, the Constitutional Court, the Inspector General‟s Office (Procuraduría) 
and the Office for the Defense of the People (Defensoría del Pueblo) (Constitution 1991, 
arts. 116, 118; Semana, 08/07/08). In a study comparing the political reintegration of the 
M-19 guerrilla in the 1990s and the paramilitary groups in the 2000s, Guáqueta 
(2007:425) has argued that the rebels sought out a more favourable social and political 
environment for their participation in elections: their actions were perceived as a 
reaction to appalling social conditions and restrictions of the political system. Their 
petitions and proposals, too, had addressed structural changes towards more and better 
democracy. The guerrilla demobilisations were thus perceived as Robin Hood-esque in 
their actions, and there were widespread feelings of sympathy towards the ex-
combatants.  
However, these reforms impacted enormously on the power of the traditional parties 
and elites in the regions, which led to the polarisation of the political landscape 
(Romero, 2003:40). This also coincided with burgeoning military competition among 
the different armed groups operating in the country at the time: on the one hand, two 
guerrilla factions reluctant to demobilise (FARC and ELN) became stronger in both 
number of troops and military tactics, which in turn prompted the creation of illegal 
paramilitary groups to counter the guerrilla threat (Ferro and Uribe, 2002; Echandia, 
2006:28). On the other, drug-trafficking began its expansion across the country and 
provided sizeable economic resources to finance the military power of both guerrillas 
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 Consejería para la Reconciliación, la Normalización y la Rehabilitación (CRNR),  decrees 2577/1986 
and 1860/1991 and Plan Nacional de Rehabilitación (PNR), decree 2707/1993. For a detailed account of 
programmes and offices, see FIP, nd; Turriago and Bustamente, 2003:25). 
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and paramilitaries, as well as prompting the creation of private armies to fulfil the 
security needs inherent in criminality (Romero, 2003; Gutierrez and Baron, 2004).  
During Barco‟s Presidency, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defense and the 
Inspector General advocated for the creation of self-defense groups to counter the 
guerrilla threat, while the Ministry of Government and the Counsellor for Peace 
denounced these private armies as criminals (Romero, 2003:204; Pardo, 2007:18). 
Whereas Barco at first claimed that the debate was purely “semantic”, he later strongly 
opposed the creation of any type of private army (ICG, 2003:5-7; Pardo, 2007:18; Ávila, 
2010:106). Significantly, the debate as to whether illegal private security groups of a 
counter-insurgent nature could be considered to be politically motivated became the 
crux of the political treatment of the paramilitary leaders. Ultimately, then, the use of 
the terms “self-defenses” or “paramilitary” has profound consequences as a means of 
legitimising or de-legitimising these groups (Ljodal 2002:297). 
Romero considers the difference between the two to be whether the group is defensive 
or offensive in nature: while the former is a strategy of protection against guerrillas or 
other security threats, the latter describes groups that actively engage in military 
offensives and territorial expansion. However, he clarifies, these differences have 
become blurred as the Colombian conflict has developed (2003:37). Key to this research, 
during Uribe‟s presidency the political battle over the approval of Law 975 revolved 
around whether the military actions of the paramilitary groups and their involvement in 
drug-trafficking could be justified by the pursuit of political aims, and thereby be 
judged by transitional laws rather than criminal justice.  
I have chosen to use the term “paramilitary” here as it is the most common 
nomenclature. However, the paramilitary groups lacked any sense of military and 
political unity. It is important to take into account that various scattered armed groups 
demobilised – all with contrasting origins, aims and economic bases. These included 
local vigilante groups as well as small private armies for the protection of drug-
traffickers. Specifically, I will refer here to the Colombian United Self-Defenses 
(AUC)
19
, an organisation that tried to unify diverse groups such as private armies, gangs 
and vigilante groups under the umbrella of the paramilitary cause, and which played a 
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 Acromyn in Spanish. Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia. 
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crucial role in the negotiations with the Uribe government and the subsequent 
demobilisations.   
The creation of paramilitary groups brought about one of the most violent periods in 
Colombian history. Although the new leftist parties were highly successful against their 
more traditional counterparts in winning democratic elections, few of their elected 
candidates were ever able to exercise their mandate or even be inaugurated into office. 
Many politicians, mainly but not only those from new leftist parties, fell victim to 
selective killings by the guerrillas, the paramilitaries, the drug-traffickers and the 
national army (Romero, 2003:91; Avila, 2010:102). By the mid-1990s entire political 
parties – those formed by ex-rebels but also by civic movements – were wiped out 
through the systematic murder of their politicians, members and sympathisers. 
Remarkably, the political and social environment mentioned above contrasts sharply 
with some of the assumptions found in the literature on DDR, which tends to 
foreground the risk the demobilised may pose in a post-conflict setting: 
[DDR] aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem that results from ex-
combatants being left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their 
former comrades, during the critical transition period from conflict to peace and 
development.  
(UNDP, 2006, 2.10:4) 
Without [a reintegration programme] they will most likely return to lawlessness, 
banditry and violence.  
(Gleichmann et al, 2004:51) 
Mcmullin has argued that “the claim that ex-combatant criminality could „spiral up‟ to 
threaten security in the post-conflict state relies upon the assumption that ex-combatants 
naturally and seamlessly turn to lives of crime after conflict” (2012:13). DDR 
discourses have tended to reinforce forms of domination from international agents over 
programme beneficiaries by ignoring the historical and political context of conflicts and 
instead perpetuating stereotypes of communities and ex-combatants (Kriger, 2003:6; 
Mcmullin, 2013:23). Moreover, multilateral and international organisations reproduce 
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and perpetuate the discourses and practices embedded in international macro-economic 
policies and global politics (Ruffer, 2005:12; Bowd and Özerdem, 2013:20), and 
impose prescriptive and normative discourses that assume war to be an anomaly and 
combatants to always be deviant (Duclos; 2012:7). Conversely, alternative approaches 
that portray the ex-combatants as human resources for development and reconstruction 
have received less attention (Nübler, 1997; Özerdem, 2009:47). 
The ex-rebels who decided to demobilise during the 1990s in Colombia became the 
victims of, rather than a threat to, the security situation of the country. Furthermore, and 
despite the bloodshed, the former guerrillas contributed to producing structural changes 
that favoured democracy: updating a Constitution that was more than a hundred years 
old; breaking a bygone tradition of bi-partisan politics to include new political parties; 
and prompting the creation of institutions of control and mechanisms for citizenship 
participation and protection. Certainly, former combatants could equally help either to 
build and strengthen democracy or to threaten its security, and the reasons and 
circumstances behind one or the other may reach beyond the creation of a programme to 
deal with the ex-combatants.  
My contention is that, by emphasising the risks they pose, the design and 
implementation of DDR programmes reproduces stereotypes and misconceptions of the 
fighters. Other aspects could instead be taken into account, such as the security 
problems the demobilised face themselves, the challenges and dilemmas associated with 
their reintegration, or their own potential contribution to post-conflict society. By 
analysing the institutional learning of the Colombian reintegration institutions, and by 
listening to the personal experiences of former combatants, this thesis aims to shed new 
light on how a reintegration programme could be effective in fostering a safe 
environment both for ex-combatants and society in general.  
The central research question of this thesis, then, is how the Colombian reintegration 
programme contributed to the economic, social and political reintegration of the ex-
combatants. Adopting an approach from social constructivism, the research focuses on 
the interaction between the reintegration programme and its participants. It is assumed 
that the individuals‟ behaviours and preferences are the result of social relationships and 
roles brought about by their interaction with the institutions. The resulting analysis is 
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twofold: firstly through an historical reconstruction of how the DDR process evolved 
and how the ACR programme came into being; secondly, by investigating the personal 
experiences of the demobilised who participated in the ACR programme.  
By taking both the ACR programme and the excombatants into account, this thesis 
understands the DDR as a set of social relationships that could potentially prompt 
political and identity transformations. The design and implementation of a DDR 
programme goes beyond technical considerations, being as they are part of larger 
political and historical processes, to which the DDR officers also belong. The format by 
which the demobilisation and disarmament are negotiated greatly influences initial 
programme design, as well as how it evolves, is contested and implemented. All of this 
inevitably affects the capacity of the programme to support the ex-combatants in their 
reintegration and in their transition into law-abiding citizens. New questions must surely 
be raised over existing DDR literature and practice: such as where responsibility should 
lie for implementing the reintegration, and to what extent the relationships created 
between the demobilised and the DDR officers are meaningful, meaningless or 
conflicting.  
At the time of writing, there are currently two relevant processes underway in Colombia: 
first, peace negotiations with the FARC have reached a final agreement and the 
demobilisation of its troops is due to begin within a matter of months. Second, the DDR 
process analysed here is coming to an end: on the one hand, the former rank-and-file 
guerrillas and paramilitaries are finishing their reintegration programme and graduating 
as citizens; on the other, the situation of the paramilitary leaders has been resolved and 
(those who were extradited aside) they have started to be released from prison after 
completing the sentences imposed on them by Law 975. Hence, this analysis is of 
foremost importance given its potential contribution to designing and implementating 
future DDR strategy, to improving the reintegration of former paramiltary leaders, and 
to helping Colombian society come to terms with past DDR experience and the violence 
perpetrated by the ex-combatants.  
Research purpose and thesis outline  
DDR policies and literature have assumed that two elements are crucial to prevent the 
ex-combatants from following a certain tendency towards violence by returning to their 
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armed groups or engaging into criminal networks: first, breaking the social ties and 
hierarchies within the military factions and second, fostering the establishment of 
livelihoods out of the non-war economy. However, armed conflict may continue after 
the successful demobilisation of groups and fighters due to a variety of factors: the 
relapse into war may involve different people (Mcmullin, 2012:11); security problems 
may be due to a re-accommodation of the criminal world (Massé, 2011); and failures in 
addressing the security dilemma, i.e. the mass killing of the demobilised population, 
may result in the rearming of the demobilised (Themnér, 2011). 
Although I agree that breaking the military structure constitutes an important step 
towards the process of laying down arms, I also contend that the social and political 
environment that receives them is a fundamental factor in achieving a successful 
reintegration. This environment is not restricted to their families or their recipient 
communities, but to the creation of institutions, mechanisms and a bureaucracy that 
establish real and functional links between the former combatants and the state. 
Ultimately, ex-combatants do not reintegrate in a vacuum and their transformation into 
law-abiding citizens requires an adequate political context for doing so. 
Adopting a social constructivism perspective, this research analyses the interaction 
between individuals and institutions. More to the point, it explores whether and how the 
ACR reintegration programme contributed to the reintegration of ex-combatants in three 
different dimensions: economic (if it prepared the ex-combatants to earn livelihoods in 
non-war activities), social (favouring the break of factional ties and the creation of other 
social links) and political (whether it contributed to generate faith in the democratic 
process and their transformation into law-abiding citizens). The focus of this thesis is on 
the reintegration of low- and mid-ranking ex-paramilitaries and ex-guerrillas who were 
subject to laws 782 and 1424, and thus active participants in the ACR reintegration 
programme. Paramilitary leaders did not participate in the programme: although by 
2015 a handful have been released from jail having complied with eight-year sentences 
under law 975, the trials of most of them continue and their judicial situation remains 
uncertain.   
This thesis is organised as follows: chapter one presents an overview of four main 
debates on the design of DDR programmes – the scope of the DDR, who to target with 
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reintegration benefits, the ownership by the local government and the reintegration 
phase. This chapter shows that the role of state institutions in the transformation of 
combatants into law-abiding citizens has been largely neglected. The second chapter 
presents the methodology and data: it describes the fieldwork and the thematic analysis 
applied to the interviews and focus groups. The third chapter explains the design of the 
Colombian DDR process and how the differential security policies in dealing with the 
paramilitary and the guerrillas defined who would receive status as demobilised, and 
how. As a result, the initial DDR policy neglected the long-term reintegration of ex-
combatants or the provision of aid to the receiving communities. Chapter four describes 
the process of ownership and state-building, exploring how the implementation and 
contestation of national DDR policy by the Mayoralties of Medellín and Bogotá 
transformed the DDR, which in turn resulted in the creation of a national policy for 
reintegration and the ACR programme.  
The last three chapters present a micro-level analysis of the ex-combatants‟ personal 
experiences during their reintegration process. The fifth chapter evaluates the different 
strategies of economic reintegration, highlighting the difficulties faced by the 
demobilised in obtaining employment within the formal economy. Nonetheless, these 
challenges did not necessarily result in recidivism among the ex-combatant population. 
The sixth chapter analyses the creation of social bonds with family and community, as 
well as with the ACR reintegration officers. It shows that the reintegration phase in 
Colombia introduced the psycho-social as the organising element for the other 
dimensions and addressed the social relationships as a means to change the ex-
combatants‟ behaviours. Chapter seven presents three different scenarios for a political 
reintegration: the transformation of ex-paramilitary groups into political parties, the 
creation of grass-roots organisations and the building of a citizen identity. This analysis 
shows how the ACR programme can contribute to access to the democratic mechanisms 
and the subsequent creation of new forms of interacting with the state, which in turn 
resulted in the creation of a new identity as citizens. Finally, I conclude by summarising 
the findings and conclusions of this research and presenting some recommendations for 
the  demobilisation and reintegration of FARC troops.  
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Chapter 1  
Ex-combatants in Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration 
(DDR) Programmes: Citizens or Civilians? 
And since the State belongs to the class of compound bodies,  
as much as anything else that is a whole itself,  
but yet is composed of many factors,  
it is clear that it is the citizen who must be first discovered. 
(Aristotle, Politics III §1275) 
 
The UN has stated that “[t]he objective of the DDR process is to contribute to security 
and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin” 
(UNDP, 2006, 1.10:1). Thus, although DDR alone cannot solve the conflict or prevent 
the violence, it is a contributing factor for establishing a secure environment and 
subsequent social recovery and development (UNDP, 2006, 1.10:1). Similarly, the 
World Bank claims that “DDR programs and SSR [Security Sector Reform] share the 
objective of contributing to a countrywide [...] process toward peace and stability and to 
creating better conditions for development” (MDRP 2003:3). However, Jennings has 
argued that, in reality, this smooth continuity between security and development does 
not take place as their goals “[...] may neither coincide nor be mutually realisable” 
(2008:13).  
 
The main debates in the design of DDR programmes revolve around this 
security/development relationship. First, there is the question of the scope of the 
assistance given and whether DDR interventions should be security-oriented (traditional 
or minimalist) or development-oriented (second generation or maximalist). Secondly, 
DDR programmes need to find the balance between targeting the ex-combatants with 
reinsertion aid (combatant-based) or extending that aid to recipient communities and 
victims (community-based) to ensure better reintegration results and further 
development. Thirdly, it has been pointed out that DDR programmes impose one-size 
models made to fit an international security agenda, but lacking national ownership and 
agency in their own projects for local development. Finally, despite being the ultimate 
goal of any DDR process, insufficient attention has been paid to ex-combatant 
reintegration: most DDR programmes include some form of reinsertion assistance to 
prevent security problems caused by the ex-combatants, but long-term activities to 
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achieve a sustainable reintegration of the demobilised are not necessarily included in the 
original design, which has tended to result in the insufficient commitment of donors and 
governments to provide sustainable funding and resources.  
 
This chapter aims to show how these four debates emerge out in the design of a DDR 
programme by multilateral organisations. In the first to third sections of this chapter, the 
debates on the scope, targeting and ownership will be expanded in order to identify how 
this research on the Colombian DDR advances the current literature. In the fourth 
section emphasis is made on the reintegration phase and its various dimensions 
(economic, social and political) to claim that while the economic dimension has been 
stressed, the social and political aspects are often neglected. In the fifth section, it is 
argued that the ex-combatants are too often perceived as a security risk, based upon  
methodological individualism that stems from liberalism: it is assumed that these are 
greedy and apolitical individuals who join wars motivated purely by economic gain, and 
mistakenly seen as a deviant group entirely separate from society at large. Thereafter, 
the sixth section looks at the ways in which the design and implementation of DDR 
programmes tend to address the excombatants as civilians rather than as citizens: while 
being a civilian defines a person solely in relation to the military or armed forces, being 
a citizen does so with regard to the wider state and its democratic institutions.  
 
1.1 The scope of assistance: minimalist and maximalist approaches  
After the end of the Cold War, practitioners and policy-makers on international peace-
keeping missions started to question the effectiveness and ethics of restricting their 
activities to providing short-term and security-oriented aid (Muggah and Baaré, 
2009:227; Berdal, 1996:23). Multilateral operations have therefore progressively moved 
their focus from narrow „peace-keeping‟ to broader „peace-building‟ and „state-
building‟: although originally these missions were deployed with a mandate of 
maintaining a minimum of security in post-conflict situations by imposing military 
presence and reducing the number of armed groups that threaten the monopoly of force, 
more recently the emphasis has shifted towards broader developmental aims (Kriger, 
2003:3; Rufer, 2005:27; Muggah, 2010:1; Muggah, Berdal and Torjesen, 2009:270). 
This prioritising of development, in turn, mirrors changes in the international 
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community‟s own precepts and discourses, which have progressively moved towards 
stressing positive peace as opposed to negative peace (Özerdem, 2009:45) and focusing 
on human security rather than military security (PSD, 2009:13). 
More closely, DDR programmes move in a continuum ranging from minimalist to 
maximalist approaches (Muggah, 2010:14). On the one hand, minimalist approaches 
address the management of immediate security risks in post-conflict settings. Hence, 
emphasis is made in preventing and controlling the risk ex-combatants may pose in 
terms of their return to arms or their involvement in criminality. On the other hand, 
maximalist approaches imply long-term and more ambitious goals for reconstruction 
and development, comprising activities to stimulate the economic and social recovery of 
war-torn societies as a whole (Muggah, 2009:14-15; 2010:2; Torjesen, 2009:412-416).  
At the micro-level, the guarantee of a minimum of security conditions for the ex-
combatants constitutes a main tenet in any peace settlement: that they will not be killed 
after surrendering their weapons and that the agreements will be fulfilled to some extent. 
As such, DDR programmes address this security dilemma by providing the fighters with 
a safe environment in which to lay down their arms and return to civil life, and – by 
minimising the presence of spoilers – preventing them from exacerbating the security 
dilemma for their own benefit (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007:535). The next step 
towards security comes “[...] through a process of removing weapons from the hands of 
combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to 
integrate socially and economically into society” (UNDP, 2006, 1.10:2). In practice, this 
help takes the form of reinsertion assistance: short-term material and financial aid to 
cover the basic needs of the ex-combatants and their families and to prepare them for 
civilian life. This reinsertion assistance is designed to be temporary and transitional – 
usually lasting no more than one year – and it may include the provision of economic 
support-schemes, one-off payments, housing or food, as well as short-term education, 
vocational training and counselling for business creation or employment seeking (ibid, 
1.20:19). 
At the macro-level, development is expected to occur after certain security conditions 
have been achieved. Security Structures Reform (SSR) and Judicial Reform (JR) thus 
complement DDR through the building of efficient and accountable security forces and 
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judicial mechanisms. These reforms may include the decision to integrate previous rebel 
forces as part of the national armed forces or to reduce their size by partially 
demobilising their military, paramilitary and supporting personnel (UNDP, 2006, 2.20:4; 
MDRP, 2003:4). A further expected outcome is the reallocation of the military 
expenditure in the form of investment in social and development projects (Berdal, 
1996:5; Muggah, 2010:15).  
Minimalist approaches have been highly criticised because they have proved 
insufficient – even counterproductive – in preventing the resumption of conflict or the 
continuation of violence in other forms. It has been argued that DDR programmes tend 
to be designed as short-term technocratic interventions: restricted to achieving 
immediate security goals and insufficiently linked to other critical areas such as 
reconstruction, security sector and judicial reform, peace-building or development 
(Thruelsen, 2006; Jennings, 2008:11; Muggah, 2009:2; PDS, 2009:ii). For instance, 
Berdal (1996:23) has argued that failures in implementing, planning and funding DDR 
programmes only served to exacerbate the political tensions in Angola and Somalia. 
The subsequent turn towards a maximalist approach has highlighted the need for long-
term and multi-institutional actions to address human security, going beyond mere 
military security, and producing overarching reforms in the security, political and 
economic realms (Ottaway, 2003; Gomes, Alden and Parsons, 2007:32; PDS, 2009:13). 
As the Stockholm contribution has posited: 
Hence, beyond making a contribution to securing peace, DDR programmes have 
been considered to be capable of fundamentally transforming social relations, 
achieving reconciliation, solving structural economic imbalances or helping 
countries achieve significant developmental leaps.  
(Stockholm, 2005:10)   
Accordingly, the UN has recently updated the IDDRS guidelines by addressing „Second 
Generation‟ DDR programmes, as opposed to „traditional‟ DDR programmes 
(UNDPKO, 2010b:3). These second generation programmes have brought about three 
main shifts in DDR policy-making: first, there is yet greater stress on the importance of 
long-term development goals, rather than short-term security goals; second, 
demobilisation, disarmament and reinsertion are no longer considered to be post-
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conflict activities but may also be implemented in contexts of ongoing violence caused 
by civil unrest or criminality; and third, the sequence of DDR has become more flexible, 
facilitating the implementation of the reintegration phase in parallel or even before the 
demobilisation and disarmament phases (Muggha, 2009; Munive and Jakobsen, 
2012:363; Muggah, Berdal and Torjesen, 2009:270). 
At the international level, the emphasis on maximalist versus minimalist approaches 
may depend on the institutions in charge of the design and implementation of peace 
operations and DDR programmes. For instance, within the UN, the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) carries out security-oriented and combatant-based 
disarmament and demobilisation missions, according to its mandate of maintaining 
international security; while the Development Programme (UNDP) or Unicef tend to 
implement more development-oriented and community-based interventions, focusing on 
the reinsertion and long-term reintegration of ex-combatants (Muggah, 2009:15; 
Muggah, Molloy and Halty, 2009:215). In a similar vein, the World Bank‟s mandate 
precludes its participation in disarmament or any kind of security operations, hence its 
activities must focus on development in the demobilisation and reintegration phases 
(MDRP, 2010b:10). 
However, some authors have warned of the excessive expectations placed on DDR 
programmes, and on the real capacity of the international community to achieve social 
and economic recovery in war-torn societies. Pugel has made a call for “realism” over 
“inflation of expectations”. He argues that while DDR programmes can provide for 
short-term livelihood opportunities, long-term employment and reintegration depend 
more on a variety of elements embedded in local politics and social dynamics that go 
beyond the action of the international community (2009:90). Both the Stockholm 
Initiative (SIDDR, 2005:10) and Gleichmann et al. (2004:16) have also signalled the 
dangers of over-expectation: particularly the impact that DDR programmes may have in 
changing social relations or addressing the root causes of conflict. Given the fact that 
international aid projects tend toward the short-term and the specific, they are better 
suited to activities around demobilisation, disarmament and reinsertion, rather than the 
long-term and more ambitious actions required for reintegration.  
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At the local level, the decision between addressing security-oriented versus 
development-oriented goals may be contingent on the political environment and the 
nature of the peace settlement. In other words, the scope of DDR programmes, policies 
and activities should also be considered against the contextual reasoning behind the 
negotiations, the expectations of the warring factions, and the political arrangements 
that were negotiated throughout the DDR process. Therefore, while the international 
community requests (and expects) from war-torn states security as precondition for 
development – sovereignty and monopoly of force, as much as human security –  
national governments may have other priorities, namely, their military goals and the 
consolidation of territorial control. The result, then, is a DDR programme designed to 
follow a purely security-oriented logic. 
1.2 Targeting: community-based and combatant-based approaches 
The debate between minimalist and maximalist approaches is also linked to the question 
of targeting. Does the intervention begin and end with the ex-combatants as the primary 
recipient of reinsertion aid? Or should other groups and communities affected by the 
conflict be included as well?.  
Sending aid directly to the ex-combatants and their families is deemed to be a means of 
preventing their involvement in criminal or war-related activities. However, two   
criticisms have been made of this approach. For one, it has been argued that this 
constitutes a divisive strategy, creating resentment in the communities and perceptions 
of reward and impunity towards perpetrators (Özerdem, 2009:54; PDS, 2009:13; 
Muggah, 2010:8). Additionally, choosing certain people over others may 
unintentionally strengthen the position of the commanders by legitimising the armed 
groups and reifying the perpetrators of violence (Torjesen, 2009:415; Schulhofer-Wohl 
and Sambanis, 2012:25).  
Moreover, targeting the demobilised population with differential treatment may have 
the contrary effect of inhibiting or delaying reintegration by artificially creating 
differences between the ex-combatants and the community that do not stand up in 
reality (Gomes, Alden and Parsons, 2007:3). For instance, Karamé (2009:509) has 
argued that the geography of Lebanon and the rhythm of the war allowed soldiers to 
alternate between military and civilian lifestyles. Similarly, Muggah et al (2009:197) 
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have shown that rural soldiers in Ethiopia left their communities only for short periods 
of time. Jennings‟ research in Liberia demonstrated that the decision to join an armed 
group was seen by the soldiers as a job that co-existed alongside their domestic 
activities in their communities. Furthermore, she argues: 
The idea of ex-combatants as a specially disadvantaged group that can be 
successfully targeted with policy interventions depends on several assumptions: 
most obviously, that ex-combatants are substantively different (and worse off) 
than civilians in terms of skills, earning capacity, stigmatisation, and the level 
of hardship endured during conflict; and furthermore, that there is a clear 
difference between civilians and combatants; that combatants are organised 
into a limited number of discrete factions; and that the civilian population is a 
relatively static, skilled entity into which ex-combatants can be placed.  
(Jennings, 2008:13) 
Therefore, in areas where going to war is seen as a social norm, reintegration 
programmes may stigmatise those who would otherwise be “ordinary boys”, no more 
marginalised, no less educated or no less poor than their compatriots in their own 
communities of origin (Boas and Hatloy, 2008:52). 
In contrast, community-centred approaches take into account the role of the recipient 
communities and the socio-economic needs of the whole population in the areas where 
the combatants are to be reintegrated (Özerdem, 2012:52; Mcmullin, 2012:28). Such 
measures might include extending the benefits offered to the ex-combatants to wider 
sections of the community, or the establishment of common goods and public services 
(Muggah and Baaré, 2009:238). The World Bank recommends that the needs of both 
populations be addressed by channelling the monetary assistance to ex-combatants 
through projects that benefit the communities as well (MDRP, 2004:5). Likewise, the 
UN has stated that Second Generation DDR programmes should recognise the potential 
role that local and customary institutions have to play in the reintegration of ex-
combatants: providing them with security and alternative sources of employment 
(Muggha, 2009:276; PDS, 2009:41; UNDPKO, 2010b:3).  
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Pugel goes further in calling for a “holistic approach” that provides tangible benefits for 
the recipient community (2009:90); while Gomes, Alden and Parsons (2007:29) have 
also proposed an integrated approach that factors in the situation of all the affected 
groups. Özerdem (2012:60), too, argues that the engagement of existing community 
structures in the reintegration process has a positive impact on the development of civil 
society and on the ex-combatants‟ participation in local governance structures. Certainly, 
research has shown the importance of involving the communities in the reintegration 
process. For instance, Karamé (2009:506) has argued that successful reintegration is 
directly linked to the degree of contact the ex-combatants were able to maintain with 
their communities of origin during the war. Muggah et al (2009:197) also note, that in 
rural Ethiopia, kinship networks facilitated the return and absorption of ex-combatants 
once the conflict was over. 
However, some authors stress the distinction between community-based and 
community-located approaches: whereas the former aim to have an impact on the 
communities, but do not necessarily include them throughout the process, the later 
implies full participation of the communities in the design, implementation and 
assessment of each programme (PSD, 2009:ii,38; Özerdem, 2012:59). Furthermore, 
Kilroy calls for a “participatory approach” that includes the community in the design, 
planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of DDR programmes (2011:129). 
In practice, though, Kilroy also underlines the wide-ranging array of factors that may 
impede any sense of a truly bottom-up participatory approach: the short timeframes in 
which the DDR programmes are implemented; the dependence on donors for quick and 
measurable results and clear exit strategies; post-war violence and other security 
concerns; lack of real capacity among the multilateral agencies or the local state to 
implement the programme; lack of forward planning; divergent interests, agendas and 
cultures among international agencies; and instability and migration in the ex-combatant 
population (ibid, 2011:143). 
Mcmullin has argued that the preference for community-based over combatant-based 
approaches may also springs from the moral assumptions and internal needs of 
multilateral organisations rather than more local concerns regarding security or 
development. Obtaining funding with which to target the fighters then becomes more 
difficult: as they would be competing for donations with other vulnerable groups such 
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as the victims of violence or internal displacement. Equally, the choices of practitioners 
and policy-makers may rise out of sheer personal preference and the assumption that 
communities deserve the aid more than the ex-combatants. Consequently, Mcmullin 
argues, combatant-based approaches are too readily dismissed for sowing the seeds of 
social tensions and resentment (2013:20,174), as evidenced in the example below: 
When compared to per capita aid contributions to others in need, say internally 
displaced people or those affected by malaria and other communicable diseases, 
DDR constitutes an especially generous form of compensation. Notwithstanding 
the ethical dilemmas associated with 'rewarding' bad behaviour, investment in 
DDR was justified by outsiders as a way of securing the peace.  
(Muggah, 2009:7, emphasis mine)  
The World Bank, too, maintains this dividing line: 
The poverty challenges all of these countries face are massive, and there are 
numerous beneficiary groups that need to be included – not least of all the 
victims of the violence rather than the perpetrators of it.  
(MDRP, 2010b:85, emphasis mine) 
Of crucial importance for this research, finally, is the extent to which the benefits 
provided as part of reinsertion and reintegration  far from remaining politically neutral 
 are co-opted and exploited by local political elites as instruments to consolidate their 
own rule (Mcmullin, 2013:36). The decision to include or exclude certain groups from 
the status as demobilised and the subsequent economic and judicial benefits, must 
therefore also be understood within the (often slippery and/or tainted) context of the 
negotiation of the peace settlement and the political and security needs of the warring 
factions.  
1.3 Ownership and state-building 
The UN and the World Bank understand that national ownership is essential for the 
success and sustainability of DDR programmes. Both institutions recognise that 
building a national strategy of DDR implies the participation of political and non-
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political actors including the central government, authorities at the regional and 
municipal levels, as well as NGOs, grass-roots organisations and civil society groups. 
There has been subsequent emphasis on capacity and state-building activities such as 
training and funding for the involvement of local authorities and civil society groups 
and the supply of technical assistance to national and sub-national authorities (UNDP, 
2006, 2.10:12; 3.30:3; MDRP, 2010a:11; MDRP, 2010b:62). The UN recommends the 
creation of national institutional capacity through the creation of implementation 
partnerships within the civil society and the employment of local communities and 
authorities (UNDP, 2006, 2.10:12), as well as recognising the role of community 
leaders and civil society in the founding and functioning of new institutions (UNDP, 
2006, 3.30). For their programme in the Great Lakes Region, for example, the World 
Bank trusted the implementation of DDR programmes – and the aid that came with it –  
to the newly-formed national governments (MDRP, 2010b:45). 
However, it has been argued that DDR programmes impose one-size models made to fit 
an overarching international agenda, and therefore lacking in national ownership and 
local involvement. The agency of both communities and ex-combatants is often 
neglected as a result, and their participation is reduced to passive recipients of aid 
(Özerdem, 2009:39,212; PDS, 2009:ii). Mcmullin has also noted that the dominant 
blueprint of the IDDRS guidelines for DDR programmes, although couched in terms of 
empowerment and partnership, only reinforces the dominance of the international 
agenda as it leaves little room for the input or participation of communities or civil 
society (2013:28). In sum, although concepts such as “local capacity”, “national 
ownership” and “community empowerment” are widely used in policy-making 
literature, little has been said on how to tackle these issues in practice (Scott, 2007:11; 
DFID, 2008:9).  
Ottaway raises the point, moreover, that international initiatives in state-building and 
development are inevitably engaged in a task that is in its very essence oxymoronic: 
building democratic institutions and fostering social and economic reforms for people 
who may themselves be unwilling to embrace such policies (2003:261). Similarly, the 
World Bank has called for “accepting the risks and tradeoffs of national ownership” 
(MDRP, 2010a:45):  when the responsibility – and hence the funding – of implementing 
DDR programmes rests with national governments, other factors will most likely 
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influence their outcome. These may include the political environment, the willingness 
of public servants to carry out a DDR, the capacity of the authorities to enforce the rule 
of law, and their autonomy in taking decisions that international organisations may not 
agree with. 
In addition, while the demobilisation and disarmament phases are for the most part 
framed as a military problem, the reintegration phase is generally taken on by civilian 
institutions (Rufer, 2005:28,31; Berdal, 1996:48; Specker, 2008:3; MDRP, 2010:50). In 
practice, then, the different phases of DDR can become disconnected as the institutions 
and organisations involved do not necessarily form a unified body or pursue a coherent 
policy. More significantly, the demobilisation and disarmament phases tend to be led by 
top-down policies imposed by international bodies or national governments, taking 
precedence over smaller political communities in which the reintegration phase takes 
place. For instance, there is a tendency for multilateral organisms to use local NGOs or 
grass-roots organisations as mere sub-contractors to implement the international 
guidelines, which in reality may inhibit the potential for these groups to contest these 
policies or to mediate between local communities and DDR practitioners (PDS, 
2009:71). By way of counterpoint, community-based approaches may choose to focus 
more on keeping ownership within the recipient communities rather than on larger state-
building strategies, which may result in conflicting goals and activities (ibid:41). 
It is equally worthy of note that, in the international development literature, “local” 
usually means national, neglecting not only the dynamics that take place at a municipal 
and sub-national level, but also the role of intermediary authorities and sub-national 
administration structures in providing stability and security in post-conflict situations. 
On the contrary, local dynamics are the by-product of overlapping layers of formal and 
informal institutions and political relations that mediate between the central government 
and its citizens (Cramer, 2006:255). When analysing the problems of state formation 
and consolidation then, it is important to disaggregate the levels of the state (Davis, 
2003:29). From international relations to the sub-national level, the institutions that 
form the state operate at different speeds, within complex and cross-cutting dynamics, 
and often spurred on by fundamentally contrasting interests.  
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1.4 Reintegration: economic, social and political 
While the demobilisation and disarmament phases pursue fixed and time-limited goals, 
the reintegration phase targets a broader and longer-term social and economic recovery 
that consolidates the entire DDR process (UNDP, 2006, 2.10:5; SIDDR, 2005:25). 
Ultimately, the final analysis of DDR programmes is dependent on whether or not there 
is a successful reintegration of ex-combatants in the community: 
Sustainable social and economic reintegration of former combatants is the 
ultimate objective of DDR. Failure to reintegrate ex-combatants will undermine 
the achievements of the disarmament and demobilisation phase, placing the DDR 
programme at risk and causing increasing instability.  
(UNDP, 2006, 4.30:3) 
The evidence expected of a successful reintegration is twofold: firstly, loyalty towards 
comrades-in-arms and commanders within the military structure must be re-directed 
towards a nation-state and the rule of law. Secondly, the economic incentives that the 
ex-combatants received during the war must be replaced by new skills and capacity to 
generate income in civilian jobs and non-war related activities:  
DDR programmes should support the process of turning combatants into 
productive citizens. This process starts in the demobilisation phase, during which 
the structures of armed forces and groups are broken down and combatants 
formally acquire civilian status.  
(UNDP, 2006:2.10,4)  
However, in practice the reintegration phase is often neglected and underfinanced 
during DDR programme design (Specker, 2008:v; PDS, 2009:ii). When it is considered 
at all, there is a tendency to over-emphasise the economic elements, while the social and 
political receive less attention (Muggah, Berdal and Torjesen, 2009:279). Furthermore, 
these three dimensions tend to be considered in isolation, as discrete rather than as 
deeply entangled parts of the whole (Özerdem, 2012:53, 66). Scholars and policy-
makers have often forgotten that the economic, the social and the political form part of a 
complex, interwoven reality and that their separation is only workable for purely 
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analytical purposes. In the following sub-sections I aim to further evidence and draw 
out the inter-relation between these three dimensions: 
Economic Reintegration 
The priority given to the economic dimension has two root causes: on the one hand, 
economic recovery and the creation of employment opportunities are the central 
challenges in post-conflict societies; on the other, addressing the personal economic 
situation of ex-combatants is forwarded as a preventive measure to avoid recurring 
security problems: 
At the end of a conflict there is often an abrupt release into the labour market of 
thousands of ex-combatants who compete with ordinary civilians for extremely 
scarce jobs and livelihood opportunities. In such circumstances, ex-combatants 
might attempt to use violence to make a living, becoming involved in banditry, 
theft and other forms of illegal and harmful activity.  
(UNDP, 2006, 4.30:27, emphasis mine) 
What is virtually guaranteed is that unless ex-combatants have a real opportunity 
to acquire functional skills or resume or recreate sustainable livelihoods, they 
will not return to normal civilian life.  
(Stockholm, 2005:24, emphasis mine) 
The World Bank has claimed that failed reintegration may result in a general context of 
insecurity: as ex-combatants may resort to “rent-seeking behaviour through the barrel of 
a gun” (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996:18). Likewise, using several examples 
of looting and profiting by armed groups in illegal economies in Africa, Berdal has 
argued that weapons always have economic and security value for those who possess 
them: “with limited employment opportunities and few marketable skills among 
soldiers, this in itself is a disincentive to lay down arms” (1996:17). Spear also states 
that providing legitimate economic opportunities to the ex-combatants is essential “to 
wean away from the war economy those who saw it as the only means to survive” 
(2006:168). Finally, Specker upholds the following two factors as crucial to a successful 
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reintegration: the trust of the ex-combatants in the process and the presence of economic 
alternatives (2008:1).  
Certainly, former fighters can face significant disadvantages in finding civilian 
employment. Firstly, the ex-combatants often lack the education and working skills 
required to perform jobs outside of military action. Secondly, there is widespread 
rejection of ex-combatants in places of work as potential employers fear and 
discriminate them on the basis of their military background. Thirdly, poor macro-
economic conditions and the low socio-economic capacity of the society to provide jobs 
for the general population constitute a very common setting in post-conflict societies 
(BICC, 2003:31; Gomes, Alden and Parsons, 2007:115; PSD, 2009:13; Muggah et al., 
2009:197). To address these issues, DDR programmes develop economic reintegration 
activities that tend to take the form of schemes of temporary monetary assistance, 
vocational training, and support for the creation of employment opportunities and 
micro-businesses. 
However, much criticism has been made of this tendency of DDR policies to prioritise  
economic reintegration, and the underlying assumption that social and political 
reintegration will result automatically from a successful strategy of promoting income 
generation and employment (Gomes, Alden and Parsons, 2007; Bhatia and Muggah; 
2009:126; Munive and Jakobsen; 2012:373; Baas, 2012:177; Özerdem, 2012:52; Bowd 
and Özerdem, 2013:20): 
A major working hypothesis of the literature on reintegration of ex-combatants 
is that reintegration depends on the successful establishment of economic 
livelihoods. This operates on two levels: firstly because sustainable economic 
livelihoods are seen as a crucial and free-standing element of reintegration, 
and secondly because economic independence is seen as supporting other 
elements of social and political reintegration.  
(Gomes, Alden and Parsons, 2007:115) 
Historically, this emphasis on economic reintegration stems from theories that have 
highlighted the primacy of economic factors as causes of political violence. On the 
contrary, research has since shown how these theories overstate the economic 
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motivations: greediness, unemployment or poverty have proved insufficient in 
explaining the origin and continuation of civil strife or the recruitment into armed 
groups (Cramer, 2006:124-135; Mcmullin, 2012:13; Baas, 2012:204). Furthermore, in 
Colombia, the decision to join the guerrillas is more likely to worsen the economic 
prospects of the combatants than to improve their opportunities of obtaining income 
through salary or looting (Gutierrez Sanin, 2003, 2008). In Liberia, too, research has 
also challenged the salience of economic reintegration: Boas and Hatloy (2008) found 
that unemployment and idleness have been overemphasised as reasons to join an armed 
group. Rather, it was the combatants´ concerns for their own safety and that of their 
families that initially led young people to war:  
Thus, our data suggest that the effects of „idleness‟ and „unemployment‟ are 
overstated with regard to people joining armed groups, and thereby also 
the effect on societal security of combating „idleness‟ and „unemployment‟ 
through the [DDR] programme. Thus, the question that begs to be asked in 
the Liberian case is, if idleness does not seem to have been behind the first 
decision to pick up the gun, then why should post-conflict policy-makers 
assume that idleness would be behind security problems after the war?  
(Boas and Hatloy, 2008:49)  
More broadly, too, the debate remains open as to how to effectively assess a successful 
economic reintegration: while some practitioners and scholars argue that DDR should 
aim to equalise the economic conditions of the ex-combatants with that of the rest of the 
population, others say that doing so only serves to position them in the same 
marginalised conditions that ignited war in the first place (Alden, 2002:342; Rufer, 
2005:76; Gomes, Alden and Parsons, 2007:49; PDS, 2009:13; MDRP, 2010a:2; 
Mcmullin, 2013:19).  
Ultimately, it is precisely in the creation of employment for ex-combatants and 
economic recovery for the communities involved that DDR programmes have hitherto 
shown little success. Even in countries where DDR programmes adopted maximalist 
approaches and were heralded as successful by the international community, 
unemployment among ex-combatants remained high amid widespread poverty and 
inequality, as witnessed in Namibia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia 
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and Kosovo (Alden, 2002:6; BICC, 2003:31; Mitton, 2008; Mcmullin, 2013; Özerdem, 
2008). And in the example of Ethiopia the income of ex-combatants was found to be 
lower than pre-war levels (Muggah et al. 2009:197).  
Gomes, Alden and Parsons have pointed to the international community‟s apparent 
overlooking of the fact that DDR programmes may only achieve “reintegration into 
poverty” (2007:140). Certainly, the capacity of the ex-combatants to provide a 
livelihood for themselves and their families could be taken as a key indicator of a 
successful reintegration to the civil life as well as of a general economic recovery. 
However, the assumption that there is such continuity between political violence and 
criminality is a flawed one, even more so when considering how the economic 
motivations fall short by way of explanation. The real weight of economic incentives in 
the decision to leave an armed group and remain attached to the reintegration process 
requires a more nuanced assessment. 
Social Reintegration 
Alternatively, social reintegration could be emphasised as the crux around which the 
other economic and political dimensions of reintegration can be articulated. The 
Cartagena Contribution has stated that:  
Ultimately, social reintegration is the foundation of all other forms of 
reintegration (economic and political). If it is mishandled or fails, all other forms 
of reintegration will be endangered as state legitimacy, civic trust, and social 
cohesion will be undermined. 
(Cartagena Contribution, 2009:45)  
Özerdem (2012:53, 60) has also argued that social reintegration, with a high level of 
both ex-combatant and community participation, helps in creating those new roles, 
social ties and social capital that are central to the development of a citizen identity. 
Social reintegration, in turn, embraces three main areas of intervention: the role of 
family and community; sustainable employment (social capital support, dealing with the 
employers and economic conditions of the receiving society); and civic responsibilities 
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(participation in political life and decision-making process, as well as civil society 
activities). 
The UN makes its own assumption that by breaking the social networks created by the 
military life – between combatants as peers as well as with their leaders – there will be a 
transfer of loyalties from the warlords to the democratic system and the rule of law 
(UNDP, 2006, 6.10:9). Subsequently, the demobilisation and reintegration of troops is 
portrayed as a means of reducing the risk of relapse into conflict, based on the belief 
that fragmenting the armed structures hinders any return to armed contestation 
(Humphreys and Weinstein, 2009:49). Munive and Jakobsen (2012:369) have also 
warned of the risks of reproducing patron-client structures that characterise the 
relationships between commanders and their troops in wartime if these structures are 
not first broken down. Similarly, it has been argued that the lack or failure of 
reintegration programmes may leave ex-combatants prone to manipulation by their 
commanders as they try to maintain influence and authority (PSD, 2009:39).  
However, studies in Sierra Leone have concluded that breaking up the hierarchies of 
command and merely sending ex-combatants back to their communities of origin is not 
sufficient to achieving successful reintegration (Vries and Wiegink, 2011:38). 
Humphreys and Weinstein (2007:533) found no association between dismantling social 
ties with the armed group and an improved likelihood of finding employment or 
acceptance by the communities. On the contrary, supporting networks that originated 
within the military structures may in fact have helped the reintegration of ex-combatants 
into civil life (Vries and Wiegink, 2011:47; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007:532-534). 
Giustozzi (2008:174) has argued that breaking the social links among ex-combatants did 
not prevent their absorption by systems of patronage in Afghanistan. Rather, their 
economic situation was directly dependent on their capacity to take part in these social 
networks. Similarly, in Northern Ireland, IRA combatants released from jail received 
support not from the government but from NGOs created by former fellow fighters 
(McEvoy and Shirlow, 2009:34; Rolston, 2007:271). Therefore, the temporary 
maintenance of precedent military structures may facilitate and allow time for the 
transition between military and civil life (Stockholm, 2005:25). And these forms of 
social fabric among ex-combatants take on particular relevance in cases where the 
reintegration phase has been poorly conceived or not included in the original DDR 
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programme design, as well in those cases where the community of origin has been 
destroyed or returning to it is not a desirable option. 
Mcmullin (2012:29) has pointed out that ex-combatants are portrayed by the 
international community and in the DDR literature as a threat, and at the same time as 
the subject of resentment from the community. Both narratives thus present former 
fighters as a group wholly separate from the community and bestow on them sole 
responsibility for the conflict. As mentioned above, the combatants are not necessarily 
a deviant group from the wider communities, yet the debates around who to target with 
reintegration aid nevertheless tend to rest responsibility for reintegration with either the 
ex-combatants or the communities.  
In sum, the literature on DDR has prioritised the dismantling of military links, without 
taking into account how to replace the layers of social and political organisation that are 
also destroyed. It is also important to consider the extent to which the communities are 
also closely tied into the dynamics of war and the recruitment of their members as part 
of the armed group. More to the point, ultimate responsibility for carrying out DDR 
processes – as well as maintaining peace, security and development for their own 
population – rests with the state and whether or not it is able to create a direct and 
democratic relationship with the ex-combatants and the communities they come from. 
Therefore, although the DDR literature has addressed the creation of social fabric 
between the ex-combatants and the recipient communities, other important factors 
remain largely neglected: namely the creation of social and political links with the state 
and its institutions as a means to replace the old models of military fellowship.  
Political Reintegration 
Although international peace-building missions and other military interventions justify 
their actions in terms of building democratic institutions and establishing free elections, 
the political dimension has been largely ignored by DDR programmes (Gomes, Alden 
and Parsons, 2007:100; Guáqueta, 2009:12; Söderström, 2011:38; Duclos, 2012:8). In 
fact, in policy-making documents by the UN and the World Bank – including the 
IDDRS – political reintegration is barely mentioned, and much-needed guidelines on 
specific actions to be taken are noticeably by their absence. 
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Guáqueta (2009:34) claims that political reintegration forges the link between DDR 
processes and transitional justice on two levels: the transformation of rebel forces into 
legitimate political power-brokers and the transformation of combatants into law-
abiding citizens. However, in the previous section I have shown how the DDR literature 
emphasises the breaking of factional ties as a prerequisite of successful reintegration. It 
could instead be argued that the fragmentation of the military and social structures 
within warring factions in fact inhibits the transition of the armed group into a formal 
political party, which in turn prevents the creation of any real political opposition to the 
government in charge. As a result, the ex-combatants are left to make the move from the 
military to the civil life as individuals rather than as a group. 
Political reintegration also embraces civic responsibilities and other political aspects 
such as: how justice is meted out for crimes committed during the war, how to establish 
a new system of law and order, and how ex-combatants can access those decision-
making mechanisms available to other citizens (Özerdem, 2012:67). Moreover, 
although reforms in governance are not prioritised by DDR programmes or peace-
building strategies, a successful political reintegration can only be achieved once the 
political system has been reformed further towards democracy (PDS, 2009:34). The 
political reintegration of individuals is thus inevitably linked to wider issues of security 
and state-building:  
Some of the measures that support the political reintegration of ex-combatants 
include reforming security forces, developing and strengthening political 
institutions, government capacities and civil society, as well as enhancing human 
rights and introducing reconciliation mechanisms.  
(Gleichmann et al, 2004: 68)  
The UN has claimed that the DDR process should create a social contract based on 
participation and democratic principles (UNDP, 2006, 2.10:6). Other authors have also 
argued that demobilising and disarming the combatants should be understood in terms 
of them entering into a social contract with the state and the government (Knight and 
Özerdem, 2004:506; Özerdem, 2009:50; Duclos, 2012:8; Kilroy, 2011:143; Mcmullin, 
2013:35). This notion of DDR as social contract goes beyond the implementation of 
free elections or mere voting rights: it implies a broader notion of governance, 
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specifically the extent to which the new economic and social order is perceived to be 
fairer and more acceptable when compared to its pre-war equivalent (Gomes, Alden and 
Parsons, 2007:154; Kilroy, 2011:143; Duclos, 2012:8). Rousseau‟s theory of Social 
Contract refers to a mutually binding relationship among equals with two key 
implications: the delegation of the creation and enforcement of the law, and the 
emergence of a common identity that relies on self-control. Citizens do not renounce 
their rights of freedom and social order but instead choose to delegate the use of force to 
an authority in order to protect and preserve these rights. In turn, this implies the 
creation of a political subjectivity that accepts and supports that authority as legitimate, 
prompting subsequent changes in individual behaviours (Rousseau, 1923; Magnette, 
2005). That political subjectivity takes form as a citizen identity, defined in relation to 
everyday practices and functional links in regard to state institutions.  
Furthermore, Söderström has argued that even if the political needs of the ex-combatant 
population are largely ignored, the political dimension in DDR programmes still exists. 
Even if DDR programmes do not explicitly include actions for political reintegration, 
they could nonetheless contribute either to the positive uptake of democratic behaviours 
or, on the contrary, to the undermining of trust in democracy (Söderström, 2011:327). 
Arguably, DDR programmes have assumed that the economic and social reintegration 
of ex-combatants as civilians (i.e. in their economic and social capacities) is enough to 
bring security and stability to post-conflict societies, while the fostering of links with 
the state and the transformation of ex-combatants into political subjects – into citizens – 
has been hereto neglected. 
1.5 Ex-combatants as a security risk  
Mcmullin (2012:18) has alluded to several flaws in the DDR policies: firstly, these 
policies tend to overstate the scale and scope of the threat posed by ex-combatants to the 
state or to the local community. Secondly, the ex-combatants are described in 
deterministic terms as security threats, ignoring other sources of insecurity such as 
national armies, political elites or the wealthier classes. Thirdly, reintegration from this 
perspective aims to achieve a negative peace, brushing aside any sense of social struggle 
to overcome inequality or poverty. Fourthly, the potential for the ex-combatants 
52 
 
themselves becoming agents of reconciliation and reconstruction has been greately 
reduced.  
In a similar vein, Guáqueta (2009:12) has argued that emphasising economic factors in 
the analysis of armed conflict has “portrayed fighters as greedy individuals who do not 
have a legitimate political cause and, therefore, can or should not be politically 
reintegrated”. Similarly, Gomes, Alden and Parsons claim that theories on DDR 
characterise the combatants as mere “potential spoiler[s] resorting to violence, criminal 
activity and predatory behaviour” (2007:27). Vries and Wiegink (2011:38) also note 
that combatants are imagined as ticking-time bombs and that it is too easily assumed 
that unsuccessfully reintegrated combatants will automatically pose a threat to peace. 
Finally, Özerdem signals (2008:45) the stereotyping of ex-combatants as security risks 
on two levels: at the micro-level, it is assumed that lack of employment, together with 
the military skills acquired in the armed groups, increases the propensity of ex-
combatants to get involved in criminality. At the macro-level, these same unhappy 
former fighters are thought to harbour the potential to destabilise the state and the 
government by creating civil unrest and re-igniting the conflict.  
The following excerpts from policy documents would appear to confirm this perceived 
labelling of ex-combatants as usual suspects. For the UN: 
The return of ex-combatants can also worsen the real or perceived vulnerability 
of local populations. Ex-combatants may be seen as a „lost generation‟, having 
been deprived of education, employment and training during the conflict period. 
Often they are left traumatised by war and can only understand the world from a 
military perspective. Their lack of civilian skills or assets, combined with their 
habit of relying on violence to get what they want, may result in their becoming 
involved in predatory behaviour against communities, such as banditry and theft; 
or they may turn once more to organised armed violence in a group.  
(UNDP, 2006, 4.30:3; emphasis mine) 
Similarly, the World Bank justifies its combatant-based approach thus: 
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There are several reasons that underlie the MDRP strategy of providing direct 
support for the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-soldiers and guerrillas. 
First, failed reintegration of ex-combatants could jeopardise the peace-building 
process. Indeed, long-term costs for the entire society could be considerable if ex-
combatants are not able to establish new livelihoods and reintegrate in 
communities. Their inability to do so could contribute to new violent political 
opposition or lead to an increase in banditry and insecurity that could inhibit 
recovery and development efforts  
(MDRP, 2004:1, emphasis mine) 
Such discourse only served to reinforce the stigmatisation of ex-soldiers as a source of 
violence: propagating a sense that ex-combatants will slide back into violence as a 
natural recourse or as a direct result of their unsatisfied claims. Conversely, research has 
shown that many ex-combatants are unwilling to go back to war out of a sense of 
fatigue and scepticism over the efficacy of violence (Fithen and Richards, 2005:135; 
Thruelsen, 2006:15; Pugel, 2009:88). It should be remembered that the relapse into 
violence may involve different people (Mcmullin, 2012:11), or that the decrease in 
security is not necessarily caused by the ex-combatants themselves, but by other factors 
such as the weakening of the controls that the illegal armed groups have on petty crime 
(Massé, 2011).  
In their seminal study, Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer found no increase in 
criminality in the aftermath of DDR processes in Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda and 
that crimes attributed to ex-combatants were “infrequent” and “negligible” (1996:63). 
Furthermore, in all three countries the ex-combatants entered the poorest echelons of 
society and received incomes far lower than the national average. Despite their 
circumstances, however, it was noted that “most ex-combatants are disciplined” and 
“only some 10 percent are considered undisciplined, troublemakers, drug-abusers or 
thieves” (1996:55). Likewise, Pugel‟s (2009:88) study in Liberia concluded that those 
ex-combatants from the poorest, least-educated and most agricultural backgrounds were 
successful in reintegrating, despite being more economically disadvantaged than other 
former combatants.  
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Certainly, the possibility remains of the ex-combatants re-mobilising into armed groups 
or criminality, but rather than purely economic factors, there are other elements that 
should be taken into consideration.These include the re-marginalisation of ex-
combatants, especially in the political arena; the presence of mid-level spoilers who 
assemble new armed factions; and the creation of coalitions between the former and the 
latter (Themner, 2011:7). Moreover, renewed emphasis on the security risk posed by the 
ex-combatants may also justify certain political manoeuvres. Buzan, Waever and Wilde 
have argued that “the invocation of security has been the key to legitimising the use of 
force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilise, or to take 
special powers, to handle existential threats” (1998:21). Foucault and Arendt, too, warn 
of the priority given to national security to justify the restriction of citizenship rights, 
which certain power elites manipulate in order to maintain their privileges and avoid 
their own accountability (Rojas, 2009:230).  
Nübler (1997) and Özerdem (2009:47) have proposed an alternative approach by which 
the ex-combatants are treated as human resources, with an enormous potential to 
contribute to development as members of the working force or in generating economic 
activities. At this point, the question of “reintegration into what?” gains crucial 
importance (Jennings 2007:214; Vries and Wiegink, 2011:44). DDR programmes may 
also tend to become endeavours that avoid tackling the more structural issues of land 
reform, inequality and access to political participation (Mcmullin, 2013:242). By 
reducing the ex-combatants to the singular status of security threat in post-conflict 
settings, the power arrangements and institutional designs that perpetuate conflict are 
left to fail by the wayside. Subsequently, DDR literature continues to overlook the ways 
in which a successful reintegration of ex-combatants may depend more on the social, 
political and economic conditions they are placed back into, and certainly more so than 
any notion of personal preferences or ambitions.  
1.6 Ex-combatants: citizens or civilians? 
Despite their vastly differing meanings and origins, in DDR literature the words citizen 
and civilian are often used synonymously. However, „civilian‟ is a classification that 
refers specifically to non-military people, while „citizen‟ defines a person‟s political 
agency in relation to the state. On the one hand, of course, a citizen can also be a soldier. 
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Moreover, being a citizen implies some degree of willingness to participate in the 
defence of the political body: the Athenian polis, the Roman Empire, the medieval city 
or many modern nations base their security on the military draft of citizens. On the 
other hand, a civilian is not necessarily a citizen: as in cases where individuals or indeed 
communities lack citizenship within a given state.  
Mcmullin has noted that the literature on DDR does not bestow on the ex-combatants 
the title of veterans: while former fighters in developed countries are reified as heroes 
and freedom-fighters, having a crucial role in the defence or construction of the nation-
state, combatants from the so-called „new wars‟ are portrayed as angry, irrational and 
violent, with a natural tendency towards banditry and mercenarism (Mcmullin, 2013:22). 
In addition, the category of „civilian‟ is established by outsiders and ignores the fact that 
a person may become a combatant or a civilian at different places or times (Cramer, 
2006:77; Mitton, 2012:105). Arguably, by excluding the ex-combatants from the 
category of veterans, but including them in that of civilians, the DDR literature 
overlooks the political conditions needed for their reintegration, namely, the creation of 
democratic institutions that are both accessible and relatable.  
Although the DDR literature pays heed to the idea of the social contract, modern 
citizenship is also entrenched in the doctrine of liberalism and its methodological 
individualism: while the social contract implies a mutually binding relationship among 
equals, liberalism promotes the notion that social relations follow mainly economic 
laws. Every single person is thus provided with individual and inalienable rights, 
regardless of his or her belonging to a political community. As a result, it has been 
assumed that a citizen should be understood as a subject with individual rights, 
embedded in social and economic relations, but apolitical and guided solely by his or 
her own selfish desires (Magnette, 2005; Turner, 2000:ix; Foucault, 2009:39). Mouffe 
(1992:4; 2005), for example, believes that the modern understanding of citizenship has 
been reduced to a purely legal status: 
The failure of current democracy theory to tackle the question on citizenship is 
the consequence of their operating with a conception of the subject which sees 
individuals as prior to society, bearers of natural rights, and either maximising 
agents or rational subjects. In all cases they are abstracted from social and 
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power relations, language, culture and the whole set of practices that make 
agency possible.  
(Mouffe, 2005:95) 
The UN has itself recognised this interplay between society and individuals: 
“Individual demobilisation mirrors the wider demobilisation of a society emerging 
from conflict, and is an important symbolic phase in the consolidation of peace” 
(UNDP, 2006, 4.20:2). As Tilly (2003:60) has pointed out, a relational definition of 
democracy highlights the interaction between citizens and their governments and 
brings with it questions around the bargaining process that establishes mutual rights 
and obligations. He further argues that citizenship may refer to a category, a tie, a 
role or an identity, or a mix of any or all of the above. For theoretical purposes, he 
restricts his definition of citizenship to a type of tie, using it as a starting point from 
which the other dimensions may also be understood, specifically as: 
A continuing series of transactions between persons and agents of a given state in 
which each has enforceable rights and obligations uniquely by virtue of (1) the 
person's membership in an exclusive category, the native-born plus the 
naturalised and (2) the agent's relation to the state rather than any other 
authority the agent may enjoy.  
(Tilly, 1996:8) 
While for Turner: 
Citizenship may be defined as that set of practices (juridical, political, economic 
and cultural) which define a person as a competent member of society, and which 
as a consequence shape the flow of resources to persons and social groups.  
(Turner, 2000:ix)  
„Citizen‟, then, is a category that establishes the boundaries between insiders and 
outsiders in a given political community. Its grounding in the interplay between duties 
and obligations transcends the acquisition of legal rights and thus lies at the heart of the 
problem of how an individual or group is incorporated into a certain society (Shafir, 
1998). Ultimately, the concept of citizenship varies depending on the specific social 
systems and conditions for governability, and how different societies throughout history 
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have negotiated the distinction between an inhabitant of a certain territory and a 
member of the political body. 
It is also worthy of note that, being a citizen in a certain political group implies a civic 
spirit or a type of morality that fosters loyalties not towards a sovereign or a territory 
but to democracy as a social and political order. In turn, existing within that political 
order requires the citizen to develop certain behaviours and to display a certain level of 
self-control. Berdal (1996:45) initially introduced this concept of civilianisation, but he 
fails to develop it any further. Duclos interprets it as follows: 
Thus it [reintegration] is a matter of encouraging new loyalties to state 
institutions and in that way cementing the legitimacy of the newly (re)born state. 
Putting in place a dynamic of „civilianisation‟ which can be understood as a 
definitive return to civilian life, combined with a change of identity that leads the 
ex-combatant to abandon the military reference and prefer a civil identity, is 
generally considered an essential step in the normalisation of political life.  
(Duclos, 2012:3) 
Özerdem (2009:52), too, has argued that the transformation of combatants into civilians 
implies a process of socialisation in which the combatants internalise the norms of civil 
society. Certainly, Rousseau appreciated that the social contract needs to be constantly 
reinforced through education: natural instincts must be suppressed and replaced with 
morality for the sake of the common good (Magnette, 2005:89; Heater, 2000:71). Hence, 
participation in democracy implies the development of specific cognitive, affective and 
behavioural skills (Almond and Verba, 1989:15; IEA, 2010).  
As mentioned above, the theory on DDR is also tied closely to the process of state-
building. From a social constructivist approach, the establishment of democratic states 
is inevitably interlinked with the production of individuals with a political identity as 
citizens. The process of renouncing the use of force finds its counterpart in the creation 
of institutions and democratic mechanisms, first to replace the old military order and 
then to transform those social structures that sparked the conflict in the first place. 
Therefore, rather than imposing the responsibility for reintegration on the ex-
combatants or the communities, there is a case to be made that changes in the 
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overarching political order will be mirrored in changes in the behaviour and identity of 
the combatants, as well as their attitude to embracing the rule of law. Otherwise, in the 
absence or failure of democratic institutions, both ex-combatants and communities are 
left with little option but to establish social, political and economic relationships with 
any group that has forcibly claimed control over the place they live in. Citizens cannot 
be created in a political vacuum. Multilateral organisations or foreign governments may 
play a role in breaking apart the military factions and in transforming fighters into 
civilians, but their transition into law- abiding citizens ultimately depends on their 
ability to forge structurally sound relationships with the state and its national and local 
authorities.   
1.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has summarised four important debates that rise out of the DDR literature 
and that address the dilemmas central to DDR programme design. These debates have 
been framed by the assumption that security must underpin the conditions for all future 
development in post-conflict societies. However, critics have shown how, in reality, this 
smooth continuity between security and development does not take place as both could 
be driven by divergent and conflicting goals. Furthermore, the decisions that shape 
DDR policy and programmes may respond to the dynamics of local politics, which may 
contrast greatly with the original objectives and preferences of the multilateral 
organisations involved. 
The first debate refers to the scope of the assistance: policy-making and practice on 
DDR have progressively moved from security-oriented towards development-oriented 
approaches that will also bring broader benefits for the communities. It follows that the 
second debate refers to the population that should be targeted as recipient of 
reintegration aid: whether DDR programmes should focus on ex-combatants and their 
families or extended to also cover the needs of communities and victims of violence. As 
will be explained in the third chapter, contrary to the pattern established by multilateral 
organisations, the Colombian DDR originated from a security policy that spurned both 
the development goals and the needs of the community. Thus, DDR policy in Colombia 
was driven by the security and political needs of a national government that prioritised 
its military aims and the consolidation of territorial control. By consequence, decision 
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over who should receive status as demobilised and its benefits also responded to the 
security needs and political aims of the warring factions, disregarding further long-term 
reintegration aid to the former combatants or the community at large.  
The third debate relates to the ownership and process of state-building. The question 
remains as to how national governments, local authorities and organisations can assume 
a role in the design and implementation of DDR programmes. Although multilateral 
organisations have the common practice of sub-contracting grass-roots organisations or 
NGOs to implement their guidelines, this in fact may undermine their capacity to 
effectively mediate and critique the DDR policy. In turn, there may be a detrimental 
effect on the capacity of the state to adequately address the needs of the communities. 
Inevitably, then, programme ownership is contingent on the internal political dynamics 
at the national and sub-national levels. As chapter four will illustrate, an oft-overlooked 
element in the design of DDR programmes is the role of municipal authorities, which in 
fact must face up to and deal with the long-term consequences of reintegration by 
providing them with sustainable sources of income and by fostering social inclusion. In 
the case of Colombia I aim to analyse the extent to which the ACR reintegration 
programme resulted from tensions between the national government and the municipal 
authorities of the two most important cities in the country, which shaped the 
reintegration programme into an exercise in bottom-up state-building. 
It is also important to bear in mind that DDR programmes do not necessarily proceed 
according to their original design. The scope of the assistance and the people to be 
targeted may evolve from one approach to another as a consequence of changes from a 
range of factors including the political context, the peace settlement arrangements, the 
possibilities or restrictions established by the international donors, the nature of the 
DDR institutions, the global strategic interest, or the levels of available funding. In 
Colombia, the initial security-oriented DDR aims and design shifted over time towards 
more developmental aims, including actions to benefit the wider community.  
Finally, the fourth debate revolves around the reintegration phase. Although the ultimate 
goal of DDR programmes is ex-combatant reintegration, this phase is often neglected 
and underfinanced. The three dimensions of reintegration need to be analysed in how 
they articulate to one another: the social dimension especially may triangulate the other 
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economic and political dimensions. However, there is a tendency to emphasise the 
economic dimension due to the latent belief that economic incentives are the principal 
drivers for recruitment into armed groups and that ambition lies at the root of political 
conflict. The true power of economic incentives in the decision to leave an armed group 
and pursue successful reintegration will be analysed in the fifth chapter.  
Alternatively, the social dimension could be stressed as playing a more important role in 
reintegration success. The sixth chapter will show, that beyond dismantling loyalties 
and social links among the members of the armed groups, greater emphasis should be 
placed on the creation of social fabric, in the first instance between the ex-combatants 
and the communities, and yet more significantly between both parties and their 
respective civilian and democratic authorities. Finally, although political reintegration 
has been largely disregarded in policy-making documents, DDR programmes have the 
potential to engender trust in the democratic process, as well as the transformation of 
ex-combatants into law-abiding citizens. The seventh chapter will illustrate that, 
although reintegration does not necessarily mean that rank-on-file combatants want to 
involve themselves in politics, nevertheless it does represent a process of socialisation 
that ends in their new political identity as citizens. 
The assumption that all ex-combatants present a security risk remains deeply entrenched 
in DDR policy-making and its associated literature. This outlook, indeed, only 
reinforces the stigmatisation of ex-soldiers as a source of violence. However, in reality 
many ex-combatants are unwilling to go back to war or their armed groups, while the 
structures that perpetuate war and conflict may remain without their participation. The 
successful reintegration of ex-combatants, therefore, may depend more on the social, 
political and economic contexts into which they return, rather than their personal 
preferences or ambitions. Certainly, the theory on DDR has addressed the problem of 
state-building, but more attention should be paid to those problems the ex-combatants 
face when trying to build an identity as citizens, namely their access and use of 
democratic institutions. Ultimately, DDR processes change the nature of the political 
relationship between the state and the ex-combatants: the latter accept the surrender of 
their power, while the former includes them in the decision-making process and 
provides them with three important keys to unlocking citizenship: security, participation 
and democracy.  
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Chapter 2  
Methodology and Data 
2.1 Methodological Approach 
  
Cramer has argued that following the end of the Cold War, neo-classical economic 
theories started to dominate the study of war and conflict, areas that were previously 
associated only with other fields of knowledge. Although the neo-classical analysis has 
provided some important insights, its inherent methodological individualism has also 
produced a number of significant flaws and shortcomings in the understanding of war 
and conflict: including the assumption that individual behaviours are motivated purely 
by economic incentives, leaving behind the necessary analysis of other social and 
political elements (Cramer, 2002:1846). Social constructivism, on the other hand, gives 
a new perspective on the reintegration of ex-combatants into post-conflict societies: the 
process of learning identities and cognitive functions is, ultimately, a process of 
integrating individuals into the community (Mead, 1977; Vygotsky, 1978). In essence, 
individuals form part of a social whole in which the institutions function as social 
systems of control that prescribe “the habits of individuals in their interrelation with 
each other” (Mead, 1977:25). Martin-Baró (1983:24) contends that individual 
behaviours – including those considered violent and deviant – should be analysed as 
socially constructed in a process of mutual interaction between individuals and their 
political and social environment. Hence, he argues that damaging behaviours, attitudes 
or preferences have more to do with broken, damaged or unequal social relationships, 
rather than abnormalities within people‟s minds (Martin-Baró,1990:27). 
 
Nussio has pointed out that the literature on DDR tends to speak from the viewpoint of 
public policy. He catalogues four different approaches to the existing research. Firstly, 
the majority of studies revolve around the analysis of public policy on DDR and its 
function in peace-making. Secondly, there has been some research on public policy 
based on the experiences of the ex-combatants themselves. Thirdly, there are studies 
that look at public policy in relation to its political, social and economic contexts. 
Finally, a small number of studies have taken the personal experiences of the 
demobilised as their central focus, without the overriding frame of public policy. Nussio 
himself adopts this latter approach, arguing that the individual‟s behaviour is ultimately 
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the basic unit of social life (2012:22-23). Although I would agree that there is a need to 
include the ex-combatants‟ voice as part of the research and policy-making on DDR, an 
approach based solely on the individual‟s perspective runs the risk of reproducing those 
same limitations of methodological individualism that underpin the prevailing liberal 
and neo-classical economic theories. Thus, while this thesis gives voice to the ex-
combatants, it is located in the second category described by Nussio: in its focal 
analysis of the articulation between public policy and individual‟s experience. 
 
Kalyvas has proposed that the analysis of demobilisation and reintegration should 
comprise three levels: beginning at the macro-level, which aims to understand the 
strategic objectives that the different warring factions and political actors may have in 
negotiating a peace settlement. Secondly, the meso-level analysis should pay attention 
to the organisational structure of the rebel groups: their internal cohesion and 
centralisation, their practices for recruiting and socialising members, as well as their 
interactions with the general population. Finally, and the least investigated of all, 
research at the micro-level should focus on the individual experiences of both 
combatants and non-combatants; specifically on how the conflict has impacted on their 
identities as well as their political and social behaviour (2012: viii). Although an 
analysis of all these elements sits outside the realms of possibility for a sole researcher, 
I agree with Kalyvas that it is important to articulate these three levels of analysis. This 
research thus incorporates the macro-level (Colombian DDR policy and institutional 
dynamics at the national and municipal levels), the meso-level (how the features and 
structure of the paramilitary groups defined the negotiation and demobilisation) and the 
micro-level (the ex-combatants‟ experiences of interacting with the institutions) strands 
of the Kalyvas approach.  
 
Research Question and Aims 
 
The research question of this thesis is whether and how the ACR reintegration 
programme in Colombia contributed to the reintegration of ex-combatants according to 
three different dimensions: economic (if it prepared the ex-combatants to earn 
livelihoods in non-war activities), social (favouring the break of factional ties and the 
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forging of other social links) and political (whether it helped generate faith in the 
democratic process and the resulting transformation into law-abiding citizens).  
 
Focusing on the ACR reintegration programme in particular allows a thorough analysis 
based on the three-level approach proposed by Kalyvas, and driven by two aims: on the 
one hand, to understand further how the programme itself came into being and evolved; 
on the other, to explore its interaction with the former combatants.Over the course of 
nine years a complex set of institutions were created to provide services for the ex-
combatant population, thus, I contend that the process of reintegration did not take place 
in a social or political vacuum, nor at a purely individual level. As the DDR policy was 
itself highly contested and modified several times, it was important to establish the 
extent to which these broader legal and political factors affected the ex-combatants in 
their economic, social and political capacities of reintegrating. During the fieldwork it 
became clearly apparent that the creation of the ACR was a major turning point in the 
process which prompted the forging of new social and political relationships that had a 
transformative effect on the ex-combatants‟ behaviours. 
 
Research Design 
Humphreys and Weinstein‟s research in Sierra Leone (2007:532) consisted of a 
comparative study between ex-combatants who did and did not participate in the 
reintegration programme. Similarly, Baas in South Sudan (2012:23) compared three 
groups: those combatants that joined the army, and those who reintegrated with and 
without government assistance. Söderström‟s research in Liberia (2011) also contrasted 
the political reintegration of ex-combatants participating in different programmes and 
implemented by a variety of contractors. 
 
This thesis, however, does not constitute a comparative study because the fieldwork 
phase of the research coincided with the beginnings of the implementation of Law 1424, 
meaning that all ex-combatants were summoned to appear before government offices 
either to activate their status as participants in the ACR reintegration programme or as 
eligible candidates for processing under Law 975. Legally at least, there was no 
possibility of self-reintegration, and the ex-combatants did not join the army due to 
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strong political opposition. In sum, the Colombian ex-combatants were classified into 
three groups: first, the rank-and-file ex-paramilitaries and ex-guerrillas, for whom the 
ACR reintegration programme was compulsory; second, the paramilitary leaders and 
mid-ranking combatants, who were sent to prison under Law 975; and finally those who 
did not present themselves and were therefore declared outlaws, with warrants released 
for their arrest
20
. It was not possible to compare these groups as they were subject to 
radically different judicial treatment: gaining access to the last two groups would invoke 
a series of complex legal and security procedures.  
 
Therefore, this research was designed as a case study, albeit accounting for the 
differences between two main armed groups (the paramilitary and the guerrilla) and two 
different types of demobilisation (collective and individual). Gerring defines a case 
study as “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger 
class of (similar) units” (2004:341), and it is a methodology frequently used to analyse 
domestic or international policies (Barzelay 1993; Yin, 2009).  
 
One of the most common critiques of case studies is the extent to which analysis of a 
single particular case can inform the development of a broader theory. George and 
Bennett (2005) have claimed that generalisation is not a direct function of the number of 
cases analysed, but rather relies on the capacity of a given study to challenge and refine 
existent theories or lay-knowledge. Likewise, Barzelay has argued that, in fact, case 
studies can support empirical generalisations (1993:305) by comparing ideal-types 
versus real practices and proposing new forms of causality that challenge or nuance 
well-established – but incorrect or flawed – explanations. It is precisely in its 
characteristic as a sui generis event (Steinmetz, 2004:390) that the value of analysing 
the Colombian DDR resides.   
 
As mentioned in the introduction, a telling point – and one which will be expanded on 
throughout this thesis – is how different the reality of the Colombian DDR is to the 
cases drawn upon by the literature on DDR. Although generalisations from the 
Colombian case need to be nuanced using the specificity of other conflicts and 
                                                 
20
 Law 1424/ 2011, Article 6; Resolution 0163/2011, Article 2 (paragraph 2). 
65 
 
countries, the approach of the Colombian institutions, I would argue, directly challenges 
theories and assumptions widely accepted by the international community: namely by 
establishing a ground-breaking approach that emphasises the creation of social fabric, 
not only between ex-combatants and the communities but also with the DDR 
institutions and bureaucracy. 
Research Scope and Limits  
 
This research focuses on the reintegration process of rank-and-file and adult ex-
combatants who participated in the ACR programme, meaning that they demobilised 
under Law 782 and were not accused of gross human rights violations. However, the 
reintegration process of the leaders is outside the scope of analysis for this thesis: 
although the paramilitary bosses played an integral role in the negotiation and 
demobilisation of their groups, their pressing legal and security situation made their 
reintegration a far more difficult prospect. Those leaders that were extradited to the US, 
for instance, have little likelihood of being released from prison in the near future, while 
other leaders who demobilised and returned to criminality were killed as a result of their 
illegal activities. By 2015, 4,639 of the mid-ranking and senior leaders were facing trial 
under Law 975 (Fiscalía, 2015). A number of them had been released from jail, having 
finished their eight-year sentences; however, although the ACR does provide some 
services to the leaders and mid-ranking combatants during their jail sentences, their 
reintegration process is only just beginning.   
 
It it also worthy of note here that the demobilisation of guerrilla members represented a 
process of scattered but constant desertion by low-ranking combatants while their 
leaders were being subjected to fierce attacks by the Colombian military forces (US, 
2008:25). Significantly, the Colombian Army reported that only 12 per cent of 
individual demobilisations came from mid- and high-ranking members
21
, while the 
ACR reported that only 5.84 per cent of combatants who used its services were former 
mid-ranking officers or commanders (ACR, 2011:12).  
 
                                                 
21
 Army webpage. Available at http://www.ejercito.mil.co/wap//index.php?idcategoria=274415 
[Accessed June 2015]. 
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Furthermore, mid-ranking ex-combatants are difficult to contact for research purposes, 
as they face a variety of security problems. For instance, they are more likely to be 
involved in human rights violations, meaning that they can only apply for demobilised 
status under Law 975 and are therefore awaiting or have already received prison 
sentences. They are also the frequent victims of killings or attacks for a number of 
reasons: to prevent them from releasing sensitive information; in retaliation for previous 
activities during the conflict; or due to their refusal to take part in criminal or illegal 
activities. During the fieldwork I did in fact interview several combatants who claimed 
to be former mid-ranking paramilitaries. However, only their personal tutors and I were 
entrusted with this information, meaning that they were hiding their former status from 
the ACR to avoid the legal and security ramifications of Law 975. During the interview 
phase, I recorded only one paramilitary member who demobilised as an individual. By 
consequence, the collective demobilisations can be used as a proxy for talking about the 
paramilitary groups, and the individual demobilisations likewise in reference to the ex-
guerrilla members.  
 
In evaluating public policy, Barzelay et al highlight an important distinction between 
two complementary forms of analysis: “Intra-event analysis concentrates on how 
individual events progressed; cross-event analysis concentrates on analysing how 
individual events were influenced by others within the larger experience” (2003:39). 
This research employs intra-event rather than cross-event analysis: while other events 
were deeply entangled with the DDR, they are brought into the discussion only as a 
means to explain and analyse the reintegration of the rank-and-file and adult ex-
combatants. The first of these events refers to the political clashes around the approval 
of Law 975 and the related „para-politics‟ scandal. An historical reconstruction of these 
events is presented in Annex E. Secondly, there was a parallel reintegration programme 
specifically targeting child soldiers, designed and implemented by the Colombian 
Institute of Family Welfare (ICBF). Finally, although I often refer to the Policy of 
Democratic Security, its analysis goes beyond the scope of this study, being as it was a 
macro-policy that included many other programmes, institutions and policies.  
 
In addition, this research aims to provide certain elements by which the DDR policy and 
the ACR reintegration programme can be evaluated, as well as a better appreciation of 
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the experiences of the demobilised themselves. Gordon has warned of the disadvantages 
of evaluating DDR programmes too early following completion, as premature findings 
may be misleading (2009:170). Certainly, the fieldwork for this research took place 
only a few months after several key changes were made to the reintegration process in 
the wake of the election of President Santos. I would contend that by setting out the 
procedures for completing the reintegration process in its entirety, the enactment of Law 
1424 engendered feelings of closure for both the ex-combatants and their reintegration 
officers. This in turn allowed them to make a more nuanced assessment of their 
experiences throughout the process. However, further study will be needed to assess 
how successful the ACR programme was in demobilising ex-combatants and in 
bringing greater levels of security and stability to the country as a whole. 
 
Finally, there are certain key methodological considerations to take into account: 
Uribe‟s government officially stated that from 2002 to 2010 there were 31,671 
collective and 21,117 individual demobilisations
22
 (ACR, 2010). Prior to the 
negotiations, it was calculated that the paramilitary troops numbered around 15,000 
soldiers, with FARC members estimated at around 12,000. As will be explained in 
chapter four, it is evident that both paramilitary leaders and the government inflated the 
figures for demobilised troops. However, Peace Commisioner Restrepo dismissed the 
resulting criticism in that regard by claiming that the benefits also covered the non-
combatant supporting networks of the illegal armed groups, such as informants or 
sporadic collaborators (CNRR, 2007:39). Indeed, differentiating between real or false 
demobilised is a sensitive political issue and has proved difficult for several reasons: 
first, the paramilitaries retained an extensive network of collaborators who could not be 
classified as combatants in the strictest sense of the term. Second, the boundaries 
between paramilitary groups, criminal networks and gangs remain hazy, hence many 
members of these other groups latterly also gained demobilised status. Third, anyone 
discovered to be a false ex-combatant will face charges for perverting the course of 
justice, so there are clearly strong incentives for not disclosing their true status. During 
the interviews and focus groups, I only encountered one person who admitted to being a 
                                                 
22
 ACR statisticts 2015, Chart No. 1. Record of the demobilised. Available at 
http://www.reintegracion.gov.co/es/la-reintegracion/Paginas/cifras.aspx; Ministry of Defence, 2013. 
Statistics of Individual Demobilisations per year (2002-2012). PAHD. Available at www.defensa.gob.es 
[Accessed on 12 June 2013] 
68 
 
false demobilised; that interview has been excluded from the results. Although it is of 
course difficult to be completely sure, I found no other reasons to think that the ex-
combatants I interviewed did not belong to the armed group, as they talked very openly 
about their life and their activities during war-time. Additionally, I have previous 
experience in researching and working with active members of illegal groups, hence I 
was able to verify and contrast their narratives with my own knowledge of the topic and 
with other sources. I can only assume that, as the social and legal pressures on the false 
demobilised has been so substantial, they preferred not to volunteer for this research. 
 
2.2 Methods and Data Collection 
I conducted fieldwork in Colombia over nine months between October 2011 and July 
2012.  During that time I gathered two types of data: written material found in paper and 
online archives, and verbal data from focus groups and interviews with four types of 
informants: a) ex-combatants participating in the ACR reintegration programme; b) 
leaders of grass-roots organisations; c) reintegration officers, along with contractors 
from the ACR and the IOM; and d) independent experts in various related areas.  
 
This variety of source material brings internal validity to the findings through two types 
of triangulation: “data” and “methodological”. The former refers to gathering data from 
different sources, at different times, and from different social situations and people, 
while the later implies the use of diverse research methods (Denzin, 2009:301). As a 
result, it was possible to compare and contrast the versions of events and points of view 
of a variety of actors involved in the DDR, including the central government, sub-
national authorities, multilateral organisations, reintegration officers and ex- combatants.  
 
Written data: printed and online sources   
 
Abundant primary and secondary data was found in reports published in print and 
online. The network of institutions that took part in the DDR process produced several 
official reports, including those from the Peace Commissioner Office, the Ministries of 
the Interior and Defence and the ACR. In addition, speeches and press statements have 
been made available to the general public: from President Uribe, the Peace 
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Commissioner (Restrepo, 2005 and Restrepo, 2006), and two former ACR directors – 
Frank Pearl and Alejandro Eder. I also consulted the legislative archives for records of 
debates in Congress regarding Laws 782, 975 and 1424, as well as other related laws 
such as decrees and resolutions. Finally, the Mayoral Offices of Bogotá and Medellín 
published several reports on their own activities, which included the proceedings of 
public forums that took place in both cities.  
 
Equally, open letters and public statements from the paramilitary groups during the 
negotiation and demobilisation phases were widely available: having been included in 
several official reports or published in literature or in the press. The paramilitary leader 
Carlos Castaño, in particular, was very vocal in his defence of the paramilitary cause; I 
have made extensive use of his letters and his authorised biography
23
. To a lesser extent, 
other paramilitary leaders wrote public letters or gave interviews to the press: here I 
refer to those by Salvatore Mancuso, Vicente Castaño and Iván Duque.  
 
Secondary sources include data gathered from multilateral organisations (United 
Nations, OAS, MAPP-OAS, IOM) and think-tanks (Corporación Nuevo Arcoiris, 
Fundación Ideas Para la Paz, and International Crisis Group). I have also made 
extensive use of press reports from a variety of printed media: the two most important 
daily journals in the country (El Tiempo and El Espectador), the influential weekly 
political journal (Semana) and other established websites that collect and post both 
reports and news on the conflict and the DDR process (Verdad Abierta, La Silla Vacía, 
IPC). All of this collated information was crucial to reconstructing how the DDR 
process was contested and defended, as well as tracking how it originated, evolved and 
changed over time. For the analysis of this written material I used Atlas ti © software 
(student version).  
 
Verbal Data: Interviews and Focus Groups  
The main data source for this thesis comprises verbal data from 215 people distributed 
as follows: a) 141 ex-combatants who participated in 29 focus groups and 27 interviews; 
                                                 
23
 Published in Observatorio para la Paz (2002), his biography was written by the journalist Aranguren 
(2002) 
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b) six leaders of grass-roots organisations; c) interviews with 46 contractors working for 
the ACR, 12 for Peace and Reconciliation and four for the PAPDRB, as well as four 
contractors from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM); and d) seven 
experts with previous research and/or practice in the Colombian DDR. 
The ACR Research Unit authorised interviews with contractors at its Central Office in 
Bogotá, as well as the interviews and focus groups with reintegration officers and ex-
combatants at regional offices in seven capital cities: Cucuta, Bucaramanga, Monteria, 
Sincelejo, Barranquilla, Cartagena and Yopal. Although I also requested access to the 
ACR regional offices in Bogotá and Medellín, this was not possible due to a saturation 
of research studies
24
. As fieldwork in both cities was of the foremost importance, I 
approached the municipal offices of the PAPDRB in Bogotá and Peace and 
Reconciliation in Medellin, and both institutions authorised and facilitated the 
interviews with their own reintegration officers and the ex-combatants working with 
them.  
 
The cities chosen for the fieldwork covered key regions both during the conflict and the 
subsequent negotiation and demobilisation phases: the cities of Montería (dep. Córdoba) 
and Sincelejo (dep. Sucre) were an important paramilitary stronghold and became a 
focal point for the negotiation and demobilisation phases, while Bucaramanga (dep. 
Santander), Cucuta (dep. North Santander), Barranquilla (dep. Atlántico) and Cartagena 
(dep. Bolívar) are all capitals in departments heavily affected by the conflict. Equally, 
Yopal (dep. Casanare) is the catchment area for the violence from the Western Plains. I 
was not able to access four capital cities with a significant demobilised population: 
Santa Marta (dep. Magdalena), Valledupar (dep. Cesar), Cali (dep. Valle del Cauca) and 
Villavicencio (dep. Meta), due to administrative problems or security issues. However, 
the fieldwork across the nine cities above effectively covers departments with a high 
number of ex-combatants (see map 1). It is also important to bear in mind that the data 
was gathered in the cities where the ex-combatants are currently living, which are not to 
be confused with the centres of demobilisation or of operation of the groups.  
 
 
                                                 
24
 At the time, the ACR had requests from more than 30 studies, most of them to be carried out in both 
cities.  
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Figure 1. Map of cities represented in the fieldwork. Includes the number of participants in the ACR 
reintegration programme per department. Departments with a significant demobilised population but 
where no fieldwork was carried out are in blue.  
 
a. Reintegration officers 
At the ACR central office in Bogotá I conducted interviews with contractors working 
for the Social, Economic, Community Reintegration and Risk Management Prevention 
Units. I also interviewed the liaison officer from the national police, who has a 
permanent office at the ACR. After my visit to the regional offices was authorised, I 
contacted the director to organise the best time to carry out my fieldwork. In each 
regional office I interviewed the director – or the person in charge – and at least two 
contractors working in psycho-social services and one in economic reintegration (Table 
1, Annex A). On five occasions and owing to restrictions in the officers‟ time available, 
I conducted group rather than individual interviews. Additionally, I included four 
contractors working for the International Organisation for Migration (IOM): the 
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regional offices considered these contractors to be part of their team and therefore 
included them in my interview schedule. 
 
As mentioned above, the ACR itself underwent an internal reorganisation due to 
changes in government and the law. For the timeframe of this research, the contractors 
had differentiated roles in their functions as psycho-social tutors, or advisors on 
economic support, community relations or education. However, Law 1424 established 
the requirement for each contractor to centralise all of these functions (OACP/ACR, 
2010:186; 2011:11). During the fieldwork for this thesis, the new scheme was only just 
starting its implementation, hence the previous one remained the main point of 
reference for ex-combatants and officers. Therefore, I use the general term 
„reintegration officers‟ to refer to the ACR contractors regardless of their function, but 
use „tutors‟ when talking specifically about those officers in charge of the psycho-social 
workshops for the demobilised and with degrees as psychologists or social workers.  
 
b. Ex-combatants 
My method of approaching the demobilised was mostly through the reintegration 
institutions, with the exception of the six leaders of grass-roots organisations who I 
contacted through other ex-combatants or researchers. Once my visits to the regional 
offices were authorised, the reintegration officers helped me in gathering together 
volunteers for focus groups and interviews. My initial plan was to run focus groups with 
the demobilised and interviews with the reintegration officers. In practice, however, I 
found that each regional office had its own different working dynamics depending on 
the social context and characteristics of the demobilised. In some offices, for instance, 
assembling a group of ex-combatants was not always possible as they only had 
individual appointments with the reintegration officers. To overcome such obstacles, I 
decided to apply the same questionnaire to individual people as a form of interview. 
Although this mix of focus groups and interviews was not planned, it ultimately 
represented a means of establishing methodology triangulation.  
Söderström (2011:73) has argued that focus groups are particularly pertinent to the 
understanding of DDR programmes because the group discussion reveals robust 
information about a) norms and conceptions; b) why the participants have certain 
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attitudes or preferences; and c) how the participants interact in a given situation that 
resembles a democratic environment. Additionally, focus groups are especially fruitful 
in eliciting knowledge in the respondents‟ own words and context (Steward, 1990:12). 
Furthermore, if the focus group emerges out of preexisting networks, this may 
sufficiently recreate that group‟s own dynamics, thereby successfully mirroring the 
social process of building individual opinions (Söderström, 2011:76-78). 
The use of focus groups was certainly an appropriate means of exploring the dynamics 
within the psycho-social workshops and of facilitating the ex-combatants‟ participation 
in the discussion. In most cases, these focus groups were created by volunteers from 
groups already existent in the reintegration workshops, thus they were familiar with 
working together. I also always worked very closely with the reintegration officers, 
being conscious not to interrupt their activities and requesting their help in recruiting the 
participants to be focus groups and interviews. The reintegration officers then invited 
me to the workshops, courses or other meetings, and after a short debriefing on the 
research aims and ethics I asked for volunteers. On other occasions I created the groups 
using participants who had   approached the regional offices individually.  
On the one hand, the approach outlined above gave me very valuable ethnographic 
information on the delivery of the workshops and how the ex-combatants interacted 
both with one another and with the reintegration officers. On the other, there is always 
the risk of bias in the selection of participants and groups. However, in most cases, the 
reintegration officers recommended those groups that they knew were more willing and 
had more time to speak with me, rather than choosing specific individuals. Similarly, 
the officers provided me with advance notice of the availability of a variety of 
workshops, allowing me to choose those most convenient to would-be participants in 
terms of time and place. As a result, the sampling for this study is purposive and typical 
(Flick, 2014:122), meaning that this was not a random selection taken from the 
demobilised population. 
Group composition varied in gender and type of demobilisation (individual or 
collective). For the focus groups I took the methodological decision not to separate the 
demobilised, though I did account for whether the group was formed by people 
demobilised collectively or individually or a mixture of both, i.e former paramilitary 
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and guerrilla members together. As my research focused on their reintegration rather 
than their previous lives in the groups, it seemed more natural to maintain the usual 
dynamics of the workshops in which they worked together, regardless of gender, 
previous group affiliation or type of demobilisation (Table 1, Annex B).  
 
Table 1. Distribution of interviews and focus groups to reintegration officers and ex-combatants divided 
by city, gender and armed group affiliation  
As depicted in the above table, the vast majority of ex-combatants living in Bogotá and 
Medellín and who participated in the focus groups and interviews had demobilised 
individually, meaning most were ex-guerrilla members. This is to be expected in Bogotá, 
as the city receives approximately 85 per cent of the ex-guerrillas. However, Medellín 
mainly received the ex-paramilitaries; hence the ex-combatants that participated in this 
research are not necessarily representative of the city‟s demobilised population. This 
occurred for two reasons: firstly, in Medellín the interviews took place among the 
population that was studying at the CEPAR, an institute for providing adult education to 
ex-combatants and other marginalised groups. The CEPAR provides services to the 
more recently demobilised (usually less than two years), who are in the process of 
finishing their primary- and high-school education. By contrast, those who participated 
in the collective demobilisations would have completed – or abandoned – the process a 
long time ago. Secondly, Medellín was the first place I carried out the fieldwork: in 
January 2012, just a month after Law 1424 had started to be implemented, meaning that 
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very few of the ex-combatants who demobilised from 2003 to 2010 had activated their 
status as part of the ACR programme. Moreover in Cúcuta, Bucaramanga, Barranquilla, 
Cartagena, Sincelejo and Montería, the majority of the ex-combatants involved were ex-
paramilitary. Yopal was the only city with a similar number of both types of 
demobilisations. The total numbers of answers to the questionnaire per city are 
presented in the annexes.  
Remarkably, no clear pattern of responses was identified, meaning that it is not possible 
to infer from this study any causality links between cities or type of demobilisation, or 
armed group and answers given. Therefore, intuitive inferences – such as radically 
different responses from ex-paramilitaries or ex-guerrillas – cannot be made. In addition, 
due to the qualitative data gathered and the number of participants involved, this 
research does not constitute a representative sample of the Colombian demobilised. 
Nevertheless, the findings may serve to provide some avenues for further statistical 
assessment.  
c. Other informants and experts 
 
I also approached experts and key informants with working or research experience of 
the Colombian DDR process. I interviewed one high-ranking officer working for the 
MAPP-OAE; one former contractor involved in the demobilisation process; the former 
director of the Latin America and the Caribbean section of the International Crisis 
Group; two academics with research expertise in the specific chronology of the DDR 
(Externado and Sinu Universities); and two independent researchers who had written 
books on the topic (Cárdenas, 2005; Villarraga, 2006). Although some were still 
working for institutions involved in the DDR, the interviews were granted due to their 
personal interest in my research: as such, they do not represent an institutional voice. 
Nonetheless, these interviews provided valuable historical and analytical insight that 
complemented my understanding of the DDR process as a whole (Annex C).  
 
Instruments 
 
I created three questionnaires: for the demobilised, for the reintegration officers and for 
the experts. All of them were semi-structured and with open-ended questions (Annex 
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D). A variation of the first questionnaire was also applied to the leaders of grass-roots 
organisations, in this case emphasising their experience in the creation and development 
of the group, their internal dynamics and how they related to the institutions. The 
questionnaire for the demobilised focused on their experiences after the reintegration 
process and comprised two main parts: first, questions about the DDR process and the 
services provided by the reintegration institutions, including their opinion of the 
different workshops and activities in psycho-social, economic and community 
reintegration. Second, some questions were included to evaluate their participation as 
active citizens across four dimensions: political life, civil society, community life, and 
values (Hoskins et al 2006:11).   
 
The questionnaire given to the reintegration officers emphasised their individual field of 
expertise in psycho-social, economic or communitarian reintegration. Additionally, they 
brought in-depth information on the situation of each ex-combatant and on their roles as 
channels of communication between the government institutions and the demobilised. 
The questionnaire thus also included details on the history of the DDR process. Finally, 
the questionnaire for researchers was adapted to each person‟s field of expertise. Most 
of them had participated in or researched the demobilisation and negotiation phases and 
provided important information about the history and dynamics of the DDR policy and 
institutions.  
 
2.3 Thematic Analysis  
The technique of thematic analysis aims to identify patterns of responses and tendencies 
in qualitative data (Guest, MacQueen and Namey et al, 2011:142). It was applied to the 
interviews and focus groups following three steps: firstly, for each question, the answers 
were coded in categories that were not exclusionary, i.e. multiple answers were possible. 
This means that opposing answers to the same question were taken into account: for 
instance, in the focus groups one person may have felt accepted by the receiving 
community, but another rejected. In the case of “it depends” answers, another code was 
created to record when an ex-combatant felt accepted in some circumstances yet 
rejected in others. Secondly, each code was made binary where 1 (one) means that the 
code was present, and 0 (zero) not present (Fern, 2001:139). Thus, multiple answers to 
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one question were registered, but only once per interview or focus group. In other words, 
if in a focus group several respondents gave different answers to the same question, all 
of them were recorded, but if the answer was repeated several times, it was counted 
only once. Thirdly, the codes were classified in broader categories and presented in 
frequency figures and tables. Overall this process gives the reader a more accurate idea 
of the salience of the code and category, in contrast to those quantifying expressions 
often used in qualitative studies such as “the majority of respondents...” or “a few 
people said that…” However, no hierarchies or causalities can be inferred from this 
information. It should be made clear that this is an exploratory study and further 
research is needed to explain causalities or other connections between the verbal data 
and other variables and personal characteristics of the demobilised. The numbers 
presented, then, are to be taken as descriptive rather than inferential.  
Additionally, focus groups and interviews were analysed separately. Each method has 
different units of analysis: group dynamics in the former and individual opinion in the 
latter. Significantly, while the interviews yield independent data that can be measured as 
one independent observation, in focus groups each participant is taking part in a group 
interaction, and is thus being influenced by or responding to other people (Steward, 
1990: 142; Flick, 2014:149,194; Fern, 2001:121,141). Subsequently, it is misleading to 
count individual answers in the focus groups as it would be inaccurate to make 
connections between the answers and other variables such as gender, age or armed 
group affiliation.  
For each question a frequency table was created that included responses from the 
interviews and focus groups, as well as details of former armed group and the city in 
which the fieldwork was conducted. All the frequency tables are presented here as 
annexes, while in the main text I include bar charts featuring answers by category and 
by armed group. Finally, it is important to clarify that given the relatively small number 
of observations it is inappropriate to use percentages: the tables indicate instead the 
number of interviews and focus groups in which each particular category of answers 
was present. 
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Table 2. Example of frequency tables presenting answers by category, demoting interviews and focus 
groups, disaggregating type of demobilisation and city. 
This contrast between focus groups and interviews enriches the analysis through a 
process of method triangulation. On the one hand, the focus groups proved a useful tool 
to investigate how former combatants from two enemy groups interacted: the mixed 
groups in particular provided rich conversations around the differences and similarities 
between their experiences as guerrillas or paramilitaries. On the other hand, the 
interviews provided a safe space in which to discuss sensitive information, which could 
never be revealed as part of a group interaction.  
2.4 Access and Trust 
At first I thought it would be difficult to obtain verbal testimonies around such a 
sensitive and controversial topic. Surprisingly, I found that both the reintegration 
officers and the ex-combatants spoke very openly, not only about their personal 
experiences, but also about their disagreement with the ACR Central Office or with 
government policies. The polemic surrounding the demobilisation and reintegration 
process has clearly contributed enormously to a profound incomprehension and 
rejection of the DDR – and the ex-combatants most of all – among the Colombian 
general public. In turn, it would appear that, the people who volunteered for this 
research were highly motivated by the chance to give their versions of the story and to 
express their own views.  
Looking at the fieldwork phase in retrospect, some elements may have contributed to 
creating an environment of trust. Firstly, I introduced myself as a psychologist who was 
running an independent study as part of my PhD at the University of London. At the 
time I was not aware of the significant, ameliorative role that the psychologists had 
played in the reintegration experience of the ex-combatants. In the case of certain 
79 
 
interviews in particular it became clearly apparent that the ex-combatants trusted, 
treating me more as a therapist than a researcher: they were forthcoming with personal 
or sensitive information, some of which could potentially jeopardise their legal situation 
in the reintegration programme and put them in jail. This trend continued even after I 
was granted permission to record the conversations. In some instances, participants 
entrusted me with personal problems or even asked for my help to finish their school 
homework or transcribe their personal diary. Although I briefly accepted this form of 
interaction, I understand that the information gathered in these situations was 
confidential and was therefore not included in the overall analysis.  
Secondly, when asking for volunteers in the introductory briefing, I made it clear that 
my aim was to focus on their experiences of reintegration and that I would not be 
gathering any personal data or any other information that could be used to identify them. 
Thirdly, backing from an overseas university also contributed to an overall sense of 
trust. Some ex-combatants, for example, considered this research as an ideal 
opportunity to voice their complaints against the government and the ACR programme. 
Meanwhile, others assumed that I was taking their grievances to an international 
audience in London:  
I would like you to help us. You are going back to London, right? I‟m asking you 
to talk about our cases there: that you have talked to us […] and you can talk 
about how the government has not fulfilled its promises.  
(Focus Group ex-combatants No.3) 
Finally, I made certain that all approaches to the regional offices and the ex-combatants 
went through the official channels, while also clarifying that my research was wholly 
independent of the ACR or other related institutions. In practice, though, most of the 
reintegration officers I worked with would explicitly offer the interviews or focus 
groups to the demobilised as the equivalent of an official workshop, meaning that the 
ex-combatants were not using up extra time or sacrificing a mark on their attendance 
record, on which their monthly government allowance depends. This aside, there were 
no offers of incentives for participation in this research. The ex-combatants' reasons for 
taking part in the interviews and focus groups were evidently varied: while on the one 
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hand some thought they could use the time to make a political stand, others may have 
seen them as an opportunity to escape an unengaging official workshop.  
In regard to the reintegration officers, I sent the questionnaires to them in advance of 
our meeting, always making clear that I would adapt my schedule according to their 
activities and conducting the interviews and focus groups at the times and locations 
most convenient to them. As a result, I obtained more verbal data than initially planned, 
rich in both personal and professional opinions. Furthermore, although employed as 
ACR contractors, the officers do not necessarily follow or agree with the official 
discourse. This is not to say that theirs was the voice of open rejection of policies 
handed down from the central government, but rather that they were able to make a 
more nuanced assessment of the DDR process thanks to their position and their practical 
experience. In particular, the interviews with officers from the reintegration 
programmes in Medellín and Bogota provided an important contrast with the discourse 
emanating from the ACR Central Office.  
2.5 Ethical considerations and risk assessment 
For the purpose of this research, the demobilised are considered to be a vulnerable 
stratum of the population. The information or opinions they entrusted to me could 
potentially endanger their legal status or personal security. Similarly, the reintegration 
officers and researchers could face security or employment problems for expressing 
their personal opinions on sensitive topics. When asking for participation in each focus 
group, therefore, it was made clear that this was on an entirely voluntary basis, and that 
confidentiality was guaranteed. I also requested permission to use a voice-recorder 
before the start of each session; whenever the participants expressed any discomfort at 
being recorded, I instead took down the answers by hand. Moreover, in analysing and 
presenting the data, any personal data or references were deleted or encrypted, hence 
each focus group or interview will be identified by number alone.   
As standard procedure I signed a confidentiality agreement with the ACR: they would   
permit the fieldwork with the demobilised and the staff on the condition that the data 
only be used for academic purposes, as stated in the research project presented to them. 
However, this agreement does not imply the disclosure of information to the ACR or 
any other institution, nor its influence in presenting the findings. Finally, I was also 
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obliged by the University in London not to use any of the fieldwork data for any other 
purpose outside my own academic research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 
 
Chapter 3  
DDR design: targeting drug-lords and guerrilla deserters 
The criteria that define who attains demobilised status and its corresponding benefits are 
typically subject to significant challenges throughout the implementation of DDR 
programmes. Certainly, it is difficult to estimate the total number and characteristics of 
combatants beforehand, which prevents appropriate planning and funding of the 
reintegration aid. Commanders may lack any accurate inventory of troop numbers, or 
may inflate them on purpose; limited or lax criteria may permit the registration of 
civilians; and surveys or assessments of demobilised populations are often inadequate 
(Özerdem, 2009:178). On the one hand, relaxed criteria may encourage civilians to seek 
out those benefits on offer to the combatants, or they may buy or obtain weapons of 
their own in order to be included in the programmes. On the other, restricted criteria 
may unwillingly deny demobilised status to those combatants located at the very bottom 
of the military hierarchy – women and children in particular – who have little chance of 
demonstrating their affiliation to the group and hold limited access to weapons 
(Jennings, 2007:209, 2008:20; Özerdem, 2009:178; Söderström, 2011:337; Mcmullin, 
2013:204). 
Crucially in terms of this research, the DDR literature often overlooks how the criteria 
to include or exclude certain groups as the target of reintegration benefits is contingent 
on the reasoning put forward by the leaders of the warring factions in negotiating and 
pursuing demobilisation. Kriger has argued that the decision on “who” to demobilise 
and “how” plays a major role in strengthening or weakening the position of the ruling 
party or coalition, and is thus intrinsically linked to the aims that political actors expect 
to obtain from a peace settlement (2003:21-22). Furthermore, during the DDR process, 
military commanders acquire the power to decide who is included or excluded from 
demobilised status and so obtains the economic and judicial benefits; this in turn may 
simply reinforce the vertical and patron-client relationship between the leader and his 
troops, as well as between armed factions and the civilian population (Özerdem, 
2009:19; Munive and Jakobsen, 2012:369). 
This chapter shows that, in the case of the Colombian DDR, decisions over who would 
receive demobilised status responded to two different yet complementary strategies 
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within the framework of the Policy of Defense and Democratic Security. The 
government opted for negotiating and establishing a peace settlement with paramilitary 
groups, while at the same time increasing its military offensive against the FARC 
guerrillas. This resulted in the differential treatment of the demobilised from 
paramilitary and guerrilla groups. It could be argued, then, that the reintegration process 
of each group of ex-combatants would somehow echo these structural differences. 
However, the second part of this thesis provides evidence against this intuitive inference. 
The contrast between the personal experiences of the demobililised from the guerrillas 
and the paramiltiaries was not as sharp as may appear at first glance. Such surprising 
findings can be explained by drawing greater attention to the reintegration phase. When 
it was finally put in place, the ACR reintegration programme unified the treatment of 
both groups; hence, my contention is that it played an important role in ironing out and 
nuancing the profound differences rooted in group characteristics and reaffirmed by 
government policy. 
The first section of this chapter analyses the Policy of Defense and Democratic Security, 
showing that, where the DDR was concerned, security aims were prioritised over 
development goals. As a consequence, government policy placed too much focus on the 
combatants, while failing to take into account any benefits for the wider community. 
The second section explores the negotiation and collective demobilisation of 
paramilitary members, highlighting how the criteria for demobilised status were relaxed 
to include drug-lords seeking judicial advantages, while at the same time excluding 
child-soldiers. The third section shows that individual demobilisations originated as a 
strategy to weaken the guerrillas by encouraging desertion, predominantly as a means of 
intelligence-gathering against the FARC and the ELN. This strategy responded to the 
emphasis placed by the Policy of Democratic Security on security and 
counterinsurgency. Finally, the conclusion posits that the Colombian DDR originated as 
security-oriented and combatant-based because it responded to the specific aims of the 
leaders, and therefore did not account for the needs of the low-ranking troops, a notion 
that would also explain the lack of any long-term reintegration strategy.  
The first section of this chapter analyses the Policy of Defense and Democratic Security, 
showing that security aims were prioritised over development goals in regard to the 
DDR. As a consequence, there was a focus on the combatants, failing to take into 
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account the benefits for the wider community. The second section explores the 
negotiation and collective demobilisation of paramilitary members, highlighting that the 
criteria to obtain demobilised status was relaxed to include drug-lords looking for 
judicial benefits, while at the same time excluding child-soldiers. The third section 
shows that individual demobilisations originated as a strategy to weaken the guerrillas 
by encouraging desertion, predominantly as a means of intelligence-gathering and 
against the FARC and the ELN. This strategy responded to the emphasis placed by the 
Policy of Democratic Security on security and counterinsurgency. Finally, the 
conclusion posits that the Colombian DDR originated as security-oriented and 
combatant-based because it responded to the specific aims of the leaders, and therefore 
did not account for the needs of the low-ranking troops, which would also explain the 
lack of any long-term reintegration strategy.  
3.1 Policy of Defence and Democratic Security: stressing security, neglecting 
development 
This Policy promised to recover the monopoly of force into the hands of the state by 
attacking criminality and the outlaw armed groups operating in the country, in order to 
establish nationwide security that would lead to opportunities for development: 
Economic development and employment depend on a security environment that 
allows investment, commerce and the spending of municipal resources to benefit 
the communities, all of which are subject of permanent predation by the armed 
groups. 
(Policy of Democratic Security, 2003:22§31) 
However, although provision was made for actions addressing the protection of the 
citizens, social and economic development, as well as the efficiency and transparency of 
institutions, the security goals were prioritised through a counterinsurgency offensive 
underpinned by two military strategies: the Plan Colombia
25
 and the Plan Patriota. The 
Plan Colombia was a programme of US military aid that adopted the language of 
counter-terrorism, co-opting the war against drugs and the attacks on guerrilla groups 
under the same strategy. Its budget of US$6.13bn allocated US$4.859bn to military aid, 
                                                 
25
 The Plan Colombia started with President Pastrana but was carried out mostly under Uribe‟s mandate. 
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US$1.031bn to promote social and economic justice and only US$238 m to promote the 
rule of law (US, 2008:15). According to its initial design, the European Union was to 
finance the development component by funding these latter two as parts of promoting 
justice and the rule of law, but ultimately withdrew its offer of aid, partly due to 
concerns over human rights violations and the para-politics scandal (Gutierrez and 
Rincón, 2008:81). As a result, the Plan Colombia was devoted almost entirely to its 
security goals, abandoning its development aims to a large extent (US, 2008; Gutierrez 
and Rincón, 2008; Hylton, 2010; Oehme; 2010). The Plan Patriota, meanwhile was the 
national military strategy to attack FARC-controlled areas near Bogotá and in the 
southern departments of Caquetá, Guaviare and Meta (US, 2008:13; Semana 05/02/06). 
Some analysts agree that this privileging of the military goals was entirely justified, 
given the threat to the state posed by the illegal armed groups; yet this also comes with a 
warning that the emphasis on security should quickly evolve into institutional reforms 
and social development programmes that consolidate the security gains in the long-term 
(Mason, 2003; Marks, 2006). Elsewhere, the case has been made for a more nuanced 
analysis of the outcomes of the Policy in three main areas. Firstly, both the Plan 
Colombia and the Plan Patriota aimed to improve the efficiency of the armed forces by 
increasing troop numbers as well as the overall level of professionalisation. To do so, 
the Plan Colombia injected significant economic resources into the military, and the 
state increased the internal budget allocated to them
26
 (US, 2008; Rojas, 2009:233). 
This sudden boost in economic resources, however, took the form of a system of 
incentives that led to heightened levels of corruption inside the military, including the 
widespread practice of murdering civilians and disguising them as guerrillas to present 
as military results (Cárdenas and Villa, 2012)
27
. Secondly, President Uribe himself has 
been accused of attempts to concentrate power and bypass other authorities, and of the 
systematic use of illegal espionage and sabotage to achieve political advantage, 
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 Uribe also created a new tax for security purposes. Decree 1838/2002. 
27
 Critics on this Policy come from both outside and inside the military. In recent declarations, the ex-
coronel Juan Carlos Rodriguez, who was sentenced to 40 years in jail for his collaboration with 
paramilitary groups said that the Colombian army had become a “mercenary army”.  Recordings of the 
open audience in the Peace and Justice trial to the 285 members of the Central Bolivar Bloc, 22 
September 2015.  
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including reforms to the Constitution to allow his own re-election
28
 (Pachón, 2009; 
Rojas, 2009). Finally, under the façade of development projects – such as agribusiness 
or ecotourism, many of them financed by the World Bank or USAid – the reality has 
been a legalisation of land grabbing, forced displacement and mass murdering by the 
paramilitary forces and drug-traffickers (Ballvé, 2012:618; Ojeda, 2012). Between 2002 
and 2009, for instance, more than 2.4 million people were forcibly displaced – the third 
highest rate in the world – with the majority of them expelled from their land by 
paramilitary forces (Howe et al, 2010:9; Romero, 2003:55; CCJ, 2008:180), Similarly, 
the country ranked first in the world in the killing of union leaders, which in turn has 
resulted in the continuation of poor working conditions and low wages (Maher and 
Thompson, 2011:96). 
Therefore, as Jennings (2008:13) has warned, this emphasis on security did not 
necessarily translate into development in the form of services and welfare for the wider 
communities. Furthermore, Rojas has argued that during Uribe‟s presidency, the 
emphasis on national security found its counterpart in the creation of insecurities at the 
micro-level: allowing paramilitary control to continue unabated while weakening the 
democratic mechanisms and impeding the implementation of citizenship rights in those 
areas (2009a:234; 2009b). Paradoxically, then, the improvement in overall security has 
been accompanied by weaknesses in bringing governability, especially in the rural areas 
(Delgado, 2015; US, 2008:47, 59).  
Crucially in terms of this research, the DDR was one of the pillars of the Policy of 
Democratic Security, and thus mirrored its abandonment of further development aims. 
Rather, it concentrated on dealing with the armed groups and developed very different 
strategies to tackle the paramilitary problem and the guerrillas. The following section 
maps out the political negotiations that decided who would receive the judicial benefits 
as demobilised. 
 
 
                                                 
28
 As part of the power controls imposed after the civil war, any President was only allowed one term of 
office (four years). Uribe succeeded in modifying the law, allowing himself a second term.  
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3.2 Collective negotiation and demobilisation of paramilitary groups 
Legislation authorising the creation of paramilitary groups in Colombia has its origins 
in 1965
29
. However, apart from some spurious groups and some voices encouraging the 
civil population to arm itself, it was not until the 1980s that the country began to 
experience the creation of private armies as an extended social phenomenon. Two 
influential social groups played an important role in this: on the one hand, wealthy 
agrarian elites – mainly cattle ranchers – who decided to take up measures of local 
security in the face of the state's inability to halt the guerrillas' extension of territorial 
control and the subsequent increase in kidnapping and extortion. These elites were also 
threatened by the opening up of democracy and the creation of new leftist parties, which 
increased electoral competition and impacted enormously on the power held by their 
traditional parties (Romero, 2003:40). On the other hand, drug-traffickers were growing 
increasingly powerful, and were looking to protect and expand their illegal businesses in 
coca cultivation and cocaine trafficking (Gutierrez and Baron, 2005; Romero, 2003). 
Unlike Guatemala or Afghanistan, in Colombia the paramilitary groups were not created 
or supported officially by the state; however, the involvement of sections of the military 
and the civil service in their inception and activities has been widely documented (ICG, 
2006:15; Romero, 2003:244; Guzman and Moreno, 2007:199) and even recognised by 
the paramilitaries themselves (Aranguren, 2002:7). In sum, the paramilitary groups were 
private armies that succeeded in creating a heterogeneous coalition that catalysed the 
security needs of the regional elites and politicians, sections of the military and the 
drug-traffickers. In turn, these groups found a common cause in the counterinsurgency 
discourse that collapsed the guerrilla threat and the extension of democracy together as 
the same enemy (Romero, 2003a:41,227; 2003b). 
By the time negotiation between the paramilitary groups and Uribe‟s government began, 
the paramilitaries had seized control of one third of the country, having expelled the 
guerrillas from a substantial portion of Colombian territory and ingrained significant 
levels of influence over political and democratic institutions. Conversely, the military 
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 President Guillermo Leon Valencia (1962-1966) launched the Decree 3398/1965 allowing the creation 
of paramilitary groups. President Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966-1970) enacted the Law 48/1968 that 
allowed the Ministry of Defense to create vigilante groups of armed civilians (Villamizar, 2007:330; 
Villarraga, 2013:67; ICG, 2003:5). Also Turbay Ayala (1978-1982) both promoted a very repressive 
security policy and encouraged civilians to arm themselves (Gutierrez and Baron, 2004:4). 
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expansion of the paramilitaries has little to do with their own combat capabilities; it was 
rather the result of their strategy of using ruthless violence against civilians, exercising 
forms of social control and allying themselves with sections of the army and powerful 
wealthy elites (Gutierrez, 2010:20; Ávila, 2010:126).  
More significantly, these groups lacked military or political unity: they were at war with 
each other more often than with the guerrillas, largely due to problems produced by 
their involvement with the drug-trafficking economy. The paramilitary leader Carlos 
Castaño had attempted in 1997 to unify these disparate military activities and political 
interests into a federation under the umbrella of the United Colombian Self-Defenses 
(AUC)
30
 (ICG, 2003:8; Romero, 2007:13; Pardo, 2007:14; Jaramillo, 2002:69). His 
brother, Fidel Castaño was a renowned rancher and drug-lord who collaborated closely 
with the big boss of the Medellín Cartel, Pablo Escobar, until their long-term friendship 
ended in war (Aranguren, 2002:79). As the paramilitaries were expanding, the cattle 
ranchers and landowners‟ economy was too small to support the costs of these small 
private armies, so the narcotics trade became their primary source of financing (Romero, 
2003:249; Gutierrez and Barón, 2005:13; Guáqueta, 2013:23). The AUC was also 
engaged in the practice of selling protection, either by directly sending armies to certain 
regions or in the form of military franchises in alliance with the drug-traffickers (Arias 
and Guáqueta, 2008:7). Achieving territorial control was crucial in the war against the 
guerrillas, but this was equally the case when it came to profiteering from coca 
cultivation and trafficking. Hence, the drug trade played a key role in the inner 
dynamics of the paramilitary groups from their very beginnings.  
However, and precisely because of his inner knowledge of the drug-traffickers, Carlos 
Castaño was very aware of the ripple effects of these alliances. In personal 
communications he sent to the press
31
, he condemned drug-trafficking as “the cancer” 
that is causing the “feudalisation of the self-defenses”, or “the force that is sinking the 
paramilitary cause” keeping the AUC divided. Castaño advocated strongly for the 
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 There were three brothers: Fidel, Carlos and Vicente. Fidel had created the Self-Defenses of Magdalena 
Medio and started the project of expanding and unifying the paramilitary project before his death in 1994. 
Carlos then took over the leadership and in 1997 founded the AUC. 
31  
Public letter
 
s. 
“
The Self-Defense‟s Sour Duty”; (September 20, 2002), Annex 29:361-365. “Who will 
trust in us again?” (July 21, 2002), Annex 20:322; “Letter to Anne Patterson” (September 24, 2002), 
Annex 30: 365-366; Public letter to Luis Carlos Restrepo announcing the re-establishment of the AUC 
(September 4, 2002), Annex 28:358. In Corporación Observatorio para la Paz (2002). 
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paramilitaries to renounce drug-trafficking: he suggested to replace its enormous rents 
with other legal businesses or to shift to illegal but less dangerous activities such as 
smuggling or taxing coca crops. This would mean smaller profits but more tolerable for 
society
32
.  
This shift in Carlos Castaño‟s position was also linked to the strengthening of the 
international community‟s position against the paramilitary cause: in 2001 the US33 and 
in 2002 the European Union
34
 included the AUC on their lists of terrorist organisations. 
By September 2002 the US demanded the extradition of Carlos Castaño and Salvatore 
Mancuso
35
 under charges of drug-trafficking. Castaño had already resigned from the 
AUC, but three days after the extradition request, he took back the AUC leadership and 
released two statements
36
. In both letters the AUC stated their political unity and 
expressed their commitment to achieving a negotiated solution to the armed conflict. In 
addition, the statements reaffirmed that their intention was not to attack the government, 
but rather to transfer the control of territory back into the hands of the state. Finally, 
they invited the paramilitary groups to cease fire, transfer their controlled territories to 
the state and bring an end both to their own internecine clashes and to the violence 
perpetrated against civilians, other than that justified by counterinsurgency against the 
guerrillas. In further communications, Castaño urged both the government and the AUC 
members to make a clear distinction between paramilitaries and drug-lords, and also 
states his willingness to surrender to the US
37
. In stark contrast to this, the majority of 
the paramilitary leaders sitting around the negotiating table with the government were 
known to be powerful drug-lords with international warrants for extradition (Semana 
13/06/04). Some had adopted the paramilitary cause in order to conquer certain 
territories either by making military alliances with the AUC or by buying the AUC 
franchise (Guáqueta, 2013:433; Árias and Guáqueta, 2008:15).  
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 Public Letters. Op cit. “The Self-Defense‟s Sour Duty” and “Who will trust on us Again?” 
33
 Designation of the AUC as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation. Secretary Colin L. Powell, Washington, 
D.C. September 10, 2001, Annex 23:342, in Corporación Observatorio para la Paz (2002). 
34
 European Union decision on updating the list of terrorist organizations, May 3, 2002 (Villarraga, 
2013:151). 
35
 On September 1, 2002 
36
 September 4, 2002, Public Letter, Annex 26: 347-52; Letter to Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos 
Restrepo, Monseñor Pedro Rubiano, Ann Paterson and Kofi Annan, Annex 28: 358-61 in Corporación 
Observatorio para la Paz (2002).  
37
 “The Self-Defense‟s Sour Duty”.  
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Colombia had also recently signed the Rome Statute to join the International Criminal 
Court
38
 (ICC), which posed another international threat to the paramilitaries. The text 
was ratified in secret two days before Alvaro Uribe took the oath as President, however  
making use of Article 124 in the treaty to include a seven-year delay of its 
implementation. It was argued that the ICC‟s action was incompatible with the 
government effort in pursuing negotiations with the paramilitary groups. As a result, 
enforcement of the statute would not apply to political war crimes committed on 
Colombian soil prior to 2009 (ICC, 2012:8; El Tiempo 31/07/02; 01/09/02; HRC, 2011).  
Nevertheless the military strategy of the paramilitaries of attacking the civilian 
population and their involvement in drug-trafficking, made it difficult for the 
international community to accept neither their status as a politically motivated group 
nor the counter-insurgency justification behind their actions. 
In such a context, defining the political status of the paramilitaries became integral to 
their demobilisation. In a meeting with other paramilitaries, Carlos Castaño argued that:  
It is not viable to try to obtain promises from the government not to extradite the 
AUC members. The extradition is a policy of the US and they are not going to 
stop just because two guys with warrants for extradition from Colombia ask for 
that. It is better to demonstrate to Colombia, to the world, and particularly to the 
US, that we are not drug-traffickers, and we can do that through our commitment 
to withdraw from that business and our good behaviour during the negotiations. 
[…] Once the [negotiation] process is advanced and we no longer constitute a 
problem for [the US], and if we learn how to ask in a very subtle way if they can 
withdraw the extradition, demonstrating that we are innocent; maybe we‟ll 
achieve it, or at least we should try.
 39 
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 Colombia signed the statute on 10th December 1998. Its enforcement was expected to begin on 1st July 
2002, and it was ratified on 5th August 2002 and unveiled by the media on 1
st
 September. http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/latin%20american%20and%20caribbean%20states/Pages/colombi
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39
 Carlos Castaño speaks in an AUC meeting. “My own considerations and suggestions to the AUC”, 11 
November, 2002, translation mine. Available at: 
www.verdadabierta.com/documentos/historia/paramilitares/general/152-intervencion-de-carlos-castaf1o-
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Likewise, the paramilitary commanders Salvatore Mancuso and Vicente Castaño later 
referred to the action of the ICC and the extradition as major problems that needed to be 
overcome through the legal recognition of their political status (Semana, 18/04/05; 
05/06/05; 07/10/06). In a speech in Congress Mancuso stated that:  
It is not sufficient for the peace process to achieve its aims: it must satisfy the 
warring factions, but that is not enough. It should produce positive and visible 
results to Colombians, but also be convincing to the international community.
 40
  
Crucially, the extradition is a political decision taken by the Colombian President. The 
Peace Commissioner declared in an interview: “He [Uribe] can suspend the extradition 
of some members of the Self-Defences, provided that they comply with certain 
requirements” (Semana 12/02/06). In the Colombian legal system, while Congress 
approves the laws around extradition and the Supreme Court allows or denies 
extradition requests, it is the President who carries the final discretional power in 
making it effective.   
Negotiating their political status  
The existing legal framework for establishing peace negotiations allowed the President 
to enter into dialogue with those illegal armed groups that had previously been 
recognised as politically motivated
41
 (OACP/ACR, 2010:66). As the efforts to remould 
the paramilitaries into this category proved unsuccessful, the law was eventually 
modified. The new Law 782 gave equal political status to both guerrillas and 
paramilitaries under the name of “outlaw armed groups” (Art. 8), allowing the President 
to grant amnesty from political crimes to groups that had negotiated peace with the 
government, or to individuals who decided to demobilise (Art. 50). In practice, this 
authorised the President to sign resolutions
42
 to legalise the demobilisation of any group, 
regardless of its political status (Pardo, 2007:47,143; OACP/ACR, 2010:85). However, 
                                                 
40
 Salvatore Mancuso. Speech in front of Congress. 28 July, 2004, translation mine. 
41
 The legal framework has been modified depending on the political circumstances of peace dialogues: 
Law 104/1993, Law 418/1997, Law 548/1999 and Law782/2002. 
42
 It is important here to differentiate between laws, resolution and decrees. For the purpose of this study, 
it is sufficient to say for now that the laws are approved by the Congress, while the last two can be 
enacted by the President, Ministries or Public Institutions, with no consultation from other democratic 
bodies.  
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this law only covered the rank-and-file fighters as they were considered guilty of crimes 
related to rebellion activities but not involved in gross human rights violations, crimes 
against humanity, or drug-trafficking.  
One of the main problems during the negotiations was the prospect of maintaining unity 
and control of the paramilitary troops under the AUC, but also under Carlos Castaño‟s 
political leadership as opposed to the military leadership of Salvatore Mancuso, Vicente 
Castaño and Iván Roberto Duque. The alliance between paramilitaries was extremely 
volatile: their origins and interests proved difficult to harmonise and their respective 
links with criminality and drug-trafficking invariably pushed them into internecine 
conflict. This became apparent during the negotiations, with Peace Commissioner 
entering into talks with three different clusters: the AUC, the Bloque Central Bolivar 
and the East Alliance
43
, while the Peasant Self-Defences of Magdalena Medio 
(ACMM)
44
 accepted to negotiate with the government but refused to join the other three 
(OACP, 2006:6). 
Nonetheless, the demobilisations started in June 2003: sixty-nine child and young 
soldiers were progressively handed over by the paramilitary groups to the Institute of 
Family Welfare (ICBF) (OACP, 2006:6). In July, both sides signed the Ralito
45
 
Agreement “to finish the exploration phase and start the negotiating one” (point 4). As a 
result, the paramilitaries committed to gradual demobilisation of all their structures to 
be completed within 18 months (point 2), to declare a cease of fire (point 6), and to 
distance themselves from activities related to drug-trafficking (point 7).  
The government then introduced the Alternative Penalty Bill
46
 to Congress, which 
aimed to provide a legal framework of transitional justice for the treatment of people 
who committed grave human rights violations and crimes against humanity during the 
armed conflict. The debates in Congress around this bill and other subsequent bills 
sparked a judicial battle that lasted for two years. On the one hand, it was argued that 
although the paramilitaries lacked political identity or the intention to govern, they 
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 The East Alliance (Alianza Oriente) included the Peasant Self-Defense of Casanare  and the Meta and 
Vichada Self-Defense Groups. 
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 Acronym in Spanish. Autodefensas Campesinas del Magdalena Medio. 
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 Ralito is a small town located in the department of Cordoba, in a zone of paramilitary control.  
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 Bill to modify the Constitution No. 85. Introduced to Congress on 21
st
 August 2003. In Gaceta del 
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constituted a political, social and economic authority de facto, in the absence of the state. 
On the other, detractors claimed their participation in gross human rights violations and 
their involvement in drug-trafficking made them not suitable to political status 
(Guáqueta, 2013:436). The debates also addressed the implications of considering the 
crimes committed by the paramilitary groups as political
47
, meaning their legal 
treatment could include amnesty and pardon, their participation in politics, the 
possibility of requesting political asylum in foreign countries, as well as the guarantee 
of no extradition
48
.  
Outside of Colombia, the international community attacked the Alternative Penalty Bill: 
the UN argued that it would provide amnesty and impunity for crimes committed by 
drug-traffickers who were using the paramilitary cause as a political smokescreen (UN, 
2003:12; 2004:10). Similarly, reports from Human Rights Watch (HRW) accused the 
demobilisation process of being a strategy to avoid extradition to the US under charges 
of drug-trafficking (2005a:3; 2005b:55). By contrast, the government countered by 
arguing that, in practice, all the illegal armed groups had some degree of involvement in 
the drug trade, thus excluding crimes related to drug-trafficking from the possibility of 
judicial favour would prove problematic (Pardo, 2007:152). Moreover, Peace 
Commissioner Restrepo himself recalled the guerrilla demobilisations of the 1990s, 
recommending the actions of paramilitary groups to be considered as rebellion, and 
therefore treated as political crime
49
. He also endorsed the advantages of providing the 
paramilitaries with lenient jail sentences
50
 and compared the request of making them 
confess their crimes to authoritarian systems of torture and inquisition
51
. It was in the 
midst of such surrounding controversy that the demobilisations of adult combatants 
began.  
 
                                                 
47
 Classified as sedition and rebellion  
48
 Speech on the second appeal to Articles 61 and 64. Bill No. 211/2005 in the Senate and No. 293/2005 
in the House of Representatives. Gaceta Del Congreso 331/2005.  
49
 Press release, “Political Crime Definition”, March 13, 2005, pp 29-32; “Self-Defence‟s criminal 
classifying”, 13 March 2005, pp 33-40 (Restrepo, 2005).  
50
 Press release, “Reflection on jail sentences”. 10 March, 2005 pp 65-68; “Diminishing of jail sentences”, 
13 March, 2005 pp.69-72 (Restrepo, 2005). 
51
 Press release, “Speech in front of the First Commissions from Senate and Chamber of Representatives”. 
April 5, 2005, pp 177-193 (Restrepo, 2005). 
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It is worthy of note, then, that the paramilitary demobilisation did not take place after 
but during the negotiations. The decision on who to demobilise and how was inevitably 
embedded in the bargaining process over the political status of the paramilitaries. As 
will be explained below, the paramilitary leaders decided on the demobilisation of 
certain specific groups and provided the relevant list of ex-combatants, purely according 
to their own needs and in the broader absence of a DDR strategy. These groups were 
clearly not core military or political structures: they first demobilised some minors, but 
this was a far cry from any sense of coherent policy or practice in the treatment of child 
soldiers. On the contrary, it was soon followed by efforts to deny their existence. Two 
groups of adults were then demobilised: starting with an urban group that operated in 
Medellín and was known more as a drug-trafficking gang than a group with political 
motivations. This was followed by a group of indigenous self-defenses that held little 
military power or sway.  
 
Neglecting child soldiers   
From 1999, ICBF had run a programme to protect and reintegrate child soldiers
52
, 
which was then extended and updated in 2002 to provide services to minors within 
paramilitary groups (ICBF, 2010; Gallardo, 2007). Additionally, Laws 782 and 975 
established special treatment for demobilising under-18 year olds, considering them 
victims of the political conflict (DNP, 2006:5; OACP/ACR, 2010:85). At the time, the 
UN and Human Rights Watch (HRW) calculated between 11,000 and 14,000 minors 
participating in illegal armed groups, and estimated that approximately 2,000 of them 
were recruited by the paramilitary troops (HRW, 2004:14; UNPD, 2006:22). Research 
since has shown that the guerrillas tend to recruit members at a younger age, and those 
belonging to a less educated, more peasant demographic than the paramilitary groups 
(UNDP, 2006:7; Gutierrez, 2008:12).  
However, the number of minors who took part in the collective demobilisations was far 
less than expected: the AUC only handed over 212 child soldiers to the ICBF 
(Procuraduría, 2006:338; CCJ, 2008:89). By 2007 the Peace Commissioner stated that 
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 Programme to Support Children, Teenagers and Youth Demobilised from the Armed Groups: Preparing 
them for Citizenship and Social Integration (ICBF, 2010). 
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his office had demobilised 823 minors and the MAPP reported that 1,037 minors 
belonging to the AUC had entered into the ICBF reintegration programme, but only 391 
of them demobilised collectively, whereas 432 had demobilised individually and 214 
were captured (UNDP, 2006:7; MAPP, 11:12; ODDR, 2011:5). Furthermore, of the 
2,685 child and young ex-combatants receiving protection and reintegration services 
from the ICBF between 1999 and 2005, 63 per cent demobilised individually, 23 per 
cent were captured by the army, and only 14 per cent were part of the collective 
paramilitary demobilisation (DNP, 2006:14).  
There has been heavy criticism of the paramilitaries for not demobilising child soldiers, 
and the decision to instead send them home to avoid charges for recruiting minors. As a 
result, many child-soldiers decided to demobilise individually after they were denied 
participation in the collective demobilisation by their commanders or after being 
captured by the army (HRW, 2008:77; Procuraduría, 2006:339, CCJ, 2008:89). In 
declarations in the framework of Law 975, the paramilitary commander Iván Duque 
said that he discussed the topic with Restrepo, but the Peace Commissioner told him 
that the President would not to allow the demobilisation of child soldiers or even make 
them visible at the demobilisation ceremonies (El Espectador 17/07/14). Similarly, 
other commanders also later confessed to having denied the existence of minors within 
their troops (El Tiempo, 12/07/08; Semana 27/03/09; CCJ, 2008:92)
53
  
As child recruitment is a crime punished by the ICC, war-lords and rebel leaders tend to 
be reluctant to recognise the existence of child soldiers (MDRP, 2004:2; Mcmullin, 
2013:169). In the case of Colombia, the demobilisations themselves were based on the 
troop list provided by the paramilitary leaders, thus most of the child soldiers were 
excluded for fear of being accused of child recruitment. There were reports of children 
joining other groups after being left out of the demobilisation by their commanders (El 
Tiempo 12/07/08; El Espectador 17/07/14). Moreover, despite having the capacity to 
assist, the ICBF programme failed to provide reintegration services to many minors, as 
they never officially demobilised (Defensoría, 2006:56; Interview Villarraga). This 
exclusion also impacted on the child and young soldiers‟ legal status and their 
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September, 2013. 
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possibilities for claiming socio-economic benefits, which left them more vulnerable to 
becoming the victims of violence at the hands of other armed groups, or to be recruited 
into other armed groups.  
Targeting drug-lords  
The Cacique Nutibara Bloc (BCN) was an urban group that operated in Medellín and 
became the first paramilitary front to demobilise under the Ralito Agreement in 
November 2003. The Bloc was primarily made up of gangs and petty criminals led by 
Don Berna, head of the drug-trafficking organisation known as the Envigado Office. 
Don Berna had made an alliance with the AUC in 2001 to gain military control over 
Medellín slums. In October 2002, the National Army launched the military operation 
Orion to occupy and control Comuna 13, the most violent neighbourhood in the city. It 
has been argued that Orion received some support from the Cacique Nutibara Bloc and 
the operation mainly targeted guerrilla militias and other paramilitary groups that were 
not willing to join the negotiations with the government, such as Don Berna‟s 
competitor, the Metro Bloc (Romero, 2007:393; Gutierrez et al, 2009:12; Árias and 
Guáqueta, 2008:14). A few days after Orion, Don Berna declared a ceasefire and 
expressed his willingness to demobilise the Cacique Nutibara Bloc. By the time the 
demobilisation took place, his troops numbered around 4,000 members and controlled 
three quarters of Medellín‟s poorest neighbourhoods (ICG, 2004:12). In spite of this 
strength, it only demobilised 868 of its members along with two leaders: Giovanni 
Marin and Fabio Orlando Acevedo (aka Don Fabio). Don Berna himself did not 
demobilise but stayed at the negotiating table. Crucially for this research, the Cacique 
Nutibara demobilisation had no prior cantonment and there was no strategy for their 
reinsertion or reintegration; however, two weeks later La Ceja Agreement was signed, 
placing responsibility for the reinsertion of these troops
54
 on Medellín‟s Mayoralty.  
In December 2003, a second group under the name Peasant Self-Defense of Ortega
55
 
demobilised 168 members. This was a small and indigenous group created in 2000 
following the massacre of thirteen members of the community at the hands of FARC. Its 
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members only used machetes and hand-crafted weapons (OACP, 2006:16; ACR, Video). 
Arguably, this was the only group of a purely defensive nature that demobilised during 
this time: none of their leaders was present at the negotiations; none of them has been 
accused of drug-trafficking; and there have been no reported incidents of them relapsing 
into violence.   
In March 2004 the government finally succeeded in creating a unified negotiating 
table
56
, but this was placed in jeopardy by the increasing fragmentation within the 
paramilitaries, as the AUC political leaders started to be killed by those commanders 
more involved in drug-trafficking (Gutierrez, 2004:27; Romero, 2007:82). Carlos 
Castaño himself fell victim to the internecine conflict and two other commanders who 
had distanced themselves from drug-trafficking were also neutralised: the commander 
of the defeated Metro Bloc, Carlos Fernandez aka Doble Cero was murdered
57
 (ICG, 
2004:7); while Martín Llanos, commander of the Casanare Peasant Self-Defenses, was 
forced to cede territorial control to the Centauros Bloc – an AUC franchise bought by 
drug-lord Miguel Arroyave
58
 – before fleeing to Venezuela59. 
As criticism of the negotiations between the government and the paramilitaries 
continued, a new agreement was signed outlining the creation of a zone for the 
concentration of troops in Ralito, Department of Cordoba
60
. On 15th June 2004 the 
government was forced to withdraw the Alternative Penalty Bill as reaching a Congress 
approval proved difficult and the legal deadline for legal expiration was close. On the 
same day Uribe signed two resolutions formalising, at last, the negotiations that had 
started unofficially almost a year earlier
61
. In practice, this had two main outcomes: the 
government suspended the arrest warrants of the paramilitary leaders and, in exchange, 
they gathered some of their troops in the designated concentration zones.  
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The debates in Congress continued over, not one, but nine other bills that were 
introduced by different political forces (ICG, 2005:20; Palou, 2006; Pardo, 2007:99). 
Palou has argued that following the withdrawal of the Alternative Penalty bill, the 
government decided to change its strategy by trying to achieve political consensus 
before introducing a replacement bill (2006:49, 69). Hence, at the end of July 2004, 
three key paramilitary leaders – Salvatore Mancuso, Iván Roberto Duque and Ramon 
Isaza
62
 – made a surprising visit to an informal session of Congress, giving speeches 
that received standing ovations by a third of Congress members in attendance
63
 (Pardo, 
2007:141). The speeches had only been made possible because two Congress members 
summoned the paramilitary leaders to speak
64
, and the visit was ratified by the Peace 
Commissioner, who issued freedom of movement permits. Furthermore, the mayor of 
Monteria and the governor of Cordoba accompanied them on the trip to Bogotá; the 
National Army and the police provided transport and logistics and this extraordinary 
session was broadcast on national TV (Semana 01/08/04; El Tiempo 29/07/04; Pardo, 
2007:141). In the end, however, the whole event drew enormous criticism from a wide 
variety of groups, nationally and internationally. The US ambassador to Colombia, 
along with members of US Congress, expressed their disapproval (Pardo, 2007; Palou, 
2006:69). Similarly, the leaders‟ visit to Congress created fractures within the 
government as some Congress members, including some who were part of Uribe‟s 
coalition, rose up against it (Semana 01/08/04; El Tiempo 29/07/04). Only a few months 
later, in November 2004, 27 members of Congress visited the negotiations in Ralito and 
proposed a constitutional reform to forbid extradition in the case of peace processes (El 
Tiempo 12/11/04; Pardo, 2007:147). This proposal never came to fruition. 
Just as the overarching process was entering into crisis, the demobilisations started 
again: the paramilitaries announced the demobilisation of three different structures 
between November and December 2004
65
. However, before their inception, the 
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Supreme Court of Justice authorised the extradition of one paramilitary leader held in 
the encampment area: Juan Carlos Sierra aka El Tuso. The President was reluctant to 
effect the extradition (Palou, 2006:71), until the political journal Semana leaked a secret 
recording between paramilitary leader Salvatore Mancuso and Peace Commissioner 
Restrepo, which revealed that the extradition was one of the main points discussed at 
the negotiating table (Semana 24/09/2004)
66
. Two days later, Uribe authorised the 
extradition of El Tuso to the US, and  in October the paramilitaries issued a statement 
entitled “An act of faith in the peace”, announcing a new wave of demobilisations due 
to start in November, in order “to gain back confidence in the process”67. Subsequently, 
at the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005
68
 eight military structures demobilised, 
including Mancuso and 2,362 of his troops. The Peace Commissioner would claim that 
“[It] is a gesture of good will that the Self-Defenses had declared a ceasing of hostilities 
and the demobilisation of [4,820] of its members”, before the approval of the 
transitional law (Restrepo, 2005:39). 
The negotiations continued but in April 2005, politician Orlando Benitez
69
 was 
assassinated along with his sister and driver very close to Ralito. Don Berna, still 
present at the negotiating table, was himself accused of the murders and an arrest 
warrant was issued in his name. It was alleged that he had ordered the attack because 
Benitez was carrying out a political campaign in the area without paramilitary 
authorisation. Don Berna fled, only to surrender three days later after a man-hunt by the 
Army and intermediation by the Peace Commissioner (El Tiempo 27/05/2005). Despite 
the incident, he was granted demobilised status and was thus allowed to continue in his 
role as a member of the negotiation team (Pardo, 2007:144). Only a few weeks later, in 
June 2005 Don Berna demobilised as the leader of the Heroes de Tolová Bloc. On 25
th
 
July 2005 the transitional law was finally approved by Congress, entitled Law 975 of 
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Justice and Peace. In total eleven paramilitary structures containing 5,903 fighters had 
demobilised in the interim, making it for 18.63 per cent of the total paramilitary 
demobilisation.    
Demobilisations as part of negotiating the political status 
The decision as to who would obtain demobilised status was defined through the 
interplay of these three elements: the negotiation between government and paramilitary 
groups, the demobilisation of paramilitary members, and the debates in Congress to 
approve the transitional law. Table 3 shows how decision-making over the 
demobilisation schedule was linked to specific events that had a direct impact on the 
negotiations or their legal context. To develop Kriger‟s statement (2003), it was the 
paramiltiaries who decided not only who and how to demobilise, but also when.  
 
EVENT NEGOTIATIONS LEGAL SPHERE DEMOBILISATIONS 
 Ralito Agreement to 
demobilise the BCN. 
15/07/2003 
Introduction of the  
Alternative Penalty Bill 
to Congress. 21/08/2003 
Demobilisation of child 
soldiers and the Cacique 
Nutibara Bloc. 07/2003 
Secret recording is 
leaked to the press. 
25/09/2004 
“Act of Faith” 
agreement to 
demobilise three 
structures. 07/10/2004 
Uribe authorises the 
extradition of Juan 
Carlos Sierra. 
26/09/2004 
 
  The Supreme Court of 
Justice authorises 
extradition of Salvatore 
Mancuso. 24/11/2004 
Salvatore Mancuso 
demobilises with the 
Catatumbo Bloc.  
10/12/2004 
Killing of  politician 
Orlando Benitez, his 
sister and his driver. 
11/04/2005 
 Court issues warrant for 
Don Berna for the 
Benitez murder. 
22/05/2005 
Don Berna demobilises 
with the Heroes de 
Tolová Bloc. 15/06/2005 
Table 3. Examples of the interplay between the negotiations, the legal sphere and the demobilisations. 
 
The demobilisation of troops took place at the beginning of the negotiations (the 
demobilisation of the Cacique Nutibara Bloc and of 69 minors) and when the approval 
of the transitional law in Congress entered into crisis after the leak of the secret 
recordings. Furthermore, paramilitary leaders Salvatore Mancuso and Don Berna only 
demobilised when they could no longer avoid jail: their status as demobilised protected 
them from imprisonment and extradition, at least temporarily. Therefore, the 
demobilisations were instrumental in the efforts of the paramilitary leaders to gain 
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public trust and to pressurise Congress into approving a legal framework that would 
mitigate the extradition and the international justice threats against drug-lords disguised 
as paramilitary leaders (ICG, 2004:3; Pardo, 2007:143-147; Guáqueta, 2013:435). In 
response to the unfulfilled deadline that was initially established for the demobilisations, 
the Peace Commissioner declared: 
[...] We are worried that the Self-Defenses have postponed the demobilisations 
before and have used that as a strategy for the negotiation. This cannot become 
an excuse to revisit topics that have already been covered at the negotiating table, 
or topics that are in the hands of the government, by the Law of Justice and 
Peace or by going to prison to pay for their alternative jail terms.
70
 
Law 782 authorised the President to demobilise rank-and-file troops and rebel leaders, 
but it was the need to include lax criteria on drug-trafficking crimes that defined the 
timing and number of the demobilised troops. There was thus a need for the 
paramilitaries to find political backing for their cause (outside of support from the 
President) in order to make structural reforms to the legal system. These reforms would 
lead to the form of transitional justice needed for their crimes to be treated as politically 
motivated. The paramilitary commander Vicente Castaño issued the following 
complaint about later changes made to Law 975:  
I totally trust in Uribe, but one swallow does not make a summer [...]. Even if we 
achieve our aims, the international community or a new president may overthrow 
everything [...]. That is why the law of Justice and Peace is full of hidden issues 
not in our favour but against us, in order to put us in the deepest dungeons of 
torture by the Americans and the International Criminal Court.
71
   
In practice, under the original version of Law 975 charges of drug-trafficking were easy 
to avoid, and while the war-lords‟ properties and goods could be expropriated in theory, 
in reality it was difficult to prove them as the products of criminal activities (ICG, 
2003:12). In the case of being found guilty of war crimes the paramilitary leaders could 
have their sentence reduced to a maximum of eight years, having fulfilled certain 
requirements such as collaboration with the authorities and reparation of the victims. 
                                                 
70
 In an interview to Semana. “The Peace Commissioner Uncovered”, February 12, 2006.  
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 Vicente Castaño, Interview in Semana. “Vicente Castaño Uncover”, October 7th, 2006.  
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However, confessing was optional and false or incomplete confessions were not 
punished (ICG, 2005:20; Pardo, 2007:108). Similarly, paramilitaries who demobilised 
individually could be entitled to the judicial benefits even if the group continued its 
activities, and their sentences could potentially be reduced to as little as 22 months 
(ICG, 2005:21). Furthermore, Law 975 was lenient in its procedures and its 
interpretation could easily be manipulated: had the accused not confessed or accepted 
any of the charges against him, for instance, the Fiscal Office would only have 60 days 
to present evidence and call the accused to trial, a time which proved too short to collect 
and prepare a case against them
72
. The Fiscal Office would hence have missed the 
deadline to present the case, the accused would be acquitted of charges and set free due 
to legal technicalities (Pardo, 2007:102, HRW, 2005b:55). Ultimately, then, had the 
Alternative Penalty Bill been approved or Law 975 implemented without modifications, 
the paramilitaries would have achieved immunity at the international level. In the 
hypothetical case of being judged and sentenced in Colombia, they could then not be 
judged for a second time for the same crimes under international law (Palou, 2006:31). 
Drug-trafficking could have been justified to finance the counterinsurgency war and, 
given the immense political influence of the paramilitary forces and their infiltration of 
the judicial system, they were very likely to avoid the effective enforcement of the law 
in the form of jail sentences.  
Following the approval of Law 975, 26 paramilitary structures comprising 26,366 
soldiers demobilised between August 2005 and April 2006, but this did not stop the 
criticism of the government and the legal and political battles. In the face of these 
apparent shortcomings, Law 975 was subjected to several demands of 
unconstitutionality and a number of amendments were made by the Constitutional Court: 
its final version states that crimes against humanity (e.g. kidnapping, genocide and 
terrorism) and crimes not related to the nature of the armed conflict (e.g. rape, fraud and 
drug-trafficking) are to be excluded from legal favour
73
 (PRVC, 2006:41). Confession 
of crimes became compulsory and the paramilitary leaders were required to declare for 
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 The delay in criminal procedures in Colombia is inherent to the justice system. Calling a person to trial 
may take years, even if incarcerated.  
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 Sentences from the Constitutional Court C-531 in 12 July, 2006; C-127 22 February, 2006. Sentence C-
370/2006 18 May, 2006 that modifies the paragraph 71 among others (CONPES 3554:5; OACP/ACR, 
2010:86) 
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their crimes in front of the Fiscal Office
74
. Looking further ahead, the actions of the 
justice system changed the course of the DDR process and the conditions that the 
paramilitary leaders had negotiated with the government for their demobilisation were 
overturned: on the one hand, the paramilitary leaders who demobilised were not able to 
escape from jail or extradition (see Annex F); on the other, the low-ranking demobilised 
fell into a judicial limbo and their legal situation remained unsolved for nine years. 
Crucially, then, the debates revolved around the legal benefits for the demobilised 
paramilitary leaders, while any negotiation on the future reintegration or the legal, 
economic or social situation of former rank-and-file combatants were left to fall by the 
wayside. Furthermore, the reintegration of low-ranking fighters was impeded by their 
unsolved legal situation, and the lack of a strategy either on the part of government or of 
the paramilitary leaders. 
3.3 Individual demobilisations 
The legal framework for the individual demobilisations originated in 1958
75
 and aimed 
to provide amnesty to the liberal guerrillas who had fought in the civil war (Schuster, 
2009:21; Villarraga, 2006:21). The intensity of the guerrilla warfare demands levels of 
commitment as well as physical and mental conditioning that are difficult to maintain 
over long periods of time, subsequently the guerrillas typically move through a more or 
less constant cycle of recruitment and desertion (Pinto et al, 2002:1; Cardenas, 2005:13; 
Interview Villarraga). 
In 2002, a report by the National Department of Planning (DNP)
76
 showed that 
desertions of guerrilla members had increased from 150 to 1,200 fighters between 1998 
and 2002. The report also suggested that the government could benefit from this 
desertion phenomenon in order to reduce the numbers of the rebel groups and to gather 
intelligence against them, with the additional benefit that reintegrating guerrilla fighters 
was cheaper than fighting them head-on (Pinto et al, 2002:29,65). The Policy of 
Democratic Security, therefore, depicted the individual demobilisations as a strategy to 
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 Currently, there are thousands of declarations used by the judicial system to judge the paramilitary 
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 Decree 328 and 2582/1958, under the presidency of Alberto Lleras Camargo. Updated by Decree 1384 
and 1385/1994, under César Gaviria. 
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increase the military pressure on the guerrillas within the counterinsurgency frame 
(Pretelt, 2006:25; Cartagena Contribution, 2009:10; OACP/ACR, 2010:98).  
As part of its mandate, in 2003 the Ministry of Defence launched a campaign to 
encourage the desertion from the guerrillas by offering demobilisation benefits 
(OACP/ACR, 2010:117). This campaign featured advertisements on radio and TV, as 
well as other marketing strategies: including broadcasting a song, throwing flyers from 
helicopters flying over combat zones, and hanging Christmas lights in a tree in one of 
the guerrilla corridors
77
. In the same vein, imprisoned guerrilla members, or those 
caught up in combat with the army were offered the benefits of demobilisation and 
reintegration, in exchange for the jail sentences they faced.  
The institution responsible for the individual demobilisations was the Programme for 
Humanitarian Assistance to the Demobilised (PAHD)
78
, administered by the Ministry of 
Defence. The PAHD had four main objectives: to foster the demobilisation of guerrilla 
members, especially from mid-ranking soldiers and urban militias; to promote a positive 
image of the demobilisations among the national and international community; to 
provide humanitarian services to the demobilised; and to prevent recruitment within 
illegal armed groups (OACP/ACR, 2010:98; Army webpage). Equally, the Director of 
the reinsertion programme, stated that the offer of demobilisation to guerrilla members 
aimed to slow down the expansion and strengthening of the illegal armed groups, by 
providing alternatives to the use of military force or criminal prosecution to process the 
ex-combatants (Angel, 2006:199). 
Desertion from the guerrillas is considered betrayal and invariably punished by death. 
However, many fighters prefer to risk their lives and abandon the group, rather than 
bearing the intensity of the combat, the precarious living conditions and the proximity 
to death involved in the guerrilla warfare. Building on this, the Ministry of Defence 
focused its attention on those that dared to escape and managed to survive. Deserters 
from the guerrillas could simply present themselves in front of any civil or military 
authority and request status as demobilised. The combatants would then be transferred 
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to a military compound where he or she would remain for a maximum of two weeks for 
adults and 36 hours for minors. Following this period, they would proceed to one of a 
set of shelters administered by the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Defence, 
mainly located in Bogotá. Finally, in a crucial point of difference to the collective 
demobilisations, the ex-combatants could also include their families in the programme: 
specifically their partners and children, or their parents (OACP/ACR, 2010:102; ACR, 
2011).  
During Uribe‟s administration, there were circa 23,000 reported individual 
demobilisations
79
. Between August 2002 and October 2008, 17,450 people were granted 
demobilised status, an average of eight per day (Conpes, 3554:12). Ex-guerrillas, both 
from FARC and ELN, constituted 67 per cent of the individual demobilisations, 
compared to 13.41 per cent of ex-members of paramilitary groups (Table 4). 
GROUP 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
80
 2008 2009 2010 % 
FARC 529 1376 1300 1135 1558 2480 3027 2128 2009 15542 
% 72.47 54.22 43.74 44.27 63.33 77.69 87.46 80.67 82.13 67.6 
ELN 139 405 333 301 359 423 403 492 359 3214 
% 19.04 15.96 11.20 11.74 14.59 13.25 11.64 18.65 14.68 14.0 
Para 0 692 1269 1096 470 155 0 0 65 3747 
% 0 27.27 42.70 42.75 19.11 4.86 0 0 2.66 16.3 
Others 62 65 70 32 73 134 31 18 13 498 
% 8.49 2.56 2.36 1.25 2.97 4.20 0.90 0.68 0.53 2.2 
Total 730 2538 2972 2564 2460 3192 3461 2638 2446 23001 
Table 4. Individual demobilisations 2002-2010 per group. Source: Ministry of Defence, 
statistics. 2015. Percentages mine.  
 
 
 
                                                 
79
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Targeting deserters 
The policy of individual demobilisations can be considered a turning point in the 
treatment of guerrilla deserters. On the one hand, the Policy of Democratic Security 
offered them status as demobilised, which entitled them to some form of protection 
from the death threat posed by their former comrades, as well as opportunities for 
employment and education (2003:7). On the other, within their own ranks, the police 
and the army promoted the idea that the protection and good treatment of the 
demobilised facilitated the process of gathering information useful to military 
operations, which would be translated into positive results against the guerrillas (CCJ, 
2008:30). As a US report on the Colombia Plan stated:   
[The Colombian] government, through its counternarcotics strategy, military and 
police actions, and other efforts (such as its demobilisation and deserter 
programmes) has degraded the finances of illegal armed groups and weakened 
their operational capabilities.[…] [T]he number of FARC combatants and its 
capabilities have been dramatically reduced by continuous assaults on its top 
leadership, the capture or killing of FARC members in conflictive zones, and a 
large number of desertions. 
(US, 2008:22, 25, emphasis mine) 
In addition, the contrast in bureaucratic procedure between the collective and the 
individual demobilisations shows that both responded to different strategies and 
institutions in the frame of the Policy of Democratic Security. The collective 
demobilisations of paramilitary groups were handled by civilian institutions: the Peace 
Commissioner Office was responsible for the negotiation and demobilisation, the 
Ministry of Interior (PRVC office) for providing reinsertion assistance, and the MAPP-
OEA for monitoring the process, while an inter-institutional group was in charge of 
collecting and destroying the surrendered weapons. The individual demobilisations, 
conversely, were the responsibility of the military institutions, in particular the Ministry 
of Defence. After the demobilisation process had been exhausted, ex-combatants from 
both individual and collective processes were then transferred to the PRVC Office 
(Figure 2). 
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More significantly, the bureaucratic procedures to obtain status as demobilised 
requested former guerrillas to collaborate in intelligence-gathering against their group 
(OACP/ACR:102). Each deserter would receive a certificate from the Operative 
Committee to Laying Down Arms (CODA), which was part of the PAHD and formed 
by representatives of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Peace 
Commissioner Office. CODA was responsible for verifying and certifying that the 
candidates were real guerrilla members: thus, during their time in the military 
compounds or in the shelters the former fighters were subject to a series of interviews to 
establish their status and activities inside the rebel group (Ministry of the Interior, 
2006:11):  
[The ex-combatant should] collaborate with the authorities in the dismantling of 
the guerrilla group that he belongs to, or with the justice system in the 
investigation of crimes that he could have committed during his participation in 
the armed group.
81
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     Individual Demobilisation                                          Collective Demobilisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Comparison between the stages of individual and collective demobilisations. Source: My own 
based on Ministry of the Interior, 2006. 
Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence was allowed to offer millions of pesos in 
monetary rewards to the demobilised for information that was effectively translated into 
military results, and for their participation in military operations (Ministry of the 
Interior, 2006:11)
82
. The reward amount could range from $US 750 to $US 35,000 for 
information that aided in the rescue of kidnapped military personnel or civilians, in 
capturing guerrilla commanders or in locating guerrilla camps (Árias and Guáqueta, 
2008:24). Physical or psychological abuse in these interviews has not been reported, 
although some ex-combatants have complained of receiving pressure from their 
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interviewers, while others understood that the CODA certificate depended on their 
participation in military operations (Cardenas: 2005:44; Interview Cardenas; 
Procuraduría, 2006:31). Rosenau et al (2014) found more than 15,000 of these 
interviews conducted with ex-FARC members, containing personal information 
regarding the reasons behind their recruitment into and their desertion from the 
guerrillas, as well as intelligence information around the group‟s activities. Furthermore, 
the Army publicly stated that the demobilisation policy had resulted in: 
1. Affecting the enemy: reducing its number of combatants, demoralising them 
and obtaining vital intelligence (logistics, mobility, strategy and military targets). 
The PAHD has provided: 1.1 intelligence to plan military operations fundamental 
for the success of the Policy of Democratic Security [...] and many other 
operations where the demobilised have been the only source of information. 1.2 
the demobilisation has been fundamental in halting the military offensive by the 
guerrillas because it implies: sending less troops to the operations, in an effort to 
minimise the risk of desertion; the need to move more often due to the 
information provided by the demobilised; more time invested in recruiting [...] 
83
.    
However, the use of the demobilised population for military purposes has been heavily 
criticised by a host of different institutions: UN representatives criticised the desertion 
campaign by saying that, rather than as a marketing strategy, the Ministry of Defence 
could have used it to provide more accurate information about the rights of the 
demobilised and about the reinsertion programme, or to foster further trust and 
acceptance from the demobilised within the recipient communities (PNUD, 2003:148). 
Similarly, the General Inspector‟s Office and the Mayors of Bogotá and Medellín 
denounced military collaboration as too great a risk for the ex-combatants: first and 
foremost, they may be killed during their participation in military operations; second, 
rather than targeting every single deserter, the guerrillas retaliate heavily against those 
who released sensitive information or who took part in military operations; third, the 
monetary rewards became a source of corruption within the military, and reports 
emerged of payments that were delayed or never made, as well as cases of unlawful 
killing of ex-combatants by the military in order to claim their monetary rewards for 
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collaboration (Cardenas, 2005:33,44, Procuraduria, 2006a:33; Villamizar, 2005:22). A 
report from the Defensoría and Unicef also flagged evidence that intelligence-gathering 
interviews were also carried out with child soldiers, and that some of them even 
received offers to participate in military operations, both practices are illegal under 
Colombian child law (Defensoría, 2006:45). More importantly for this thesis, the 
offering of money to shift loyalties runs contrary to an appropriate reintegration process: 
while the criminal world may extend offers millions of pesos to the former combatants, 
the ACR reintegration programme and officers aimed  to introduce the ex-combatants to 
those basic skills needed for formal work and education, which privileged personal 
development rather than greed (Villarraga, 2013:90; Cárdenas, 2005:33; Árias and 
Guáqueta, 2008:24)
84
.  
Certainly, the policy of individual demobilisation addressed the phenomenon of an 
increasing number of deserters, but also promoted it for specific military ends. 
Ultimately, as the security aims were prioritised, any notions of pursuing further 
reintegration of ex-guerrilla combatants or development for the wider communities 
affected by the conflict were largely abandoned. This may have been a combatant-
centred strategy from the outset, yet rather than focusing on wider concerns over the 
security risk the former combatants may have posed, the combatants themselves were 
targeted on the basis of their military worth as collaborators and providers of 
counterinsurgency intelligence. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has described how the DDR process evolved during the negotiation and 
demobilisation phases, analysing the politics behind the criteria over who could obtain 
demobilised status. The DDR process originated in a strategy of national security and 
targeted combatants selectively: its initial design could hence be categorised as security-
oriented and combatant-centred. However, rather than the immediate concerns over the 
security threat posed by the former combatants, or the effectiveness of their 
reintegration aid, the negotiations revolved principally around who among them could 
obtain the judicial benefits from the new transitional legislation.  
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On the one hand, the collective negotiation and demobilisations took place in a context 
in which powerful drug-lords had allied with the paramilitaries and could potentially 
obtain the legal benefits of transitional justice for themselves. Demobilised status would 
have entitled them to lenient treatment by the national legal system, which could also 
block the enforcement of extradition to the US as well as international human rights 
laws. However, these drug-lords first needed to be considered as politically-motivated, 
and several strategies were developed to do so. Firstly, their political disguise was only 
workable through the elimination of those political leaders who, despite their strong 
links with drug-trafficking, opposed the drug-lords‟ take-over of the paramilitary cause. 
Secondly, close alliances with politicians encouraged support from Congress members 
during the lobbying process and the introduction of new bills. Finally, the 
demobilisation of troops was also used to gain trust in the system and thereby put 
pressure on Congress to adhere to its workings.  
The demobilisation of paramilitary groups could have been completed within the legal 
framework of Law 782, but due to the military strategy of attacking civilians and their 
involvement in drug-trafficking, the paramilitary leaders were in need of a legal 
framework different from the one covering their foot-soldiers. The analysis above has 
highlighted the interplay between the negotiations, the demobilisations and the debates 
in Congress around the transitional laws: these three elements conspired to create a legal 
and political environment that favoured the relaxing of key criteria, including more 
lenient treatment of drug-trafficking crimes and grave human rights violations. In the 
same vein, child soldiers were systematically excluded from demobilised status in order 
to avoid accusations of crimes related to child recruitment, which fell outside the 
boundaries of the transitional legislation. It was undoubtedly the needs of the 
paramilitary leaders – rather than those of the fighters – that defined the who, how and 
when of the demobilisations. By contrast, any sense of coherent government strategy on 
DDR, or guidelines to deal with the combatants after their demobilisation, are 
conspicuous only by their absence.  
On the other hand, the individual demobilisations formed part of a military strategy 
whose sole purpose was to weaken the guerrillas by fostering troop desertion and the 
subsequent acquisition of intelligence and collaboration in military operations. While 
the paramilitary leaders and war-lords negotiated and demobilised under the umbrella of 
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civilian institutions, deserters of guerrilla groups were processed by the military 
authorities. As such, rather than protecting the individually demobilised population, the 
military used them as part of its own counterinsurgency strategy. 
In sum, none of the demobilisations outlined above were aimed towards development as 
it is understood by the international community or multilateral organisms: the sense of 
achieving the recovery of the economic and social welfare of war-torn societies. 
Although the demobilisation of low-ranking combatants proved instrumental for both 
the paramilitary leaders and the Colombian government, policies directly addressing the 
reintegration of ex-combatants back into society fell quickly and sharply down the list 
of priorities, and were largely overlooked throughout the DDR process.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Ownership by Sub-national Institutions: the Role of the Bogotá and 
Medellín Municipalities 
 
As the demobilisation and disarmament phases continued the DDR process started to 
crumble precisely because of the lack of a reintegration strategy. This chapter shows 
how the DDR process entered into a crisis, forcing the central government to shift its 
initial policy and turn its attention to the reintegration phase, which resulted in the 
belated creation of a national programme for reintegration. To do so, I will focus on the 
policies and actions of the Colombian authorities at two different levels: whereas the 
national government neglected the reintegration of ex-combatants, the municipalities of 
Bogotá and Medellín actively supported and contributed to it. This is followed by 
detailed analysis of the role of the Mayoral Offices of both cities in two main areas: 
how they urged the central government to reassess the DDR policy, and how they 
provided services to the former combatants from paramilitary groups and guerrillas.  
This chapter addresses the issue of ownership and state-building by evidencing the role 
municipal authorities can take on a DDR programme. The first section describes the 
reinsertion strategy originally implemented by the central government, and the reasons 
for its failure. The second section presents the reintegration programmes developed by 
the Mayoral Offices of Medellín and Bogotá, explaining how these authorities played a 
key role in filling the gaps left by central government and navigating the various pitfalls 
inherent in implementing the DDR policy, and also in contributing to build the ACR 
and its reintegration programme. The third section analyses the challenges of the 
reintegration phase at the municipal and sub-national level. Crucially, given that 
municipal institutions are closer to their citizens than the central government, fostering 
coordination, communication and cooperation between national and sub-national 
authorities is integral to building sustainable state capacity from the bottom up. On the 
one hand, this encourages ownership and legitimacy, particularly in terms of the 
capacity to respond to security needs at the sub-national level, in tandem with national 
security requirements. On the other, and more importantly for this research, the action 
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of both Mayoral Offices underpinned the creation of the ACR Reintegration Programme 
and a sustained reintegration strategy, while also contesting central government policies 
and laying out the consequences of their deficiencies in governability. Finally, the 
fourth section describes the ACR programme in its final form. 
Although there has been significant progress in the DDR literature in recognising local 
actors as the central players in policy-making, there is still a monolithic approach to the 
idea of “the local”. Thus the question remains, then, over how best to articulate the 
different levels of authorities and institutions – international, national and sub-national – 
specifically regarding the degree of legitimacy and ownership that each authority is able 
to build in a post-conflict society. There is, however, no simple answer: as “the local” is 
a complex system of political, economic and social structures that is subject to 
continuous accommodations. Nevertheless, when it comes to the Reintegration phase, 
the DDR process needs to trickle down to the needs of these local authorities and 
communities by addressing the grievances of the victims, promoting reconciliation and 
establishing general human security. At this stage, whether they are prepared to or not, 
it is the responsibility of the municipal authorities to respond effectively to the long-
term consequences of reintegrating ex-combatants into society by providing them with 
sustainable economic income and by fostering social inclusion.  
4.1 The PRVC short-term reinsertion strategy 
From the sub-national point of view, the negotiations, demobilisation and disarmament 
of the paramilitary groups took place without the participation or even consultation of 
the municipal authorities, even in decisions directly affecting local communities 
(Negrete, 2004:23, 32; Rivas and Mendez, 2008:12). For example, the creation of 
concentration zones in their territories was never broached with the local authorities. 
There were entire towns, such as Ralito, in which the inhabitants were compelled to live 
alongside the paramilitary soldiers awaiting their demobilisation ceremony, with no 
previous consultation or preparation. Therefore, the Mayors and other municipality 
authorities declared that the DDR process took them “by surprise”, hence their reaction 
was one of reluctance to and rejection of the decisions taken by central government 
(Rivas and Mendez: 2008:12). This situation inevitably undermined the municipal 
115 
 
governments in terms of their capacity and legitimacy, and left them unprepared for the 
reintegration processes that were to take place in their territory. 
During the cantonment in the concentration zones, the National Registry Office and the 
judicial courts then had the task of gathering personal data from all the combatants, 
including name, fingerprints and dental ID. After this phase of identification the ex-
combatants received workshops on a variety of topics and were redirected to further 
services, mainly regarding their legal needs. Finally, the demobilised were given a 
citizenship ID. Following the demobilisation ceremony they would surrender their 
weapons and were free to go home
85
 (OACP/ACR, 2010:85, 110, 131). 
For the reinsertion phase, Uribe‟s strategy was to employ the same programmes, 
methods and infrastructure that had been in place since the 1990s: the Ministry of the 
Interior and the PRVC had been the institutions created to facilitate the reinsertion of 
guerrilla rebels into civil life, and their functions included coordinating the institutional 
offer of health, education, working skills and employment opportunities (Villarraga, 
2006:31; OACP/ACR, 2010:133). Between 1990 and 1994 the total number of PRVC 
beneficiaries was 4,715 ex-rebels who demobilised collectively as part of peace 
settlements, while between 1998 and 2001 the programme provided services to 2,505 
ex-combatants who had deserted from the active guerrillas (Pinto et al, 2002:1).  
Under Uribe‟s government, however, the PRVC was appointed to provide reintegration 
services to both collective and individual demobilisations alike. In less than two years, 
the number of users skyrocketed: between December 2003 and August 2005, the PRVC 
was in charge of 16,596 ex-soldiers: 8,796 from collective demobilisations and 7,800 
from individual demobilisations (Angel, 2005:197). The PRVC was no longer able to 
cope with this new level of demand – more than five times higher than previously –, 
simply because its budget and resources did not increase at the same rate. Such lack of 
resource and forward capacity was evident in the estimated ratio of around 1,500 to 
2,000 ex-combatants for one social worker (Interview Villamizar; Reintegration 
Officers No. 73, 128, 141, 143; MAPP-10, 2007:6).  
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Moreover, the PRVC did not deliver reinsertion aid directly, but relied instead on its 
regional offices – Reference and Opportunity Centres – to coordinate with the sub-
national authorities (Ministry of the Interior, 2006:23). By 2006, there were eight of 
these centres located in Bogotá, Medellín and four other mid-sized cities
86
. Additionally, 
there were three mobile units to provide services to other rural areas. It was expected 
that after the demobilisation phase, these centres would work as a form of walk-in 
service with the following functions: a) to facilitate bureaucratic procedures for 
requesting the judicial benefits, as well as obtaining IDs and other documents
87
; b) to 
establish links with other sub-national institutions in order to provide services in health, 
education, psychological aid, vocational training and legal advice; and c) to monitor and 
evaluate the reintegration process in general (Angel, 2005:201; Procuraduría, 2006b:43). 
However, by 2006 the MAPP reported that 35 per cent of the demobilised population 
had not received the services to which they were entitled (MAPP-7, 2006:9).  
In sum, the reinsertion activities implemented from 2003 to 2006 were marred by a lack 
of planning and engagement from both the central government and the paramilitary 
leaders. Whether due to the under-estimation of combatant troop numbers, or their 
inflation by the paramilitary leaders, the strategy and resources dedicated to providing 
services to the demobilised proved limited and ineffective. Ultimately, the institutions 
that were in charge of ex-combatant reintegration collapsed, and the DDR process 
entered into a period of crisis.  
4.2 Reintegration at the Sub-National Level 
In 2007, the PRVC office was closed down and replaced by that of the ACR. However, 
in the interim between the first demobilisations in 2003 and the creation of the ACR, the 
Mayoral offices of Medellín and Bogotá developed programmes to provide services to 
the demobilised population migrating to or already living there (Table 5). The two cities 
are the largest and most economically significant in the country, thus the flow of 
demobilised occurred for several reasons: for one, the government purposely sent the 
demobilised there to facilitate the bureaucratic procedures and their physical protection. 
Secondly, the demobilised chose to migrate there voluntarily, drawn to the better 
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provision of and access to public services and employment opportunities, and by the 
prospect of maintaining one‟s privacy and anonymity more easily (Acosta et al, 2007:22, 
64; FIP, 2005:3). Thirdly, compared to other cities, Medellín and Bogotá have more 
sub-national institutions that operate independent of the central state, a stronger 
economy and a broader proportion of the middle class. This translates into municipal 
authorities that can operate with real autonomy from both the national government and 
the unsettling dynamics of the conflict in the regions (Gutierrez et al, 2009:8). It is 
important to note, however, that although both cities have acted as recipients of the 
migrant demobilised population, the armed conflict had effected them differently, and 
consequently their security needs and approaches to reintegration also varied: Bogotá 
mainly hosted individually demobilised ex-guerrillas, while Medellín for the most part 
received the flow of the paramilitary collective demobilisations (Foro Bogota, 2006:17; 
Villamizar, 2005:15; Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007a).  
YEAR PROGRAMME INSTITUTION 
1994-2003 Programme of Reincorporation to the Civil Life 
(PRVC) 
Ministry of the Interior 
1994-2003 Reincorporation into Civilian life Mayoral Office of 
Medellín 2003 Peace and Reconciliation 
2004 
Complementary Services to the Demobilised 
Population  (PAPDRB) 
Mayoral Office of 
Bogotá 
2007-2012 High Commission for Reintegration (ACR) 
Presidency 
2012 Colombian Agency for Reintegration 
     Table 5. Reinsertion and Reintegration Programmes in Colombia 
 
The first democratic election of Mayors in 1988 and the new constitution in 1991 
transformed the role of the Mayors by giving them political independence and greater 
powers. Specifically, in terms of security, there was a division of functions whereby the 
Mayors assumed the protection of the citizens, while central government became 
responsible principally for threats to national security. In practice, however, this 
division proved rather hazy and brought ambiguity into the chain of command of police 
forces at the municipal level, and has been subject for political negotiations ever since 
(Gutierrez et al., 2009:8). At the time of the demobilisation, Bogotá and Medellín had 
elected Mayors who contested Uribe‟s electoral majorities in the rest of the country88.  
                                                 
88
 The mayors had been elected for the period 2004-2007.  
118 
 
On the one hand, Sergio Fajardo claimed victory in Medellín by creating a centrist 
coalition including left-, centrist and right-wing politicians, disrupting the traditional bi-
partisan electoral dynamic for the first time. The outgoing Mayor Luis Pérez, had been 
accused of corruption and tolerating the activity of the paramilitary groups in the city, 
and he had agreed with the central government that Medellín‟s Mayoralty would 
provide reinsertion services to the members of the Cacique Nutibara Bloc. On the other, 
Bogotá‟s Mayoral Office is considered to be the second most important political post in 
Colombia after the Presidency. In 2004, the electorate voted in a leftist union leader, 
Luis Eduardo Garzón
89
, in a significant break from the trend of electing centrist Mayors 
that had begun in 1995.  
The Fajardo-led coalition in Medellín, as well as the last three Mayors of Bogota
90
, had 
a major impact on how local politics tackled urban security problems, namely by 
addressing public service provision and improving public institutions (Gutierrez et al, 
2009:14). Although their governing styles varied greatly, these politicians brought about 
a new emphasis on creating more and better links between the municipal authorities and 
their citizens. While the former would improve the provision of services and the level of 
accountability, the latter would commit to using the mechanisms of democratic 
participation to flag their grievances. Through this process, the inhabitants would 
replace their expressions of violence with civic behaviours more conducive to caring for 
their city. The approach favoured by the Mayoral Offices of Bogotá and Medellín was 
therefore radically different from that of the Presidential Office: while national security 
placed the emphasis on dismantling the paramilitaries and defeating the guerrillas, at the 
local level the security problem was tackled in terms of coexistence and integration. 
 
Against this political backdrop, during the demobilisation phase Medellín took over 
responsibilities to provide services of reintegration. Meanwhile, Bogotá provided an 
arena for sense-checking, contesting and redefining the policy passed down from the 
national government. It is also worth noting here that the activities of these municipal 
programmes had no constitutional mandate. Instead, they functioned as a form of social 
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programme for a marginalised population, providing assistance to the demobilised in 
tandem with those services that, in principle, were the responsibility of the state and its 
central institutions.  
Peace and Reconciliation Programme – Mayoral Office of Medellín 
Medellín was one of the most violent cities in the world during the 1990s. Despite being 
the largest and most modernised city in the north-west of the country, it was the 
epicentre of the violence produced by the drug-cartels, paramilitaries and guerrilla 
groups. More broadly, Medellín is the capital of the department of Antioquia, a crucial 
stronghold for any group involved in illegal activities due to its strategic location: close 
to both oceans and connecting the centre of the country to the north coast and to Central 
America. Historically, too, the presence of large areas of cattle ranching, agribusiness 
plantations and factories of national companies and multinationals made Antioquia an 
important area for the guerrilla struggle in the 1980s. In the 1990s the region then 
witnessed a prolonged period of armed conflict between the EPL, ELN and FARC 
guerrillas, and between these groups and the paramilitaries, for the control of key 
territories and strategic corridors. By the 2000s the paramilitary groups had triumphed 
and conquered the city, but the violence continued in the form of internecine fighting 
until the alliance between Don Berna and the AUC gave the former the military support 
he needed to defeat his competitor, the Metro Block (Gutierrez and Jaramillo, 2004:28; 
Echandía, 2006:150; Arias and Guáqueta, 2008:15).  
As the majority of the collective demobilisations took place in areas previously 
controlled by the paramilitary groups, i.e. the north and the north-west, Medellín‟s 
Mayor had a primary role to play in the reinsertion phase. Between 2003 and 2006, nine 
different paramilitary groups demobilised in Antioquia, two of them in Medellín itself: 
the Cacique Nutibara Bloc and Héroes de Granada Bloc. By 2006, 4,130 ex-
paramilitaries were living in the city and 10,844 in Antioquia, constituting 13 per cent 
and 34 per cent respectively of all the collective demobilisations (Alcaldía de Medellín, 
2007a:15). By 2008, only 10 per cent of ex-combatants living in Antioquia had 
demobilised individually (Aguirre, 2010:216). The city thus proved vitally important in 
providing services to the flow of demobilised who already lived in the city; and in 
receiving those ex-combatants migrating from Antioquia and other nearby less 
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developed states in which the paramilitaries operated, such as Córdoba, Sucre and 
Santander.  
Moreover, Medellín‟s role went far beyond the number of people receiving services. 
The Mayor‟s Office took centre stage in the demobilisation and reintegration of the 
Cacique Nutibara. Although the signed La Ceja Agreement stated that the national 
government should take responsibility for reintegrating these troops, it also tasked the 
Municipality of Medellín with: developing a strategy of verification, monitoring and 
tracking of the status of the demobilised population and the recipient communities; 
overseeing the reintegration process as it developed; providing jobs to the ex-
combatants by hiring them as temporary contractors (as city gardeners, street cleaners or 
traffic controllers); and delivering security and psychosocial services to the demobilised 
population. In reality, the Mayor‟s Office in Medellín transcended its initial support role, 
and effectively assumed responsibility for all the aforementioned functions before going 
on to create a reintegration model of its own.  
When the demobilisation and disarmament phases began, Medellín already had a 
reintegration programme that had been implemented during the demobilisation of 
guerrillas and militia groups in the 1990s: the Reincorporation to Civility Programme. 
The new programme of demobilisation had already been arranged with the outgoing 
Mayor Luis Pérez, and then imposed on Fajardo‟s incoming administration, leaving him 
with no option but to implement a strategy for reintegration (Gutierrez and Jaramillo, 
2004:28; Interview Officer No. 46). He thus replaced the former programme by creating 
“Peace and Reconciliation” to tackle coexistence problems and pursue development 
aims in regard to the demobilised and the victims of violence (Salazar, 2007:8).  
Although no legal or formal agreement was signed, in practice, Peace and 
Reconciliation took over the reintegration of ex-soldiers who were the product of 
collective demobilisations, while the PRVC provided services to the individual ones 
(Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007a:9), alleviating the pressure created on the national 
programme due to the overflow of new users. Additionally, this informal division of 
work meant that Peace and Reconciliation was forced to deal with the pitfalls of the 
central administration‟s DDR policy, as well as the loopholes in the agreement between 
the paramilitary leaders and the national government. Consequently, the Mayor‟s Office 
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was compelled to find solutions and deliver services even though their procedures had 
not yet been clearly established.  
Although the Ministry of the Interior transferred financial support to Peace and 
Reconciliation, Medellín also had to allocate important resources from its own local 
budget (Ministry of the Interior, 2006:24; Alcaldía de Medellin, 2006:141). In turn, 
Peace and Reconciliation took on further functions, such as giving legal advice 
regarding the status of the demobilised population, an activity that was beyond the 
Mayor‟s scope of action. To tackle this situation, Peace and Reconciliation assembled 
its own team of lawyers, but this initiative proved unsuccessful due to the political 
debates taking place in Congress over the legal framework for reintegration. Moreover, 
Medellín‟s programme designed a software for tracking the legal situation of each ex-
combatant, and the services provided to them (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007a:45).  
The Mayor‟s Office was also faced with the problems and challenges of reintegrating 
ex-combatants into a specific community. This raised two main concerns: firstly, the 
immediate consequences of a sudden increase in inhabitants, which brought with it 
pressure to provide housing and jobs as well as health and education services. Secondly, 
there was the question of how to avoid perceptions of “preferences towards the 
perpetrators” and possible discrimination against the ex-combatants, while at the same 
time addressing the grievances of the many victims of the paramilitary groups (Alcaldía 
de Medellín, 2007a:11). Specifically, with this latter aim in mind, Medellín created a 
model for reintegration named “Return to Legality”, whose mission was to contribute to 
the reconciliation process in the city by merging two previously separated areas of 
operation: the reintegration process of ex-combatants and the social care of victims of 
violence (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007a:14; Salazar, 2007:8).  
Peace and Reconciliation would now target both populations: the demobilised were 
entitled to services in psychology, education, employment skills training, income 
generation support and legal advice, while the victims of violence could also access 
psychological counselling and legal advice. Remarkably, the Mayor‟s Office adopted an 
integrated approach: creating an inter-institutional board on reintegration and fostering 
inter-administrative programmes seeking to address security problems in the city, for 
instance by promoting educational models of non-violence (MAPP-8, 2007:2). As such, 
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Peace and Reconciliation not only delivered services and activities but also coordinated 
with other institutions in the following areas: prevention of violence; social care for 
victims of violence and vulnerable communities; rehabilitation of perpetrators of 
violence; and, of course, achieving the reintegration of ex-combatants into society 
(Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007a).  
There were seven direct lines of action regarding the reintegration of ex-combatants:  
psychosocial care, education, income generation, legal advice, security, research in 
urban conflict and mediation, and institutional strengthening (Alcaldía de Medellín, 
2007a:14; Foro Bogota, 2006:38). On the educational front, the adult education institute 
CEPAR
91
 was built in the downtown area to provide literacy, primary and high school 
education and other courses for adults (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2011a). For economic 
reintegration, Medellín was also able to make alliances with the private sector at the 
local level, offering access to employment skills workshops, internships and jobs 
(Procuraduría, 2011:70). Likewise, Peace and Reconciliation ensured its users were 
enrolled in the national health system and collaborated with other health institutions to 
offer a variety of workshops on issues such as nutrition, hygiene, stress management 
and recreation (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007a:24). More significantly, Medellín extended 
its reintegration services beyond the 18-month scope  initially established by central 
government, pointing to the need for a longer and more sustainable reintegration 
strategy (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007a:8, 2007b:17; MAPP-8, 2007:13).  
When the ACR started operating in 2007, it implemented Return to Legality as the 
reintegration model nationwide for two years (ACR, 2009:3; OACP/ACR, 2010:161). 
However, in 2009 the ACR decided to develop a strategy more suited to its needs as a 
national institution and underwent an internal reorganisation. In this transition, the 
director of Peace and Reconciliation assumed the simultaneous role of first director of 
the Social Reintegration Unit inside the ACR, whose main task was to design a new 
national reintegration model (OACP/ACR, 2010:168). It is also worthy of note here that 
the Mayor of Medellín provided resources to the MAPP Mission to hire six contractors 
working as observers in the city (MAPP-7, 2006:2); as one of the founding tasks of the 
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Mission was to seek out sponsorship with which to carry out its mandate (MAPP-1, 
2004:2), it paradoxically also included the budget of the Municipality of Medellín. 
In sum, the Mayor‟s Office played an integral role in achieving the effective 
reintegration of a significant proportion of the ex-paramilitary soldiers in Medellín 
(Palou and Llorente, 2009:30). Using its own financial and human resources, the 
Municipality took over responsibility for providing services to many of the ex-soldiers 
in areas such as education, income generation and legal advice. These services were 
also extended to the receiving communities and to the victims of violence. More 
importantly, a local reintegration programme was created that came to lay the 
foundations for the psychological counselling and integrated services that are now 
implemented nationwide by the ACR programme. 
Peace and Reconciliation arguably contributed to the sustainability of the peace 
agreements by supplementing the paramilitary leader‟s rationale of pursuing political 
aims by controlling violence in the area (Palou and Llorente, 2009:30). Certainly, after 
the demobilisation of the Cacique Nutibara Bloc, security in the city improved at an 
impressive speed: the homicide rate decreased from 98.2 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants 
in 2004, to 29.4 in 2006 (MAPP-10, 2007:4). And whereas the reduction of violence 
does not necessarily mean that the drug trade have come to an end, it allowed the 
municipal authorities to address social inclusion and citizen welfare in the poorest areas. 
Finally, the services to the Cacique Nutibara members paved the way for further 
demobilisations. Should the reintegration process have failed in Medellín, 
demobilisation across the whole of Colombia could have experienced a knock-on effect, 
with paramilitary leaders and soldiers from other regions rejecting the process outright.  
Programme of Services to the Process of Demobilisation and Reintegration in 
Bogotá D.C. – PAPDRB 
In Bogotá, the reintegration took the form of internal migration. Mayor Garzón referred 
to the increasing inward migration of both the demobilised and the internal displaced 
population to Bogotá as a “time-bomb” for the security of the city (El Tiempo, 
06/03/05b). By 2005, 85 per cent of the individual demobilised population was living in 
Bogotá, only 7 per cent of whom were born in the city (Santander and Villamizar, 
2006:17; Foro Bogota, 2006:41). In contrast, only 347 people from the collective 
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demobilisations chose to live in the capital (Pretelt, 2006:29). By 2006 the Ministry of 
Defence reported that Bogotá hosted 1,513 individually demobilised people; 119 were 
living in Medellin and 60 in Cali
92
 (Procuraduría, 2006b:29). In 2011, the number of ex-
combatants living in the capital had reached 7,000, more than 80 per cent from 
individual demobilisations (PAPDRB, 2011). 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the bureaucratic procedure post-desertion was  
designed to transfer the ex-combatants to military compounds mostly located in Bogotá. 
Thereafter they were housed in shelters for several months until they were able to rent a 
place of their own in the city in which they chose to live. The ex-combatant and his 
family could decide to remain in one of the shelters, but it was more common for them 
to live in independent homes, as the demobilised received an additional monthly 
allowance for each family member (OACP/ACR, 2010:102; ACR). It was then expected 
that they could achieve independence from the government‟s reinsertion aid. 
Arguably, the ex-guerrilla members chose to remain in the anonymity of a metropolis of 
7 million people for security reasons, namely to avoid being found by their former 
comrades:  
It took me four years to escape, it was not easy. It was four years thinking about 
how to flee and avoid getting caught and killed. In many cases the ones who 
deserted were found and killed the very next day. I was trying to avoid that, 
because if I was in a rush I would not be able to leave, as it happened many times.  
(Interview ex-combatant No. 21) 
Bogotá has not suffered the effects of violence to the same extent as Medellín, since 
governability is stronger in the capital and drug-trafficking and armed conflict are less 
evident. DDR was hence initially perceived as something far removed from the 
everyday lives of Bogotá‟s inhabitants, and thus beyond the scope of action and 
responsibility of the municipal authorities. However, between 2004 and 2005 isolated 
incidents of violence raised awareness of the demobilised living in otherwise quiet 
neighbourhoods, bringing unwanted media attention and engendering uneasy feelings 
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towards these newcomers. At the root of these problems, the shelters strategy had itself 
entered a period of crisis. 
The Peace Homes were shelters provided by the government to the demobilised and 
their families. Although these fell under the direct responsibility of the Ministry of the 
Interior, they were operated by private contractors who rented properties in the city. As 
fostering desertions from the guerrillas was crucial to the Policy of Democratic Security, 
the Ministry of the Interior had to open more shelters to receive the stream of 
newcomers. Seventy-six of these homes were created in Bogotá, three in Medellín and 
twelve in other cities (El Tiempo, 21/05/05; FIP, 2005:2; PAPRDB, 2010). The Bogotá 
Mayor‟s Office played no part in the PRVC and had little communication with the 
Ministry of the Interior in that respect; as a result, the creation or operation of these 
shelters were never subject to consultation with the municipal authorities (Interview 
Villamizar) or the wider community (El Tiempo, 20/02/05; 27/11/04). Furthermore, the 
PRVC did not follow any municipal protocol to authorise the functioning of the shelters, 
and there were 24 formal complaints from citizens asking for the closure of these homes 
(El Tiempo 11/04/05).  
Apart from sporadic visits from officials or the police, living conditions and security 
within shelters were dependent on the contractor‟s will or logistical capacity (Interview 
Cárdenas). Some beneficiaries have mentioned positive experiences of these shelters as 
places of peace and reconciliation, but the majority of these homes were run according 
to a market-oriented logic (Ramirez, 2005:182). Designed to work according to demand, 
each private contractor had to provide the demobilised and his family with housing, 
food, clothes, toiletries and transport subsidies (Angel, 2006:208; OACP-ACR, 
2010:164). In turn, the contractors were paid by the number of people receiving 
reintegration aid, which led to practices such as deliberate overcrowding of shelter 
buildings, lowering of the quality of food and services, and the allowing of poor, 
unhygienic living conditions (Interview Villamizar; Interview Cárdenas). Although 
these shelters were designed as temporary accommodation, stays were frequently 
extended by months at a time, most of which was spent idle since no education, jobs or 
other activities were provided by the PRVC (Reintegration Officer No. 28; Interview 
Cárdenas; Pax Christy, 2006:24).  
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Not surprisingly, the deteriorating conditions in the shelters resulted in increasing 
tensions between their inhabitants and the community and the authorities. To illustrate 
this point: the demobilised took to the streets of Bogotá in protest against the 
government on the basis of the poor living conditions in the shelters and delays to their 
cash payments (El Tiempo 29/06/05; 06/03/05), while the police received complaints 
regarding noise and public unrest in residential areas, which ended in clashes (El 
Tiempo 17/07/04; 16/08/04; 03/03/05; 29/06/05). More significantly, between 2004 and 
2005 serious security problems became apparent when some shelters were attacked by 
gunmen (El Tiempo 18/02/04; 24/07/04); a woman was killed by three participants in 
the reintegration programme (El Tiempo 12/11/04); a murder was committed inside one 
of the shelters (El Tiempo 29/06/05); there was a grenade attack in another (El Tiempo 
12/01/04); and a small bomb exploded in a Peace Home located in the central 
neighbourhood of Teusaquillo (El Tiempo 15/03/05). 
This last event triggered a reaction from Bogotá‟s Mayor, who made a public appeal to 
the national government asking for immediate corrective actions. That night, in an 
emergency meeting between Mayor Garzón and President Uribe, other problems came 
to light: such as the fact that the Mayor‟s Office and the Ministry of the Interior had 
conflicting data on the number of shelters functioning in the capital (El Tiempo 
16/03/05). Uribe recognised these failings and decided to close the homes located in the 
metropolitan area, transferring them to the countryside (Interview Villamizar; Foro 
Bogotá, 2006; El Tiempo 16/07/05, 30/11/05). However, critics pointed to the fact that 
isolating the demobilised would in no way contribute to their reintegration and, rather 
than solving the problem, merely shifted it into cities with fewer resources, jobs or 
education opportunities (FIP, 2005:2). As a result, this crisis prompted the revision and 
later dismantling of the housing scheme nationwide (Pretelt, 2006:27; El Tiempo, 
18/07/05, 10/11/05), which would later result in the rewriting of the entire reinsertion 
strategy.   
Prior to the shelter crisis, Garzón had already planned to create an office to tackle the 
constant flow of demobilised into the city. The shelter crisis expedited this process, and 
on May 2005 the Mayor‟s Office launched the Programme of Complementary Services 
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to the Process of Demobilisation and Reintegration in Bogotá (PAPDRB)
93
, under the 
administration of the Office of Security and Coexistence. To this day, the services 
provided by the PAPDRB have included legal advice, income generation support and 
community reconciliation activities. Additionally, other services in health and recreation 
have been provided in cooperation with other departments in the Mayor‟s Office 
(PAPRDB, 2010).  
Apart from making direct improvements to the quality of life of the demobilised, the 
PAPRDB also aimed to achieve some readjustment in the national policies for 
reintegration. In its original design, then, the Bogotá programme intended to open up 
channels of communication and so bring together the three different, sometimes 
antagonistic, parties in the DDR process: the national government, the community and 
the demobilised population (Villamizar, 2005:18). Moreover, the PAPRDB cultivated a 
nationwide debate by helping to organise conciliatory meetings (El Tiempo 11/04/2005; 
11/05/2005), as well as forums in Medellín (Foro Medellin, 2006) and in Bogotá (Foro 
Distrital, 2005; Foro Bogotá, 2006) to address reintegration problems at the municipal 
level.  
Given the particular circumstances of the shelter crisis, the Bogotá authorities took on 
the role of critiquing the reintegration process, rather than enduring it as Medellín‟s 
Mayor had. Remarkably, the PAPDRB was in a position to illustrate the ex-combatant‟s 
perspective: its two directors were former guerrilla members who had demobilised in 
the 1990s. By 2012 it also included ex-FARC, ex-ELN and ex-paramilitaries on its 
working team (Reintegration Officer No. 30). Perhaps because of this, Bogotá has 
continued to play a critical oversight role, highlighting the pitfalls of the DDR policy, 
especially regarding the levels of improvisation in and the lack of planning before the 
reintegration phase. The PAPDRB helped to create space for discussion that, among 
other topics, strongly criticised the use of individual demobilisations as part of the 
counterinsurgency strategy pursued by Uribe‟s government (PAPDRB, 2010:22, 28; 
Foro Distrital, 2005 and Foro Bogotá, 2006). More broadly, the PAPRDB remains an 
important point of reference for both the demobilised and the local authorities, as it also 
runs joint activities with the ACR, although in many cases this is achieved through 
                                                 
93
 Acronym in Spanish: Programa de Atención al Proceso de Desmovilización y Reinserción en Bogotá. 
128 
 
personal agreements among staff rather than institutional coordination (PAPDRB, 2011; 
Reintegration Officer No. 30, 31).  
The Peace Homes remained as shelters, but they were reduced in number and returned 
to their original function as venues for short-term reinsertion activities immediately 
following demobilisation. Their renewed aim was “to re-signify the life experiences that 
the ex-combatant had inside the armed group, to develop skills for them to live in 
legality and civility, to educate the demobilised with regard to the national institutions 
and services whose aid they are entitled to during the reintegration process” 
(OACP/ACR, 2010:165). By 2010 there were 17 Peace Homes still operating in Bogotá, 
but all were placed under the close monitoring of the Mayor‟s Office94 (PAPDRB, 
2010:19). 
From another perspective, it could be said that the security issues in Bogotá were not a 
threat to the state‟s monopoly of force, nor to the sovereignty of the national or sub-
national administrations: the individual demobilised were deserters from the guerrillas 
who were highly unlikely to return to their groups, and whose involvement in 
criminality was relatively low. Furthermore, the think-tank Ideas Para La Paz concluded 
that the shelters did not necessarily pose a security problem for the city. They argued 
that armed groups had not targeted the deserters or the shelters as expected, as there had 
been no other violent episodes apart from those that occurred around the time of the 
shelter crisis. Indeed, by 2004, 55 per cent of the individually demobilised were living 
in independent homes rather than shelters, and only 31 of the 34,699 crimes committed 
in Bogotá that year involved ex-combatants under the supervision of the PRVC. 
Similarly, most of the complaints made were more applicable to coexistence and 
“inappropriate behaviours” rather than specific involvement in crime (FIP, 2005:3). 
Regardless, the failures in reintegration nationwide only became apparent when the 
consequences of flawed policy reached the capital city in the form of social protest and 
unrest. The Mayor‟s Office then fostered debates on a national scale and created an 
arena in which to redefine the institutions and policies of central government, a process 
that also prompted the creation of the ACR.  
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4.3 Legitimacy, ownership and security at the sub-national level  
There are three main challenges to successful reintegration at the municipal level. The 
first is the immediate overloading of municipal social services that result from the 
sudden population increase, and the subsequent surge in levels of poverty and 
unemployment. This reflects the fact that the municipalities were faced with 
reintegrating the low- and mid-ranking ex-combatants rather than the leaders and 
warlords who negotiated their own privileges with the national government (Foro 
Bogotá, 2006). To counter these problems, Peace and Reconciliation and PAPRDB 
provided extra services in income generation and employment, including recruitment 
advice, job allocation and training, as well as support for small and family businesses 
(Alcaldía de Medellín, 2011b; Interview Officer No.31). Both programmes also 
improved the economic situation of the demobilised population by entering into 
partnerships with the private sector to offer job placements and training in a variety of 
skills, targeted at the local level and specifically at the recipient communities.  
The second challenge refers to the social rejection of the demobilised and to widespread 
discrimination against them as a whole. In response, Peace and Reconciliation and the 
PAPDRB carried out activities for integration as well as for reparation and forgiveness, 
which helped to reduce cases of discrimination and other grievances within the recipient 
communities (Alcaldía de Medellin, 2007a; PAPRDB, 2010). Most notably, the 
Mayors‟ Offices had more flexibility than the central government in providing services 
to people outside the targeted population, i.e. the families of ex-combatants and other 
vulnerable populations (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2011b; Reintegration Officer No.31). For 
example, aside from ex-paramilitary and ex-guerrilla members, the CEPAR in Medellín 
provides primary and high-school education to four different social programme groups: 
victims of violence; youth at risk of crime or prostitution; the homeless; and former 
prisoners (Reintegration Officer No.38; Alcadía de Medellín, 2011a:69). Contrary to 
what might be expected, no major incident or violent action has been reported on 
CEPAR premises. Although students come from a broad spectrum of marginalised 
groups, they share the premises in a peaceful manner, following the code of practice – a 
type of coexistence manual – that prescribes appropriate behaviour within the institution. 
During my fieldwork interviews, the board of directors and teaching staff working at 
CEPAR agreed that, although the process has been far from easy, considerable effort 
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has been made to preserve the neutrality of the institution and to encourage students to 
appreciate CEPAR as an opportunity to overcome poverty and marginalisation 
(Reintegration Officers No.38, No.46, No.58 and Interview Teachers CEPAR). 
Pursuing the same end but by different means, the PAPDRB did not create a separate 
institution for education provision but rather encouraged the use of pre-existing adult 
education and literacy programmes created for the entire Bogotá population. This 
encouraged the demobilised to take up this the offer of social care as any other citizen 
would (Interview Villamizar). In this way, both programmes have achieved some 
balance in attending to the needs of both demobilised and the non-combatant population. 
The third key challenge lies in how to establish effective collaboration between 
municipal and national authorities. At the outset of the process, there were no channels 
of communication and cooperation between the sub-national authorities and the national 
government (Foro Bogotá, 2006:24; Interview Officer No. 141). Indeed, even in cities 
where the Reference and Opportunity Centres were located there was no legal or 
functional link with the municipal authorities (FSD, 2008:20). No Mayor‟s Office in the 
country had access to information on the number or status of the demobilised living in 
their cities, and as a result only recognised them when problems arose. Buenaventura‟s 
Mayor even declared that he thought the demobilised did not fall under his jurisdiction, 
and that he only became aware of this reality when they started to be killed in his city 
(Foro Bogotá, 2006:48). 
Communication, coordination and decentralisation were therefore stressed by the 
Mayors as the crucial factors in their dialogues with the Ministry of the Interior. Garzón 
and other Mayors asked the national government to transfer resources and 
responsibilities for reintegration activities to the municipal authorities (Foro Bogotá, 
2006). It was argued that delegating the implementation of the programme to the 
municipalities had the potential to strengthen their political commitment, leaving to the 
national offices the tasks of monitoring and control (FSD, 2008:20). Certainly, 
decentralisation would encourage a sense of ownership in the sub-national authorities 
by increasing their ability to respond to their own security needs, which in turn would 
help to reinforce the legitimacy of national policy. The Mayors also have a greater 
capacity to act at the street level, interacting with the existing social networks (Interview 
MAPP). On the down side, the municipal institutions run the risk of being appropriated 
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and manipulated by local illegal agents. To mitigate this possibility, the ACR decided to 
open more regional offices, thereby strengthening the lines of communication with the 
municipalities rather than delegating their functions to the Mayors (OACP, 2010).   
The shelter crisis crystallised all of these grievances and brought them to the attention 
of central government. To tackle these issues, the National Department of Planning 
recommended several strategies: to create regional and local plans for reintegration; to 
strengthen communication and coordination between central offices and municipal 
governments; and to integrate the demobilised within local welfare programmes and 
social networks (DNP, 2006:33). More specifically, the sub-national authorities urged 
the creation of a revised and unified national reintegration policy with which they could 
themselves engage: although they were very critical of Uribe‟s approach to the DDR, 
both the Mayor of Bogotá (Garzón, 2006:18) and the Governor of Antioquia (Gaviria, 
2005:27) declared the need for a reintegration strategy and their willingness to 
implement it. Likewise the Mayor of Medellín, Sergio Fajardo, stated:  
Back to the beginning: from the financing to the detailed management of the 
process, national leadership is required. We urge the creation of an 
administrative structure, under the direction of a High Commission with political 
recognition, with broad powers to coordinate the local and the national 
governments, to channel international aid and to motivate the participation of 
Colombians. That is the only way we can make reintegration a unified national 
aim.  
(Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007b:12) 
Reporting on a workshop with the municipal authorities from cities with less political 
leverage than Bogotá and Medellín, Rivas and Mendez (2008:14) concluded that 
neglecting the municipal authorities directly influenced their resistance to the 
implementation of the national programme for reintegration. The Colombian 
government was seen to have acted ambiguously by ignoring the sub-national 
authorities during the negotiation and demobilisation phases, while still requesting their 
active participation in the reinsertion itself. Subsequently, the municipal authorities had 
little political motivation to implement the reinsertion policies, not only due to the 
initial confusion and lack of knowledge and resources, but also the fear of being seen as 
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accomplices to the illegal activities of the paramilitary groups (Rivas and Mendez, 2008; 
Reintegration Officer No. 128). Similarly, as municipal authorities had neither a 
commitment to nor a role in the negotiation, demobilisation or disarmament phases, 
they felt utterly detached from the central policy of reintegration (FSD, 2008:17; 
Conpes 3554:24). In turn, providing services to the demobilised was perceived as an 
imposition from central government, and added source of financial, administrative and 
political strain on sub-national authorities (Acosta et al, 2007:48). In Cordoba, for 
instance, demobilisation took place in small towns that had officially been declared 
bankrupt
95
 and that already played host to monumental social problems, such as 
receiving large numbers of the internal displaced population (Reintegration Officer No. 
143).  
Therefore, the approach taken by the municipalities of Medellín and Bogotá, working 
independently of the Presidential chain of command, favoured the contestation of the 
over-emphasis on security inherent in the Policy of Democratic Security and instead 
urged a reintegration strategy that also included the needs of the wider communities, 
mainly but not solely, with regard to the DDR. 
4.4 The ACR programme 
 
At its inception in 2007, the ACR had three main objectives: first, to develop a more 
sustainable and long-term strategy for the reintegration of ex-combatants; second, to 
include the communities in the process; and third, to achieve better and longer-term 
coordination between the national and sub-national authorities (OACP/ACR, 2010:11; 
Interview Officer No. 17; Interview Cárdenas). The ACR also took up the task of 
unifying the policies of collective and individual reintegration that had hitherto been 
divided and spread across different institutions (FIP, 2007:2). As a primary measure, the 
outsourcing of services was re-evaluated, as it was found to bring with it certain 
problems such as service variation and inconsistency, since each company operated 
autonomously and in accordance with their own approaches and techniques. Hence, in 
the transition from the PRVC to the ACR, one of the main challenges was to unify a 
host of concepts and practices, and create a strategy to provide the services in 
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psychology, education and vocational training to work in tandem with one another 
(OACP/ACR, 2010:163).  
 
In its more regional work, the ACR extended the reintegration services to those areas 
where the ex-combatants were living, bringing the central institutions closer to local 
realities (OACP/ACR, 2010:272). A network of 29 regional offices was established, and 
with it a team of professionals in psychosocial, economic and community reintegration 
and legal advice (OACP/ACR, 2010:325-328). The demobilised were each assigned a 
personal tutor to lead them through the process of psychosocial reintegration, as well as 
monitoring their other activities in education, vocational training and family relations. 
The creation and training of local reintegration teams was based on the Dunbar
96
 
number, which yielded the average ratio of one psychologist per 120 ex-combatants, in 
stark contrast with the previous ratio of 1 social worker per thousands of demobilised 
(OACP/ACR, 2010:168). There were also three liaison officers: two in health and 
education, one in charge of enrolment, and the psychosocial liaison officer, responsible 
for communicating between the regional and central levels of administration, as well as 
coordinating the tutors. In 2009, the figure of godfather/godmother is added to the 
scheme: these were liaison officers in charge of improving the flow of communication 
between the central and regional offices (OACP/ACR, 2010:184).  
These regional teams had the additional function of coordinating policies with the 
municipal authorities. This meant lobbying Mayors, Governors and other authorities to 
include the demobilised as a special population within their policies and budgets, in 
order to facilitate their access to sub-national institutions and local services, as well as 
engaging directly with the recipient communities. This articulation of local agents was 
crucial to the both reconciliation and the reintegration as a whole (OACP/ACR, 
2010:273; Conpes 3554, 2008:10). As a result, by 2010, 17 departments and 132 
municipalities had factored in the demobilised population as part of their local 
government programmes (OACP, 2010:4). 
Internally, the ACR adopted a four-department structure: Social Reintegration Unit, 
Economic Reintegration Unit, Community Work Unit and Risk Prevention and 
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Attention Unit (OACP/ACR, 2010:145). The Social Reintegration Unit orchestrated the 
work of the other three around the psychosocial services (ACR, 2009:4). In 2008, the 
new National Policy of Social and Economic Reintegration (PRSE)
97
 was enacted, with 
two main areas of action: the ex-combatants and the communities. The ACR thus 
became responsible for: a) unifying criteria within the regional reintegration 
programmes; b) coordinating with the sub-national authorities in the national 
implementation of the PRSE; c) evaluating and monitoring the demobilised living in the 
regions; and d) strengthening the channels of communication between sub-national and 
national institutions through the regional offices (Conpes 3554:61). During 2008 and 
2009, additional support services were introduced to address specific needs for women, 
young people, the elderly (those aged 62 and over), the physically disabled and mid-
ranking soldiers, as well as special emphasis being placed on mental health in cases of 
drug and alcohol abuse. New software (SIR) was developed to replace the SAME, and a 
model of education and literacy training was introduced by the Ministry of Education 
(OACP/ACR, 2010:182, 183). In 2009, after Restrepo left the Peace Office, the ACR 
director also temporarily assumed the portfolio of Peace Commissioner (OACP/ACR, 
2010:11). In 2011 and under Santos‟ presidency, the internal structure of the ACR 
changed for a second time: the structure of the Units was dissolved and the tutors would 
no longer have divergent workloads. They were to work instead as integrated 
professionals, with each reintegration officer solely responsible for providing access to 
the health, education and psychological services to all the demobilised in their care 
(OACP/ACR, 2010:186; 2011:11). 
Taken as a whole, then, this process – the reorganising of the PRVC, and the building of 
Peace and Reconciliation, the PAPDRB and the ACR – resulted in the creation of a 
bureaucracy that oversaw the direct provision of services to the demobilised. 
Furthermore, the creation of the ACR also defined which services could be sub-
contracted and those that would be delivered directly by the national government. The 
psychosocial services and the reintegration officers depended on central government, 
while education and health services relied on the municipalities. Other services for 
                                                 
97
 Acronym in Spanish: Política Nacional de Reintegración Social y Económica para personas y grupos 
armados ilegales (Conpes 3554), December 1st, 2008. 
135 
 
economic and community reintegration were monitored by the ACR, albeit by 
outsourcing them to third-party companies (Reintegration Officers No. 20, 31, 49-51).  
It is also worth noting that the central government opted for a strategy of de-
concentrating rather than de-centralising the reintegration policy, creating offices in the 
regions rather than simply transferring funds directly over to the existing regional and 
municipal authorities. However, this strategy also assumes that other sub-national 
authorities will provide services, when at times they may have no capacity to do so. For 
example, adult education should always, in theory, be provided by the Secretary of 
Education for each municipality, as it is a social service provided for a wider poor and 
marginalised population (OACP/ACR, 2010:174; Interview Officer No. 128), but in 
practice there are areas in which the demobilised have no access at all to education. 
Most of the municipalities in the Department of Córdoba, for instance, have no budget 
for this service. Likewise, in Antioquia, the situation may vary from town to town: some 
Mayors want to help but are simply devoid of capacity or resource; others simply offer 
no commitment to the demobilised whatsoever (Aguirre, 2010:110).  
I would like to bring this section to a close by briefly mentioning the consequences that 
all the above changes had for the ex-combatants. In sum, the policies of reintegration 
changed three times. Firstly, all the demobilisations took place under Laws 782 and 975 
before they underwent any legal modifications. Hence, the rank-and-file ex-combatants 
were promised an 18-month reintegration accompanied by a monthly allowance and 
other economic aid for housing and business planning. Secondly, in 2007 this initial 18-
month limit was eradicated
98
; the monthly allowance was also extended but linked to 
compulsory attendance of psychological workshops and basic education and vocational 
courses (Conpes, 3554:5). However, although the demobilised could pursue and 
complete the ACR programme, the criminal investigations against them remained open.  
Thirdly, the situation was finally broached by Law 1424, which declared no amnesty for 
the ex-paramilitaries. They would instead face trial for their political crimes, and their 
sentence could be lifted had they fulfilled certain requirements: confessing all their 
crimes, successfully completing the reintegration programme, contributing to the 
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reconstruction of the history of the violence
99
, and working 80 hours in community 
projects. In July 2012, and for the first time since 2003, the ex-combatants were finally 
allowed to culminate the ACR programme (El Tiempo, 19/06/2012), and since then 
9,081 ex-combatants had graduated from it
100
. 
The creation of the ACR also brought several changes to the DDR process itself. Firstly, 
it consolidated a reintegration strategy by taking elements and lessons learned from 
previous institutions such as the PRVC, Peace and Reconciliation and the PAPDRB. 
Secondly, it unified and extended services to all the demobilised nationwide, managing 
the economic benefits in a way that was personalised to each ex-combatant. Thirdly, it 
sought to properly include the needs of the communities, either by also providing them 
with services or by offering workshops and activities tailored to reconciliation. Fourthly, 
it created a bureaucracy that was trained in full accordance to the ACR programme and 
devoted to coordinating and delivering services to the former combatants. Finally, it 
opened up vital channels of communication at various levels: between the national and 
sub-national authorities, and between the ACR central offices and their regional 
counterparts. The following chapters are dedicated to exploring how the demobilised 
themselves experienced the DDR process, including their own perceptions of the ACR 
programme. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how in the absence of an effective reintegration strategy from 
central government, the municipalities of Medellín and Bogotá were able to create their 
own local reintegration programmes that transcended the initially security-centred and 
combatant-based design of the DDR policy: addressing the needs of both the ex-
combatants and the non-combatant population, as well as introducing policies for the 
welfare of the victims of violence and for the development of the recipient communities. 
It is also important to recall that the reintegration institutions themselves played no part 
in the demobilisation of ex-combatants: they were only able to provide services to those 
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ex-combatants who had been referred by the Ministry of Defence or the Peace 
Commissioner‟s Office. 
Although municipal authorities do not face the challenges of achieving the monopoly of 
force to the same extent as the national government, their policies relating to the 
demobilised vary depending on local security needs and the impact of the conflict on 
each particular territory. As the Bogotá and Medellín municipal administrations were 
more immediately concerned with reconciliation and reconstruction of the social fabric, 
they forged ahead with creating viable conditions for ex-combatant reintegration. 
Furthermore, the sub-national authorities were also able to envisage overarching goals 
to promote stability and security in the country as a whole, contributing from the sub-
national level to the building of state policies and institutions. This was an unexpected 
outcome of their response to the security problems created by the demobilisation at the 
municipal level.  
The respective Mayor‟s Offices tasked themselves with addressing the three main 
challenges to the reintegration: the mounting pressures on municipal social services; the 
need to counteract widespread public rejection of the demobilised, balancing the 
provision of social care to ex-combatants, communities and victims alike; and the 
difficulty of forging strong collaborative links between the municipal and national 
authorities. In response, Peace and Reconciliation and PAPRDB provided extra services 
in income generation and employment to the demobilised, including recruitment advice, 
job allocation and training, as well as support for small and family businesses. 
Additionally, these services were extended to people from other marginalised 
demographics, making the process less combatant-centred and more in line with the 
needs of broader sections of the population. Remarkably, both Mayor‟s Offices 
surpassed their expected roles when the national government had itself failed in 
fulfilling its constitutional duty: they committed material and human resources as well 
as allocating budgets for a variety of activities for ex-combatants and their families. 
They also passed resources upwards from the sub-national to the national level, and 
even to international organisations such as the OAS. 
The ACR, then, was built from the bottom up, and as such, took into account regional 
needs that had been overlooked until then by the DDR policy. The creation of regional 
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offices and the hiring and training of professionals to work directly with the 
demobilised, connected the ex-combatants directly to the central government to some 
extent. In addition, the development of a reintegration strategy defined the services that 
should be provided by the central government or by the municipalities and those that 
could be outsourced. As a result, the ACR has a more forceful role to play in terms of 
state presence and control in areas where municipal governments or other national 
institutions are often found wanting. 
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Chapter 5  
Economic Reintegration: the real value of economic incentives 
In the first chapter I argued that the academic studies and policy-making literature 
around war and political conflict tend to emphasise economic forms of analysis, and to 
overstate greediness, poverty or unemployment as the causes of violence. Accordingly, 
the literature on DDR assumes that ex-combatants are likely to return to arms or to slide 
into criminality as a means of earning a living following their demobilisation. Providing 
aid, money or income opportunities is forwarded then, as a security measure to prevent 
the security problems created by the former combatants during the post conflict. In turn, 
the debates around the economic dimension of reintegration typically focus on strategies 
to integrate the ex-combatants and their dependants in the job market: including the 
provision of cash hand-outs; the need for the creation of employment programmes; or 
the support for business start-ups or other forms of self-employment (IDDRS, 2006, 
4.20:14; UNDPKO, 2010b:22). Such emphasis on the economic aspects of reintegration 
is illustrated in the following excerpt from the UN: 
At the end of a conflict there is often an abrupt release into the labour market of 
thousands of ex-combatants who compete with ordinary civilians for extremely 
scarce jobs and livelihood opportunities. In such circumstances, ex-combatants 
might attempt to use violence to make a living, becoming involved in banditry, 
theft and other forms of illegal and harmful activity. Providing support for the 
reintegration of ex-combatants is therefore vital to help develop alternatives to 
violence-based livelihoods. This support can have an immediate positive effect on 
security and contribute to the improvement of overall economic conditions. 
Economic reintegration will be successful only if the reintegration support 
provides or encourages viable forms of economic activity and is socially 
productive. All interventions must be sustainable to ensure that ex-combatants do 
not turn to violence to earn a living.  
(UNDP, 2006, 4.30:27; emphasis mine) 
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This chapter explores the strategies developed by the ACR reintegration programme to 
fulfill the short and long-term income generation needs of the demobilised. It aims to 
analyse the benefits and challenges of these strategies, and to show how the ACR 
programme was built upon the lessons learned from previous experiences – principally 
from Peace and Reconciliation and the PRVC. The first section describes the short-term 
reintegration aid (provision of cash hand-outs and monthly allowances), the long-term 
reintegration strategies (vocational training, education, and support for employment or 
creating businesses) and the appeal to the private sector. More importantly for this 
research, the second section highlights the fact that despite enormous institutional 
efforts, the majority of ex-combatants were reintegrated into low-income and informal 
work. Nonetheless, the demobilised in this case seem to challenge the common 
assumptions found in the DDR literature, and recidivism is not necessarily their 
preferred option. The final section explores in greater depth the reasons these ex-
combatants expressed for not returning to the armed groups or enrolling into criminal 
bands. 
5.1 Short- and long-term economic reintegration strategies 
 
Short-term: cash hand-outs and monthly allowances 
Short-term reinsertion assistance to the ex-combatants often takes the form of lump 
sums and monthly allowances, for a maximum of one year. However, doubts remain 
over how the money is spent: whether on buying essential items and providing 
economic stability for the ex-combatants and their families, or on buying alcohol and 
weapons. The UN does not provide clear guidance on this matter, and simply advises 
the DDR practitioners and policy-makers to examine the context before taking a 
decision (UNDP, 2006, 4.20:14).  
The agreement reached between the Peace Commissioner and the paramilitary leaders 
in 2003 stated that each ex-combatant would receive a monthly payment of US$240 
over the course of 18 months. Similarly, the policy for individual demobilisations stated 
that each ex-combatant would receive a monthly allowance of $265 plus $90 per family 
member, up to a maximum of around $450 (Pretelt, 2006:27). These amounts exceeded 
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the minimum wage in the country
101
 and functioned as a monthly salary solely on the 
basis of their status as ex-combatants. It was not until 2005, two years after the first 
demobilisations, that compulsory enrolment in basic education and vocational training 
was introduced as a requirement to obtain economic support from the government
102
 
(Conpes 3554, 2008:5). However, this system of payments merely encouraged the 
demobilised to attend as many courses as they could: as there was no control over which 
courses they were taking, some simply attended courses at random or repeated the same 
course several times purely to obtain the resulting economic aid (Reintegration Officer 
No. 27, 49-51, 143, 159). In one interview, one tutor pointed out that, rather than lack of 
or insufficient education, the real problem of the demobilised was that of disparate 
education (Reintegration Officer No. 120). In other words, despite receiving many 
certificates of completion, the ex-combatants never really acquired the skills needed to 
find employment or to generate long-term income (Cartagena Contribution, 2009:69; 
Acosta et al, 2007:65; Reintegration Officer 18-19; Interview Negrete). 
With the creation of the ACR in 2006, these economic stimuli were unified for 
collective and individual demobilisations, and the allowance was reduced to a 
maximum of US$140
103
. In addition, it was concluded that the ACR had to resolve the 
evident lack of planning for future economic and self-development projects in the 
demobilised‟s life as civilians (Conpes 3554, 2008:22). Hence, it was established that 
each demobilised had to figure out a personal life-project during counselling sessions 
with their tutors and, accordingly, to choose their options for education and vocational 
training, as well as their preferred aid for seeking employment or starting a business. 
From the reintegration officer‟s perspective, these adjustments to the policy prompted a 
change in attitude towards reintegration, as the ex-combatants focused more on personal 
development rather than purely on monetary reward. Also, as the economic support was 
now based on merits and achievements, it helped to develop responsibility, discipline 
and a sense of personal progress (Reintegration Officers No. 47, 73, 75-77, 109, 128). 
(Table 6) 
 
                                                 
101
 The minimum salary for 2003 was US$166, for 2004 $180, for 2005 $190 and for 2006 $200 approx. 
102
 Resolution 513/2005. 
103
 Decree 395/2007. 
142 
 
YEAR 2003-2005 2005-2007 2007-2010 
ECONOMIC 
BENEFITS 
COLLECTIVE  
US$240/month 
COLLECTIVE  
US$240/month 
UNIFIED  
US$140 
INDIVIDUAL 
US$265 plus $90 per 
family member/month 
INDIVIDUAL 
US$265 plus $90 per 
family member/month 
REQUIREMENTS Demobilised status 
Basic education and 
vocational training 
Design of a life-
project 
Basic education and 
vocational training 
RESULT 
Little long-term 
investment 
Disparate education Personal development 
Table 6. Evolution of short-term economic aid for collective and individual demobilisations. 
 
Therefore, these monetary incentives became more effective not only when the amount 
was reduced but also when they were more effectively organised around a strategy of 
reintegration. The ACR strategy brought in a process of counselling for each 
demobilised to properly plan out their future, while also giving them the opportunity to 
gain knowledge and evaluate their options through education and vocational training. 
Additionally, the ACR as an institution was forced to develop mechanisms of its own 
with which to guide, monitor and control the progress of each ex-combatant, and 
equally blur the differences set out by the initial DDR policy between former 
paramilitary and guerrilla members. 
It can be concluded, then, that the singular provision of economic aid proves insufficient 
– and can be counter-productive – to reintegration, particularly in the absence of 
policies or programmes that define goals and limits for the demobilised, and which 
engender a genuine sense of personal development based on achievement and progress. 
Nevertheless, it remains essential to address the ex-combatants‟ basic need to gain a 
livelihood for themselves and their families. Yet while these initial payments may 
initially attract the demobilised into certain activities in the reintegration programme, 
the economic incentives should also lay the foundations for their progressive economic 
independence over time, as will be seen in the following section.  
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Long-term: vocational training, employment seeking and Business Plans 
 
The UN has suggested that education and training are the two quintessential strategies 
to achieving a successful long-term economic reintegration (UNDP, 2006, 2.10:6; 
4.20:1, 4.30:27):  
 
Many ex-combatants have missed opportunities for basic and further education, 
and as a result are disadvantaged in the competition for jobs and opportunities. 
Provision of adult literacy classes, adult education, and technical and vocational 
training is important both to improve the skill sets of adult and young ex-
combatants and provide opportunities for reorientation and demilitarisation.  
(UNDP, 2006, 4.30:27) 
 
Certainly, most of the low-ranking demobilised from both paramilitary and guerrilla 
groups belong to a demographic that has very limited access to land and economic 
capital, and thus suffer from significant shortcomings in education (Cartagena 
Contribution, 2009:61). Research has shown that while the majority of the guerrilla 
combatants are poor rural peasants with only primary levels of education, most of the 
paramilitaries lived in marginal urban areas and had incomplete secondary education 
(Gutierrez, 2008:12). At the time of their demobilisation, 60 per cent of the ex-
paramilitaries and 71 per cent of the ex-guerrillas had only primary-school education or 
none whatsoever (Conpes 3554, 2008:16)
104
. Similarly, of those living in Medellín and 
Bogotá, 85 per cent never finished high school (Villegas, 2006:30; Cardenas, 2005:30).  
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Peace and Reconciliation developed certain 
strategies to provide training and work experience to the demobilised: vocational 
training, short-term employability schemes and income generation support. These 
different strategies were maintained by the ACR, albeit in adjusted forms (OACP, 
2010:4; OACP/ACR, 2010:197). Likewise, the PAPDRB in Bogotá continued to 
                                                 
104
 ACR statistics 2015. Chart 6. Educational level. When starting in the reintegration programme, 28.38 
per cent of the ex-combatants participating in the had finished high school. September 2015. 
http://www.reintegracion.gov.co/es/la-reintegracion/Paginas/cifras.aspx 
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provide further support for Business Plans and employment seeking
105
 (PAPDRB, 
2010:62; 2011:30; Reintegration Officer No. 31).  
 
First, the demobilised were enrolled to a massive extent in a variety of short vocational 
courses provided by the National Institute for Work Training (SENA)
106
. This offer of 
vocational training was maintained throughout the entire reintegration process and 
consisted of courses offered by SENA or by ACR contractors
107
, although there was no 
funding for pursuing university degrees. Second, the short-term employability scheme – 
originally put in place by the Medellín Mayor‟s Office – hired ex-combatants on three- 
to six-month contracts to perform a variety of unskilled roles within public 
programmes
108
 (OACP/ACR, 2010:194; Conpes 3554:48; Rodríguez, 2006:116). The 
scheme aimed to introduce the demobilised to the norms and schedules that make up 
everyday working life. As such, the ex-combatants received vocational and 
psychosocial training and were paid a small salary for working up to 80 hours (Conpes 
3554:48; OACP, 2010:4; OACP/ACR, 2010:201). Their activities included assisting the 
Transit Police
109
 or participating in community projects such as the building and 
maintenance of parks, schools and other public areas. Additionally, the demobilised 
were given the opportunity to get some work experience through internships as part of 
SENA vocational courses, or in private companies (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2011b:17).  
 
Immediately after the demobilisation and during the reinsertion phase, it is vitally 
important to keep the demobilised occupied with short-term training courses and job 
creation (Reintegration Officer No. 128). However, this needs to be supported by 
policies and strategies that address the transition into long-term employment and more 
stable forms of income:  
  
                                                 
105
 Programme to Strengthen the Business Projects of the Ex-combatants and their Families 
106
 SENA is a public institution that provides short- and medium-length courses in a wide range of 
working skills. 
107
 This service was mainly founded by USAid and the IOM. 
108
 This included the Institute for Management Sports and Recreation (INDER), Institute for Management 
of Recreational Parks (METROPARQUES), the municipal TV channel (TELEMEDELLIN) and the local 
Secretary of State. 
109
 The scheme was called Salvavías. 
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These initial, often short-term employment opportunities serve several functions. 
They provide demobilised fighters with sufficient income through the transitional 
phase, and provide evidence that they can survive within the civilian economy,  
(Cartagena Contribution, 2009:63)  
 
Training should generally be regarded as a tool for reintegration and not as 
reintegration itself. It should be practical, and should be designed mainly to 
respond to the requirements of the informal sector, which is where most 
microenterprises will start up.  
(UNDP, 2006, 4.30:27)  
 
The third strategy thus targeted more long-term income generation through two main 
activities: employment seeking and Business Plans. Employment seeking had three 
main aims: to broaden the working opportunities for the demobilised in both the private 
sector and self-employment; to facilitate the process of entering into the job market; and 
to reduce the cases of job desertion. The Business Plans, in turn, provided the ex-
combatants with Seed Capital: a lump sum for buying machinery and raw products with 
which to start their own businesses (Conpes 3554:50; OACP, 2010:4). The DDR policy 
offered guerrilla deserters a Seed Capital of US$4,000, but for the paramilitaries was 
negotiated with the leaders that each combatant was entitled to US$1,000. When 
questioning the reintegration officers about the reasons for this difference, their 
response was simply that there was no clarity, and that the only reason they could think 
of was to compensate for the greater risk involved in deserting from the guerrillas 
(Reintegration Officers No. 31, 49-51, 109, 129, 131-132, 157).  
 
However, in their initial forms, each of these strategies – providing vocational training, 
employment and business opportunities – failed in providing long-term employment or 
economic stability (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007a; 2011b; Reintegration Officers No 46, 
54, 47-51). Söderstrom has argued that more research is needed to understand the real 
need of education and training: she found that their relation to economic reintegration 
appears rather weak, whereas their impact in other areas such as personal development 
and political reintegration could be more evident (2011:53). Similarly, a report on 
Bosnia-Herzegovina concluded that rather than lack of training, the ethnic divisions and 
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authoritarian patterns of behaviour acquired during the military life caused 
psychological and behavioural shortcomings that inevitably had a negative impact on 
the economic reintegration of former combatants (BICC, 2003:34). One study in South 
Africa found that the ex-combatants were no less qualified than other civilians to 
compete in the labour market. There had indeed been high unemployment among the 
demobilised, but other factors were seen to have prevented their reintegration:  
 
It could be that their psychological state and interpersonal skills make it difficult 
for them to find and maintain jobs; that employers are reluctant to take on or 
keep ex-combatants; or a combination of both  
(Bandeira, 2008:19).  
 
Prior to ACR, Peace and Reconciliation had witnessed a substantial rate of desertion 
from jobs and courses due to high illiteracy, and lack of skills and experience in non-
military roles. More significantly, the demobilised also displayed a range of 
inappropriate workplace behaviours such as lack of punctuality, threatening superiors 
and co-workers, and severe incapacity to follow rules or respect civilian figures of 
authority (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2011a:16; Reintegration Officers No. 18-19, 48). An 
assessment of their work profiles concluded that the majority of the demobilised had 
low tolerance of frustration (75.4%); problems in dealing with authority and low 
valuing of social rules (74.7%), high levels of anxiety and low self-control (68.8%), as 
well as low self-esteem (51.3%) (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2011b:7). Furthermore, the ex-
combatants were seen to be reproducing patterns of behaviour that were useful in the 
context of war, but highly inappropriate in the civilian life and the workplace 
(Reintegration Officers No. 49-51). 
 
Equally, the demobilised lacked knowledge of or experience in accessing formal 
employment within the legal economy. Their shortcomings in education and social 
capital had a negative effect on their capacity to present the references or to certify the 
formal training required to compete in a normal job selection process (Conpes 3554, 
2008:22; Acosta et al, 2007:66). Their unresolved legal status also resulted in a lack of 
identification and other legal documents, yet another impediment for them in finding 
long-term jobs outside the provision of state aid. This situation also impacted on other 
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aspects of the ex-combatants‟ lives, including their inability to rent a place of their own 
due to a lack of references and other requisite documentation (Foro Bogotá, 2005:182). 
 
The Business Plans also proved to be a failed strategy. By 2006 the director of the 
PRVC calculated that there were around 474 Business Plans (Angel, 2006:12); 
however, during my fieldwork I found that no more than a dozen of these were still in 
place (Reintegration Officers No. 49-51, 53). One study concluded that 135 out of 157 
business associations did not exist any longer by 2007 (ODDR, 2009:16). Similarly, in 
2015 ACR data showed that despite more than 90 per cent of the economic benefits had 
been invested in Business Plans, only 27.11 per cent of the businesses were still 
functioning
110
. Such high level of failure can be attributed to three main factors: firstly, 
the Business Plans were originally addressed to the creation of microbusiness, which 
have a natural and general failure rate of more than 70 per cent (Pax Christy, 2006:49; 
Reintegration Officers 18-19, 49-51). Moreover, in the demobilisations of rebel groups 
during the 1990s this strategy had also been in place, with very little success, mainly 
due to the lack of training or vocational competence among the ex-combatants. More 
globally, developing business skills takes time and inevitably involves a process of trial 
and error; and ultimately not everyone is best suited to entrepreneurial commerce 
(Reintegration Officers No. 18- 19, 31, 49-51, 108, 131-132; Negrete and Andrade, 
2006:176).  
Secondly, there was a strong preference among the demobilised for pursuing 
agricultural enterprises: given that many of them come from peasant backgrounds, they 
consider themselves knowledgeable in rural activities (Reintegration Officers No. 18-
19). However, it is precisely these types of agricultural activities that face complex 
structural problems such as the concentration of land in the countryside and long-term 
investments with low profit return (Aguirre, 2010:109; Reintegration Officers No. 49-
51,128). More significantly, agrarian business may merely lead to the continued 
propagation of those social and economic structures that underpin poverty and 
exploitation in the rural areas, and which were the cause of the armed conflict in the 
first place. This, in turn, tends to reproduce social conditions that force people into the 
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  Other forms of investment were to buy houses or in education. ACR statistics 2015. Chart 9 shows the 
areas of investment of the economic stimuli and in Chart 10 the current situation of the Business Plans. 
September 2015. http://www.reintegracion.gov.co/es/la-reintegracion/Paginas/cifras.aspx 
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cultivation of coca, and their subsequent involvement in drug-trafficking (Aguirre, 
2010:114; Reintegration Officers No. 141, 115, 129; Interview Negrete).  
Thirdly, and most crucially, both the Ministry for the Interior and the paramilitary 
leaders encouraged the creation of business associations. At the time it was argued that 
collecting together Seed Capital from a large group of ex-paramilitaries would provide 
enough money to develop larger businesses, which in turn would result in more posts to 
fill, and greater profits for the respective stakeholders (Reintegration Officer No. 53). 
Government representatives with their own agendas may also have supported this as a 
useful means of producing large increases in employment in the short term. However, 
many Business Plans would instead become scams for the sole benefit of certain leaders 
and mid-ranking paramilitaries (Reintegration Officers No. 31, 53, 128, 157, 144; 
Interview ex-combatant No. 104; Pax Christy, 2006:49). Ultimately, the aforementioned 
associations reproduced the vertical hierarchy from the paramilitaries: these businesses 
sometimes included hundreds of people whose Seed Capital was invested in projects 
that failed soon after due to reckless management or the theft of resources. Other 
dubious practices included the creation of a business with the sole purpose of looting it 
immediately after its own inauguration (Pax Christy, 2006:49, Reintegration Officer No. 
31). By way of contrast, those ex-combatants who demobilised individually were 
granted an amount four times higher and encouraged not to enter into such associations; 
the businesses they created were instead mostly personal or family-based.   
Remarkably, the difference in the amount given to the paramilitaries and the guerrillas 
may not be as relevant as it first appears. The officers assigned to economic 
reintegration considered that, although starting a business with US$4,000 rather than 
US$1,000 represents an obvious advantage, other elements such as personal motivation,  
family support and the appropriate choice of training played a greater part in its eventual 
success or failure (Reintegration Officers No. 18-19, 31, 49-51, 96, 108, 143, 144). 
Moreover, new requirements and procedures were established to make the Business 
Plans more viable and sustainable
111
 (OACP/ACR, 2010:204, 355; Reintegration 
Officers No. 49-51, 96). In spite of the central government maintaining these 
differences in the Seed Capital, the ACR itself developed strategies to reduce the gap by 
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 Resolutions 008/2009 and 163/2011. 
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making alliances with the OIM, thereby injecting further resources – around three 
million pesos – into the Business Plans, with priority given to the former paramilitaries 
(Reintegration Officer No. 91).   
 
At its inception in 2011, Law 1424 aimed to retroactively resolve the problems created 
by the Business Plan scams. It was also decreed that those ex-combatants who had 
already received Seed Capital would no longer receive their monthly allowance. In spite 
of this, attendance of the psycho-social workshops (at least once per week) remained 
compulsory until satisfactory completion of the reintegration programme. Certainly, 
criticism of the Business Plans‟s failure was a constant topic in the focus groups and 
interviews with the demobilized: many argued that although they had been promised the 
Seed Capital, Law 1424 only served to take away the money that they were rightfully 
owed. It is also worthy of note here that – as most ex-combatants tend to find 
themselves in a very precarious economic situation – the sudden withdrawal of the 
monthly allowance would most likely have had substantial impact on their income 
overall. 
 
In sum, initial attempts to provide training and education did not necessarily translate 
into long-term employment. Certainly, the precarious social and educational 
background of the ex-combatants meant they were far from ideal candidates for formal 
employment but there were also political problems that impeded their economic 
reintegration, such as their unsolved legal status. Moreover, the initial approach to the 
reinsertion of ex-combatants focused on providing economic incentives with no further 
control or requirements from the government, which may have facilitated – or even 
promoted – reckless practices from all involved: the scams in the Business Plans by the 
paramilitary leaders on the one hand, the idleness or money-grabbing attendance of 
courses by the rank-and-file combatants on the other. Fortunately, these problems were 
eventually overcome by the contestation of Uribe‟s DDR policy and the action of 
reintegration institutions such as the ACR, Peace and Reconciliation and the PAPDRB: 
basic education and vocational training were linked to compulsory counselling on 
economic and life-projects, as well as new requirements for obtaining the Seed Capital 
and further expert support for the Business Plans. As will be explained in the next 
section, such focus on the ex-combatants‟ economic behaviour and skills constitutes but 
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one half of the process of economic reintegration: the other lies in the opportunities 
provided to them by the formal economy. 
The private sector 
The ACR developed various strategies to attract support from the private sector as part 
of its training and employment schemes. These included lobbying companies to create 
job opportunities, learning contracts or internships for the ex-combatants or their 
families, providing tax breaks if a company hired ex-combatants, and appealing the 
Corporate Responsibility Programmes (CRP) of larger companies (OACP, 2010:5; 
ACR, 2008; OACP/ACR, 2010:204). For instance, the ACR partnered Time Bank on a 
project that used volunteers to provide training for marginalised demographics, 
including the demobilised
112
 (OACP, 2010:4; Conpes 3554:50; Reintegration Officer 
No.148). Peace and Reconciliation and the PAPDRB created further strategies such as 
convincing companies to buy products from the Business Plans, or offering recruitment 
services to mid- and small-size companies that lacked selection schemes of their own
113
 
(Reintegration Officers No. 31, 49-51; PAPDRB, 2010:63; 2011:30; Alcaldía de 
Medellín, 2011b:45). Aside from improving their basic employability, these strategies 
aimed to provide the ex-combatants the experience of competing in the labour market in 
the same way as any other citizen would (Santander and Villamizar, 2006:35). 
 
However, in general the private sector tends to be reluctant to employ demobilised 
people (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2011b:8; OACP/ACR, 2010:203, 354). While many 
companies did play an important role in providing vocational training and supporting 
the creation and maintenance of Business Plans, when it comes to employment there are 
still very few companies willing to hire ex-combatants. One example is the Grupo 
Exito, which runs a programme of corporate responsibility called „Workplace Inclusion 
                                                 
112
 The Time Bank was a private initiative run by the Foundation „Colombia Presente‟ and supported by 
the  Chambers of Commerce. In Medellín, the demobilised have access to the Opportunity Bank and the 
Zone Centres for Company Development (CEDEZO), which provides them with credits and technical 
support in both business and employability. 
113
 After establishing the job vacancies for each particular company, the reintegration officers select 
candidates from a pool of CVs mainly made up of the demobilised and their families. The company then 
receives a short-list of candidates for interviewing. If one of the demobilised is eventually hired, the 
officers provide further support to both employer and employee in terms of monitoring the demobilised 
and mediating in case of problems. 
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for the Vulnerable Population‟, offering training and permanent jobs to forcibly 
displaced groups, the physically disabled, single mothers, the demobilised and victims 
of violence (Zuluaga, 2010:150). However, by 2009 this programme had only employed 
236 ex-combatants, and in 2011 this figure was a mere 86 (OACP, 2010:10; ACR, 
2011:10). Similarly, the Microsoft Group created the „Mi Llave‟ initiative to build 11 
technology centres in cities heavily effected by the conflict and to provide training to 
around 3,000 vulnerable people. Although it is claimed that 12 per cent of these trainees 
went on to find jobs (Silva, 2010:154), it is unclear exactly how many of them were 
demobilised. The ACR also tried to foster employment schemes in the regions, which 
gave direct employment to 53 ex-combatants (OACP, 2010:5). More successfully, the 
ACR worked in partnership with the National Institute for Road Construction (INVIAS) 
to include a compulsory quota of 10 per cent of jobs for the demobilised in their 
building contracts. Through this scheme the ACR achieved the direct employment of 
822 ex-combatants by 2011 (ACR, 2011:10).  
Taking into account the enormous institutional effort toward employment seeking, these 
results appear rather paltry. Previously, in 2005 the director of the PRVC had expressed 
concern about the low level of response from the private sector in hiring the 
demobilised population (Angel, 2006:12). More recently, in 2013 the director of the 
ACR issued a public appeal entreating companies to halt the rejection of ex-combatants 
from the workplace (El Tiempo 09/05/13). Furthermore, ACR officials are themselves 
conscious that the term “demobilised” carries with it negative associations, particularly 
as a label linked to criminality; there has hence been an institutional effort to phase out 
its usage and replace it with “participant”114 to avoid the label that links them with 
criminality. Officials likewise aim for discretion when providing the services 
(Reintegration Officers No. 91, 131-132): 
[B]ut when they were there, they didn‟t want anybody to know that they are   
demobilised. […] during my visits to support the [economic] projects, I used to 
say “Hey, what‟s up?”. But they told me: “When you are there, do not say hi to 
                                                 
114
 The term „participant‟ also aims to distinguish between the ex-combatants who have “active” status in 
the process and the paramilitaries who demobilised but never entered into the reintegration programme 
(OACP/ACR, 2010:325). 
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me, because they know you are working with the demobilised. They know [who] 
you [are]. Do not say hi to me [there], only in the office, here.” 
(Interview Officers No 132-131) 
Understandably, extortion and kidnapping is still a reality across the entire country, so 
the ex-combatants are still seen as a very real threat in this regard. In addition, as will be 
explained in the seventh chapter, at the beginning of the process some paramilitary 
leaders did not abandon the use of violence after their demobilisation, although their 
criminal activities were eventually halted. Indeed, a report by the ACR concluded that 
the strategies of employment seeking were less successful in places where the private 
sector had only a small footprint and/or had been heavily effected by the conflict (ACR, 
2011:9; OACP/ACR, 2010:297). However, apart from the more typical problems of 
educational shortcomings and fear of the demobilised, it is clear that other intervening 
actors contributed to the sector‟s negative attitude. One study of the perceptions of the 
private sector towards the demobilised forwarded three key findings. Firstly, private 
companies felt rather overwhelmed by uncoordinated requests and proposals from 
various sections of the government, which in turn provoked a sense of confusion and 
overlap among the different reintegration institutions. Secondly, the ex-combatants had 
to compete with other vulnerable sections of society for jobs and resources within the 
companies‟ Corporate Responsibility Programmes. Companies thus tended to prioritise 
those people they considered to be victims over those they saw as perpetrators. Finally, 
incentives such as tax breaks are limited depending on the size of the companies 
involved: mid-sized companies are more likely to react positively, while larger 
companies can be rather indifferent as such a stimulus only represents a small return 
compared to their global income (Giha, 2010:21, 23).  
Unsurprisingly, then, rejection and redundancy based only on one‟s status as 
demobilised is a frequent occurrence (Reintegration Officers No. 75-77; 143, 146). 
Hiring people who have a criminal record may understandably be a risk that many are 
not willing to take, but discrimination, lack of understanding of the reintegration 
process, and plain apathy or impassivity on the part of the private sector also greatly 
impacted on the economic opportunities available to the demobilised. As will be 
explained in the next section, this widespread rejection from formal employment has 
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important consequences on the ex-combatants‟ capacity to generate an income, pushing 
them into the informal sector and unemployment.  
5.2 The ex-combatants’ problems: reintegration into poverty?   
When asking the ex-combatants about the problems they have faced during their 
reintegration (Figure 3, Annex G), unemployment was the most common response. As 
noted above, rejection – and redundancy – based solely on their status as demobilised is 
a frequent occurrence. Additionally, those I interviewed argued that attending the ACR 
workshops resulted in frequent job absences that were difficult to justify, especially 
since they were trying to conceal their demobilised status. Their unresolved legal 
situation and the subsequent lack of legal documentation also exacerbated these 
difficulties in finding or keeping work. Ironically, problems such as illiteracy or lack of 
education were mentioned only a few times; I will return to this point at the end of this 
section. Finally, some of the demobilised argued that their lack of employment was 
simply a marker of a poor economic situation within the country as a whole. As the ex-
combatants explain: 
There is a lot of discrimination. If you go to a company to ask for a job, they 
won‟t give you one because you are demobilised. We had a lot of problems with 
that. Very few accept us to work as demobilised. And if you start working, they 
fire you as soon as they realise.   
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 24) 
I had the experience of being in a company where I was sacked because I asked 
for a permit [to leave early] because I had to go to the ACR workshop. So I 
arrived late because they didn‟t let me go earlier. Then, in order to catch up I 
had to speak again with the boss and he said: “Man, it was the same yesterday 
and again today”. So I asked the psychologist to talk to him and after that [the 
boss] told me: “Here‟s your [severance] payment, goodbye”.  
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 13) 
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Figure 3. What kind of problems have you faced during the reintegration process? 
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The second-most common complaint was around operational issues and 
mismanagement of the reintegration programme. This seems to be a larger issue among 
the ex-paramilitaries, as it mainly referred to the government‟s unfulfilled promises 
regarding the Seed Capital: either because they lost money due to the initial lack of 
planning or control (or, indeed, due to the scams); because they found the money too 
little; or because the new requirements for the Business Plans are now more difficult to 
achieve. Some of the ex-combatants also complained about other bureaucratic and 
administrative problems with the ACR, such as the delay or loss of payments due to 
failures in recording their attendance of workshops and courses. Finally, a small 
proportion of ex-combatants complained about the low quality of the aid received in 
general, or of the services in education and health in particular. However, it is worth 
noting that both of these services are provided by other public institutions and shared 
by a broader part of the population living in the same area. Finally, some said that the 
government never fulfilled its promises on jobs, the Seed Capital or housing: 
I told them about a project, and they told me there was no money […] I had 
already completed [the workshops]; they told me to take a course in 
entrepreneurship, which I did and then I tried to propose a project and then 
nothing, they said there was no money. As simple as that.  
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 21)  
I haven‟t claimed the Seed Capital. If it is two million [pesos] I can‟t get it. I 
studied to work in cattle ranch administration. Then they rejected the business 
project because [starting a business like that] was very expensive. So why did 
they ask me to study that? […] They fooled me, if they hadn‟t fooled me like that I 
wouldn‟t have studied.   
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 17) 
The third-most common group is made up of those ex-combatants who said that they 
had not encountered any problems at all during their personal reintegration process. 
Rather, they considered the ACR programme to be a real opportunity to break away 
from the armed group, to forget their negative experiences during the war, and to 
overcome their shortcomings in education. It is important to note here that this positive 
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perception appears more frequently among ex-guerrillas than ex-paramilitaries, who in 
turn tend to complain less about government mismanagement of the programme: 
Well, I haven‟t found any problems; I have found benefits, yes […] Benefits, 
education, the economic aid from the government, the services from the people 
who work here at the ACR.  
(Interview ex-combatant No. 12) 
In fourth place, a few demobilised talked about their problems in adapting to their new 
life, especially the culture shock experienced upon moving to the big cities: 
The most difficult is to go to a place where you don‟t know anybody and they 
don‟t know you. And you have to start looking for a job and get used to that, get 
used to people that you did not live with before. 
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 13) 
Finally, some of the demobilised recognised that the introduction of controls on and 
reductions of the economic benefits had been the direct result of the abuses that took 
place at the beginning of the process, and therefore lay the blame firmly at the feet of 
their former comrades for the controls and changes introduced by the government.  
At the beginning of this programme there were opportunities and many 
demobilised received 25, 30 million pesos for buying houses. But they spent it on 
alcohol, cars, motorbikes, weapons, and they were still involved in criminal 
activities. And it‟s their fault that we are all suffering the consequences. But our 
interest is very different from theirs. There is no longer support to buy a house, 
and that‟s what we need now. 
 (Focus group ex-combatants No. 30) 
Remarkably, security issues were only mentioned a handful of times. Some ex-
combatants said they had received death threats; others indicated that they could not 
travel to see their families who were still living in the conflict areas. One person also 
voiced his fears about the consequences if he was forced to confess his crimes under 
Law 1424. This is especially important given that, as will be shown in the seventh 
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chapter, the legal civil authorities and the police are not necessarily effective in 
providing protection against the death threats or the security risk that the demobilised 
face as part of their former activity in the armed groups. 
The real economic outlook of the demobilised 
By 2006, PRVC data showed that only 443 demobilised had formal jobs, while 1,820 
were working in informal activities (Angel, 2006:12). In 2011, it was calculated that 55 
per cent of them were working in informal jobs, 12 per cent had a formal job and 31 per 
cent were unemployed (ACR, 2011a:12)
115
. In 2007, Peace and Reconciliation claimed 
that the ex-combatants performed occupations such as taxi drivers, mechanics, builders 
and bus driver‟s helpers (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2011b: 9). Finally, a study in Antioquia 
concluded that, since the private sector is reluctant to hire the demobilised and the 
smaller municipalities have low capacity from job creation, the ex-combatants worked 
mostly in either agriculture or construction (Aguirre, 2010).  
In line with previous studies, I found that only a few of the demobilised had formal jobs 
within a company, worked as freelance technicians, or ran their own business. Instead 
the majority work in informal jobs that require little education or training, and most of 
which are paid minimum wage, such as driving moto-taxis, or working in construction 
or as street vendors (Table 7).  
FORMAL INFORMAL 
In a company: a slaughterhouse, a shop, 
an oil well and a textile producer 
Moto-taxis Shovelling sand 
Technicians in electricity and in roofing Builders Waiter and barman 
Hairdressing business Street vendors Clay extractor (mining) 
Security guards Washing cars or motorcycles Agriculture 
 Buying/selling recycled 
material 
Fixing motorcycles   
 
Table 7. Jobs currently performed by the demobilised. 
 
It is clear that, after their demobilisation, low-ranking ex-combatants tend to be 
unemployed or work in informal, low-income jobs. As a result, they remain entrenched 
in the poorest demographics in the country: for example, in Bogotá the majority of ex-
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 More recent data show small changes on this trend. The work in formal employment has increased to 
17% and 26%. ACR statistics 2015. Chart 8. Occupation among the demobilised. September 2015. 
http://www.reintegracion.gov.co/es/la-reintegracion/Paginas/cifras.aspx 
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combatants were found to be living in the poorest and most marginalised 
neighbourhoods (Santander and Villamizar, 2006:16; PAPDRB, 2011). Furthermore, 
figures from 2005 show a 70 per cent rate of functional illiteracy among the 
demobilised, meaning that they had only developed sufficient skills for jobs where no 
more than basic or no literacy was required (Cartagena Contribution, 2009:68; UNPD, 
2005). Arguably, then, those ex-combatants who are forced into informal employment 
may not perceive their shortcomings in education as an immediate problem in their 
reintegration. Rather, they have developed a means of generating income within social 
conditions that they share with about 45 per cent of the Colombian population.  
Equally significant is the fact that very few of the demobilised have found work in the 
security sector: Law 782 forbids the demobilised from owning or handling weapons, 
preventing them from legally working as security guards. During the demobilisation 
phase, there had been an initial proposal to transform the paramilitary groups into 
security forces, but this did not proceed due to vehement contestation on the basis of 
their human rights violations. However, it could also be the case that the rank-and-file 
ex-combatants do not necessarily prefer activities in the security sector: in a survey 
conducted by Odenwald et al in Somalia, among the options for reintegration assistance, 
jobs in the private security sector were chosen by only between 1.7 per cent and 5.9 per 
cent of the sample (2007:114).  
Ultimately, given the choice, it would appear that former combatants prefer to break 
completely with any war-related activity. As will be explored in the following section, 
despite the prospect of enormous economic and social disadvantage, the ex-combatants 
express powerful reasoning that deters them from returning to the armed struggle or 
entering into criminality. 
5.3 Recidivism 
By 2010, recidivism in the demobilised population was estimated at around 15 per cent: 
out of a total of 54,806 ex-combatants, 11.8 per cent had been captured and 4.3 per cent 
killed in actions linked to criminality (US, 2008:56; FIP, 2010:3; Policia, 2010; CNRR, 
2010:156; Procuraduría, 2011:12). Other studies have shown that 17 per cent of the 
captured members of the criminal bands were former paramilitaries, amounting to 
around two per cent of the total number of collectively demobilised (Árias and 
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Guáqueta, 2008:5). In 2014, another study concluded that 76 per cent of the ex-
paramilitaries had not fallen into criminality, and only 10 per cent of those demobilised 
who reported having received offers of this type felt inclined to accept them (FIP, 
2014:6). In 2015, the ACR estimated that from the demobilised who took part in the 
reintegration process 8.8 per cent had relapsed into criminal activities, while 5.25 per 
cent has been murdered and 9.2 had reported security problems and threats to their 
lives
116
. These numbers, hence suggest that the former combatants have a similar 
possibility to become either perpetrators or victims after they demobilise.    
One of the questions posed to the ex-combatants for this research was around their 
willingness to join either the paramilitary groups that did not demobilise or the 
BACRIM. Their responses fall into two categories: on the one hand, they talked about 
their personal reasons for not going back to the armed groups (Figure 4, Annex H); on 
the other, they gave the reasons they think other demobilised may have had for not 
doing so (Figure 5, Annex I).  
According to the first group of answers, family is the most important motivation for 
staying away from the criminal world, as it makes the ex-combatants feel as though they 
have a purpose in life other than being in the armed groups. Likewise, the reintegration 
officers also agreed that the raising of a new family or the recovering of an existing one 
acted as a solid buffer against any return to illegal activities; it also served to strengthen 
their resolve and their commitment to the reintegration programme as a whole 
(Reintegration Officers No. 73, 109, 128, 143). 
                                                 
116
ACR statistics 2015. Chart 11. Security situation of the demobilised. 
http://www.reintegracion.gov.co/es/la-reintegracion/Paginas/cifras.aspx 
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Figure 4. Motivation for no recidivism. (As the numbers are so low, I have not illustrated 
the difference between guerrillas and paramilitaries. Disagregated data in Annex H)    
 
The second-most prevalent reason revolves around the ex-combatants‟ negative 
memories of the war and of life in the illegal armed groups. These included experiences 
of an oppressive military order, harsh living conditions and enduring physical activities. 
In stark contrast, their new life in the civil life symbolises freedom to do what they 
please, but more importantly to stay among family and friends:  
The ones who go back are doing so because they don‟t want to study, they do not 
want to progress. Because being there brings you nothing. You will pay with your 
life, you‟ll find nothing else. I‟m better off staying here, even if I have no money, 
rather than being so restricted. I am happy here, nobody will bother me, nobody 
will tell me what to do. Now I only have to obey my mum and God.  
(Interview ex-combatant No. 17) 
The third-most common response was one of fear for their own security upon returning 
to the illegal groups. On the one hand, their time as outlaws had made them critically 
aware of the risks involved, including being imprisoned or killed, as well as the attacks 
that their criminal activities may bring upon their families. On the other, Laws 782, 975 
and 1424 were very clear in establishing strong legal ramifications for those involved in 
criminality post-demobilisation. It is also worth pointing out here that the Colombian 
judicial system does not distinguish between felony and crime. Hence, any form of legal 
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problem could bring still harsher consequences, making the demobilised lose any 
judicial favour and be processed by the criminal system rather than by the transitional 
law
117
. As I will explore further in the seventh chapter, the fear of legal action may also 
have contributed to the development of new behaviours of self-control:    
I want to adapt completely. For me it is still difficult. I‟ve already been [in the 
programme] for five years. Sometimes when the boss shouts at you [I think] 
about taking the shovel and hitting him in the face. But I have to control myself 
because of what might happen to you. They will not say “it was him” but “it was 
this guy because he used to be [a combatant]”. They describe you like that. I 
mean, it seems we are [obligated] to never make mistakes again. Here we have to 
be like saints. 
 (Focus group ex-combatants No. 16) 
Fourth-most common was the argument that the group had lost its ideology, and so the 
ex-combatant no longer identified with it. This process may be more evident in the ex-
guerrillas who had deserted from their groups, but it also takes place among ex-
paramilitaries:  
A: I almost said yes [to a criminal offer], but then I thought about my son. And I 
thought that the war is not like it used to be. 
B: Me neither, I wouldn‟t do it.  
A: The war before 2000… From 2005 or 2007 there are no more Self-Defenses: it 
became just a mess [of criminal bands]. They fight against each other […] there 
aren‟t anymore Self-Defenses; there are only small groups, independent from 
each other. It‟s not the same as before. 
C: They are mercenaries instead. 
B: Or maybe it is the same person, but he is acting independently. 
A: Before […] the groups were united. If one group had problems the others 
came to help. But now it‟s not like that, they may send help just to kill the others. 
That„s what I mean, the guerrillas are happy because the paramilitaries don‟t 
                                                 
117
 For instance, failing to provide economic support for their children or problems of domestic violence 
are considered crimes. If they are found to be involved in this form of legal processes, they must forfeit 
their demobilised status. 
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fight with them anymore but among themselves. It is a war that no longer has any 
logic. I cannot find logic in it anymore. 
D: It is a war with no purpose. The only outcome one may find is jail or death. 
 (Focus group ex-combatants No. 22) 
Finally, some ex-combatants recognised that it was the reintegration programme – or 
the advice they had received from reintegration officials – that had helped them in not 
returning to their groups. I will expand on this in the next chapter. 
Moving onto the reasons the demobilised thought others might have for returning to the 
illegal armed groups (Figure 5, Annex I), the ex-combatants I interviewed saw 
unemployment as the primary cause of recidivism. However, they clarify, their own 
participation in the armed conflict serves as a warning that enrolling purely for money is 
not really worthwhile. Secondly, the argument was put forth that there are people who 
simply like the lifestyle offered by war and crime, or who do not want to make the 
effort required to embrace a new way of life, be it catching up with all the missed years 
of education or working for low salaries. 
  
            Figure 5. Motivation for recidivism. Disaggregated data in Annex I 
Thirdly, the unfulfilled promises of the government were flagged as an influencing 
factor. In fourth place came the fear of imprisonment for not complying with the new 
requirements of Law 975 or of being caught up in the uncertainty created by the new 
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Law 1424. However, this could also be construed as a way of complaining to the 
government from those who find no other means of expressing their disappointment: 
A: That‟s what I mean, all the laws create a lot of pressure on us. […] One of 
these days we will go to jail and that is not what we negotiated with the 
government.  
B: Now things are complicated like never before. It is complicated day by day. 
They are putting [us under] more pressure and one day we won‟t be able to take 
it anymore and we will have to go back [to the armed group]. 
 (Focus group ex-combatants No. 24) 
Finally, it was thought that some people may be looking for protection against revenge 
brought about by “unfinished business” in the criminal world or, the case of the ex-
guerrillas, because they have collaborated with the Army. Clearly the ACR was never 
intended to act as an institution for protection. Nonetheless, it has developed strategies 
to tackle the security problems that the demobilised may encounter, such as the creation 
of a Risk Prevention and Attention Unit (RPAU
118
) or the collaboration with the 
National Police
119
 to allocate one policeman to each regional office (Interview Police 
Liaison; Reintegration Officers 24-25). The RPAU has developed its own protocol in 
case of death threats against the demobilised, which consists of formulating a risk 
assessment of the situation in conjunction with other security institutions. If the 
authorities concur that there is a clear and present danger to the ex-combatant of being 
killed or injured, he will be transferred to another city and granted a supplementary 
money allowance for a period of three months
120
 (Reintegration Officers No. 24-25). 
However, in reality the results of this assessment may take about a month or be subject 
to bureaucratic slowdown. For instance, some bureaucratic changes in 2011 caused 
delays for months before the results could be made known and acted upon 
(Reintegration Officer No. 154). Moreover, the infiltration of the Security Services by 
                                                 
118
 Acronym in Spanish: Unidad de Prevención y Atención de Riesgos. It works in tandem with other 
security institutions – such as the police, the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry for the Interior – in 
activities around prevention of and protection against death threats against the ex-combatants and the 
ACR workforce. 
119
 As part of a programme called the Communitarian Police, which addresses issues regarding 
coexistence and prevention of crime, as well as providing guidance in other bureaucratic procedures such 
as responses to robbery or loss of documents. 
120
 Resolution 163/2011, Articles 20 and 29. 
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criminal elements was also a common occurrence, as mentioned in the introduction. 
Thus, given the government‟s lack of institutional powers to protect them, the 
demobilised may instead choose to return to the armed groups out of pure self-
preservation, or they may decide to flee long before the institutions can act.  
I also asked the ex-combatants if they had learned anything specific during their time in 
the group or if they missed anything from it (Figure 6, Annex J). A significant majority 
remembered their experience in the armed groups as wholly negative or in which 
nothing was learned; this was especially evident in the ex-paramilitary groups. They 
also talked about their lack of freedom under military rule and the impact of always 
being under the control of the group. As mentioned above, the hardship of military life 
at war is still very vivid for many of them:  
A: It was an experience that you had, an experience, but nothing that… 
B: I learned something there but I haven‟t used a thing afterwards. I haven‟t used 
it and I never will. An experience like that is [something] to never repeat again. 
C: An experience not to repeat. 
B: It was a part of your life. It passed and you‟ll never forget it. 
C: You know what it is useful for? To tell your kids: “Never go there”, to explain 
to them what it‟s like and [to say] “do not take that path”. It was a horrible 
experience.  
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 20)  
 
I‟m not proud of it, I‟m embarrassed. I quit, I demobilised, I came here to be far 
away from it, not to remember. I don‟t want my kids to be pointed at: “He‟s the 
son of [an ex-combatant], he will be the same”. That is what I want to avoid. I 
got nothing from it.  
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 9) 
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Figure 6. Did you learn something in the groups that is useful to you now? Is there 
anything you miss? 
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Secondly, there was a group who said they learned discipline or self-esteem, as well as 
certain skills. This was especially true of the guerrillas, where training within the group 
features a variety of activities including basic literacy, nursing or driving. Remarkably, 
learning to handle weapons was only mentioned twice.  
Well, I don‟t miss [the group] that much but in any case I did have many options 
there, to learn things that I can use now. For instance, I learned to work with 
leather, to fix communication radios. I also learned a bit of nursing and I also 
studied political economy [the logistics of how to distribute the resources among 
the troops], which has helped me to organise [my domestic] budgeting and keep 
it in check.  
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 30) 
I think the military life has been very useful for me: to look after myself, to work, 
to pursue my goals. Of course, the demobilisation process has helped me a lot to 
overcome that trauma, I mean, from that ideology that I used to have when I was 
in the illegal group, in criminality. I left those groups and right now I‟m screwed 
in civilian life, but I feel good, because I have stopped seeing enemies everywhere 
who are trying to kill me.  
(Interview ex-combatant No. 14) 
A handful of the demobilised do remember their experience as positive: having a stable 
job or a salary in the case of the paramilitaries, or the fact that the group provided all 
their living expenses in the case of the guerrillas, could be seen as preferable to the 
economic hardship they were to face in civilian life. Only two people mentioned that 
they still had some sympathies with the ideology of the group. Additionally, some mid-
ranking ex-combatants enjoyed privileges such as access to money and cars, but even 
for them the economic incentives were not necessarily worthwhile in comparison to 
their life as civilians: 
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I miss some things. I miss the group, the life. I had nice moments, had cars and 
money. Sometimes I miss that. Now I have to wake up every day at 5am to work 
Monday to Saturday and on Sunday to study. But I have left that life and I keep 
going. 
 (Focus group ex-combatants No. 3) 
To be honest my life was better there, because I had no worries. Here, if I do not 
have a job and I have no money to pay rent, it‟s a problem. If I don‟t have money 
to pay for transport, it‟s a problem. Even if you work, the money is not enough. 
Paying the bills, those are the problems. Everything is money. You don‟t eat 
properly. Here is not the same as being there. Even if some people say that they 
were hungry, it‟s lies. Nobody goes by force. If you are capable you can progress, 
to become mid-ranking. You can collect taxes [extortion] or organise the 
community. [There] life is easier, here it is very complicated. 
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 35) 
Lastly, a few respondents said that they missed friends that they had made in the group: 
The most difficult thing was to leave them there. Coming here and thinking that 
they will remain there, waiting to be killed […] Because during the time you 
spend with them you come to love them, like a family […] Because there you find 
a father, a mother, siblings. So it is very hard to know that you go out one day 
and leave them there. 
 (Focus group ex-combatants No. 4) 
During the fieldwork, some ex-combatants talked about offers they had received from 
the armed groups. According to them, the salary for leading a small racket gang could 
reach as high as one to three million pesos [US$2,000] per month (Interview grass-roots 
No. 6, Focus group ex-combatants No. 31). However, they do not feel keen in accepting 
these offers:  
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A: I want the Colombian government to take into account what we are doing 
because now things are difficult with the armed groups. Here in Medellín, there 
are all these opportunities [for recidivism]. All the time they are telling you: 
“We‟ll give you money to join us”. 
B: A million, 1.2 million pesos per month. 
A: And they [the government] do not realise that. We are here and we want to 
keep going. They do not realise that. On the contrary, they want to screw us. 
That‟s wrong from the government. 
B: It is because we have a goal now, a place to go. But if [the criminal bands] 
talk to someone that is in trouble, like one of our mates, and they convince him, 
he will go back. And many have returned because of that. 
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 3) 
A: I don‟t regret deserting from the group, never. The government has not 
fulfilled its promises, and I know it never will but I have no regrets. I am here and 
I have a son. [...]  I will never go back to an armed group, and I have received 
offers [of joining criminality]. But I am out of that now, I only want to work, to 
make a living for me and my family. 
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 3) 
This section has explored what the demobilised believe about potentially joining an 
armed group or a criminal band. It can be concluded that there are three key elements 
that prevent their recidivism: first and foremost, participating in war is something that 
most people are not willing to do twice. Furthermore, having experienced the risks of 
war, the economic offers that initially proved highly attractive simply lose their value as 
incentives. Secondly, the emotional links provided by raising or restarting a family are 
of immense value, and provide an important incentive to enter and remain dedicated to 
the reintegration process. Finally, and as consequence of the first two, the 
demobilisation itself is perceived as a once-in-life opportunity to break the shackles of 
the armed group.  
The demobilised are keenly aware that going back to the armed groups or joining 
criminal bands will most likely result in imprisonment or death for themselves or their 
families. The reintegration officers were also conscious that neither the ACR nor the 
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government is capable of competing with the economic incentives offered by illegal 
armed groups. Yet they also understand that these incentives have lost their value to the 
demobilised, and that there are other elements that play a more crucial role, be it their 
families or the sense of freedom from the military life (Reintegration Officer No. 109; 
154). Although the money that comes with criminality is far higher than the incentives 
offered by the government and the minimum wage salaries they are likely to obtain in 
their civilian jobs, far from behaving as greedy or utility-maximising individuals, the 
economic offers for returning to the armed groups would appear to have lost their 
attraction.  
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has reassessed the emphasis on achieving a successful economic 
reintegration to prevent recidivism among ex-combatants. Certainly, the economic 
dimension has an important role to play in the dynamics of war and political conflict; it 
is not, however, sufficient to explain the success or failure of reintegration into society.  
 
On the one hand, the real value of the economic aid provided to the former fighters is 
not predicated on its amount or frequency, but on how these stimuli are used as a tool 
for facilitating and encouraging active participation in reintegration activities. More 
than a mere provider of economic rewards, the ACR was critical in  defining goals and 
limits for  the reintegration policy, as well as establishing a unified and organised set of 
activities for the personal development of the former combatants. However, and despite 
substantial institutional effort, the social background of the demobilised – and the 
political terms on which their demobilisation was negotiated – represent critical barriers 
to their access to jobs and stable income. As a result, the ex-combatants remain tied to 
conditions of poverty and marginality: their educational and social background, along 
with the rejection of their job prospects by the private sector, pushes them further 
towards informal jobs, unemployment and deeper poverty. In spite of this, they still 
share the same economic conditions with almost half of the country‟s population.  
 
On the other, bearing in mind the gigantic economic profits produced by criminality and 
drug-trafficking, the Colombian government is simply unable to compete with the 
financial  incentives on offer to those who take part in illegal activities. Nevertheless, 
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for the demobilised, war and life within the armed group is remembered as an intense 
and highly negative experience, and one that is simply not worth the money. Ultimately, 
although many of them have received offers of millions of pesos from the criminal 
world to create or lead new illegal armed groups, there remains a strong tendency to 
reject these proposals out of awareness of its consequences: imprisonment or death.  
Reintegration, therefore goes beyond the like-for-like replacement of economic stimulus 
obtained in war-related activities with legal alternatives in the civilian life. Without 
doubt, gaining employment or a stable income is an important indicator of the success 
or failure of the reintegration process (Reintegration Officer No. 31, 154). But the 
experience of the Colombian reintegration institutions has shown that this economic 
dimension is not the starting point but the final element in the reintegration process 
(Alcaldía de Medellin, 2006:129). No different from any other type of educative curve, 
the productive life is the result of a socialisation process that creates mutually 
reinforcing relationships between individuals and their social milieu.  
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Chapter 6 
Social Reintegration: Psychosocial Services and Community 
Programmes  
The literature on DDR has assumed that breaking down the military structures is a 
natural and effective means of reducing the security risk that ex-combatants may pose 
were they to relapse into violence. Subsequently, the role of the communities in 
replacing the military milieu of the demobilised and in providing support for their 
reintegration has been stressed in the form of community-based approaches. However, I 
have argued that this approach shifts the responsibility for reintegrating firmly onto the 
ex-combatants or the communities, while the role of the state in creating social fabric 
and democratic relations with the ex-combatants is often neglected. This chapter shows 
how DDR programmes may play a major role in the fostering of new social and 
political interactions to replace both those social tensions that ignited the war in the first 
place and those ties that were created during the war.  
The ACR adopted psychosocial reintegration as the model around which the economic 
and political dimensions would be organised. In turn, these psychosocial services 
adopted an approach that opposed the schools of thought based on methodological 
individualism, and thus engaged more in the construction of social links than in ex-
combatant‟s behavioural change. Supported by certain community-based activities, this 
brought a renewed emphasis on strengthening the ex-combatants‟ capacity to forge 
social relationships, as well as helping them to overcome their disadvantages and 
shortcomings in education and social capital.  
This chapter is organised as follows: first, it presents the motivations that the former 
fighters expressed for demobilising, highlighting that there were indeed more important 
reasons cited for breaking away from the group, other than those economic promises 
made by the Colombian government during the negotiation. Second, it analyses the 
different social bonds made by the ex-combatants on two different levels: with their 
families and with the recipient communities. Third, it explores the social relationships 
formed by the ex-combatants with the reintegration officers, and the tutors in particular. 
These interactions with the ACR bureaucracy seem to be especially salient to the ex-
combatants, despite their being altogether neglected by the DDR literature. For the 
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former combatants, the reintegration officers represent important figures who can 
explain, organise and mediate their complex and contested legal, social and political 
contexts.  
6.1 Breaking away from the armed group 
When asking the ex-combatants about the reasons behind their demobilisation (Figure 7, 
Annex K), many paramilitaries claimed that it was the result of orders received from 
their leaders; some reported receiving death threats for not doing so. Certainly, 
maintaining hierarchy and order within troops during the cantonment and 
demobilisation phases was crucial to preventing mass disorganised desertions. It is also 
worth bearing in mind that the leaders needed to sustain high numbers of demobilised: 
A: [T]he commanders gave the order. I didn‟t want to and the commander didn‟t 
pay us salary for four months. He didn‟t want to pay that money because he knew 
what was going to happen. I told him to give me the money so I could leave but he 
said no, because then the people would take up arms again. So I had to. 
B: I didn‟t want to either but we had to. There were some people who didn‟t want 
to and they were killed. So we had to. 
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 19) 
 
 
Figure 7. Motivations for demobilising (Paramilitaries). 
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Equally, the demobilisation of paramilitary groups was seen by many as the opportunity 
they were looking for to leave the group. As mentioned above, fatigue and 
disillusionment may develop among the combatants through their experiences within 
the group and during the war. Clearly, any display of such feelings in front of their 
comrades represents a huge risk and could be interpreted as a sign of betrayal. As such, 
when the demobilisation was ordered by the commanders, many fighters were already 
looking forward to it, amid feelings of fatigue towards the war: 
I saw the opportunity to leave and reintegrate into normal life. It was the only 
opportunity I had, and I took it straight away. Otherwise it would not have been 
possible, because once you are inside you die there, you never leave. If you leave 
they‟ll look for you at your house, they‟ll visit you several times and if you don‟t 
go back they‟ll kill you, so you don‟t speak here or there. 
(Interview ex-combatant No. 15) 
I wanted to leave. I was able to send money to my parents, my children, 1.2 
million pesos, but I was tired. I prayed to God to give me the opportunity to leave. 
 (Interview ex-combatant No. 1) 
Tiredness from the war or disenchantment with the group also served as primary 
motivation for desertion among the ex-guerrillas. Evidently, the FARC and the ELN 
operate within the most isolated areas of the country, so the rebels must endure the most 
difficult geographical conditions, along with the constant threat of attacks from the 
Army and the paramilitary groups. Some ex-combatants also voiced that they had 
problems with their commander or fellow rebels, which in some cases may result in 
punishment or even in the death sentence. For guerrilla women, too, being forced to 
have an abortion is a common cause for desertion: the group enforces a strict policy for 
regulating the love life of its members, whereby the creation of permanent couples must 
be authorised by the commanders and the use of contraception is compulsory
121
. In the 
case of unwanted pregnancy, both the man and woman involved will receive sanctions 
and the woman will be forced to have an abortion (Interview ex-combatants No. 2 and 
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 The FARC Disciplinary Code regulates the behaviour of its members. It states rules for the creation of 
couples and bans unauthorised couples and pregnancy. 
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21; Focus group ex-combatants No. 2 and 4). There was also one person who decided to 
leave based on ill health (Figure 8, Annex L).  
 
Figure 8. Motivations for demobilising (Guerrillas).  
As the tables above show, family was another important factor in the decision to 
demobilise for both ex-guerrillas and ex-paramilitaries. For security reasons, the 
guerrillas strictly regulate any communication between the rebels and their families: to 
avoid desertions, to prevent information leaks or to maintain discipline within the troops 
(Gutierrez, 2008:17; Ferro and Uribe, 2002:78). In the paramilitary groups this rule is 
more relaxed and sporadic visits to the family are permitted. However, in the midst of 
war, maintaining any level of contact is both difficult and filled with risk. Additionally, 
I also heard of some ex-combatants who had been captured by the Army and given the 
option of taking part in the reintegration process by ACR, rather than going to prison.  
Perhaps surprisingly, the promises made by the government at the beginning of the 
demobilisation was the reason least frequently mentioned as a contributing factor to the 
paramilitaries‟ decision to lay down their arms, and was not mentioned at all by the ex-
guerrillas. I will return to this point in the seventh chapter, suffice it to say for now that 
money, education and employment and housing aid promised by the government, 
appear to have played only a minimal role in the decision to break away from the groups, 
and in the reintegration process as a whole. 
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These responses described above underline that, while at the macro-level the 
paramilitary leaders and government officials were negotiating critical political issues, 
at the micro-level many combatants from both the paramilitaries and the guerrillas were 
simply tired of the war and yearning to abandon the group and the military life 
altogether. Research has shown that the armed groups employ a variety of strategies to 
attract new recruits, such as offering money or a regular salary, or opportunities for 
social mobility and escape from oppressive social conditions. However, these incentives 
are not necessarily realised post-recruitment. The economic promises, in particular, are 
likely to be a deception. For example, in the case of paramilitaries, the salary promised 
may be delayed or dependent on further commitment to the cause. Similarly, in the 
FARC guerrillas new recruits are stripped of their personal possessions and any 
economic profit for individual purposes is strictly controlled (Gutierrez, 2008:13, 23; 
2008:17; Ferro and Uribe, 2002:88; Arjona and Kalyvas, 2011:155): 
When I started working for the self-defenses, I joined because I had financial 
problems. I thought that it would solve my issues, to improve my quality of life. I 
thought that, but when I was there I realised that it was all lies, a deceit.  
(Interview ex-combatant No. 22) 
Furthermore, joining the armed groups is a decision that tends to become a life-
commitment, a reality of which the new recruits are not necessarily aware. In turn, both 
guerrillas and paramilitaries have developed strategies to prevent mass desertion 
through the combination of the use of force – by killing any person who attempts to 
leave the group – and the offer of other incentives to replace those that attracted the 
recruits in the first place (Gutierrez, 2008:29; Medina, 2008:27). 
Subsequently, the ex-combatants do not necessarily expect any sense of continuity of 
the social order – such as status and income – to which they had been accustomed 
within the armed group, but rather may see the demobilisation as an opportunity to 
break away from it. The horrifying experience of being at war should not be 
underestimated, and very few rank-and-file combatants seem to have benefited from it 
in any meaningful way. For both, ex-guerrillas and ex-paramilitaries alike, fatigue from 
the military order, from the precarious living conditions and from war itself, as well as 
the fear of being killed or imprisoned, proved to be a fundamental deterrent to retaining 
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their roles in the conflict. Additionally, as was made apparent in the previous chapter, 
the desire to see family – or to create their own – constituted another strong incentive 
for the ex-combatants to break away from the armed group and attempt to reintegrate 
into civilian life.  
6.2 Creating family and community relationships 
Family, personal development, freedom and the value of life  
On the question of what they valued the most about their new life outside of the armed 
group (Figure 9, Annex M), a significant majority of respondents (both from the 
interviews and the focus groups) reaffirmed that starting or recovering a family was the 
most prized of all. In second place, the ex-combatants valued their own personal 
development in terms of having been able to access education and training, as well as 
improving their self-esteem, self-control and discipline:  
A: [I value] many things: family, friends, everything. 
B: One stops being rude. 
A: You learn to value the shoes that you are able to buy with a lot of effort. 
B: But also [in the group] you had little money. 
A: But you could have a lot. Then you would spend it on drinking, women. Now I 
also spend it with women, but the ones from your home. 
B: If you received three months‟ salary, you spent it in four days, drinking. I used 
to get 2,360,000 pesos for three months, and in four days I would waste it all.  
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 20) 
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Figure 9. What do you value the most? 
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Thirdly, those interviewed also felt a sense of freedom from the burden of the military 
order and the harsh conditions of being at war. In fourth place, some also said that 
during their reintegration process they had learned the value of their own life and the 
lives of others: 
The most important value: my life and the life of the others. Respect for others, 
we are equal. In the armed groups all values are lost. You are commanded by 
someone and you follow orders. There are no values there. There nobody 
respects your way of thinking or your ideals. Orders must be fulfilled. Instead 
here, you take your own decisions and you know what‟s better for you, what‟s 
good and bad. Here you [can] think.  
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 3) 
Finally, there were some negative responses aimed at the unfulfilled promises from the 
government, and the expected money and the economic benefits that never arrived. Yet 
again, though, this does not seem to have been a determining factor in their 
reintegration experience. 
As mentioned above, the armed groups restrict family contact for security and strategic 
reasons. Arguably, emotional social bonds run contrary to the vertical hierarchy and 
military order of the armed groups. Moreover, the military strategy depends on the 
cohesiveness of the troops and their willingness to place the collective benefit over the 
individual‟s life and wellbeing. By contrast, for the demobilised the dismantling of 
hierarchies within the group equates to putting their personal and family needs above 
everything else: 
When people ask me “Do you think the demobilisation was [a] good [idea]?”, I 
tell them “From whose point of view? Are you asking me as a person or as an ex-
combatant?”. Because there is a difference: as an ex-combatant, as part of an 
organisation with an ideology, it was bad, the worst. It makes no sense; we were 
in the best place, we owned more than half of the country. The authorities 
recognised us as “they‟re the ones who give the orders”. The guerrilla was 
decimated economically, in weapons, in men, etc. We were superior and we 
simply turned the machine off and gave the keys to the government. However, as 
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a person, it was the best option. As a human being, as a person, there is a 
moment when all the money, power or status cannot help with the burden on your 
shoulders, the problems. You can have power and money, but you are in the 
forest at night, your family is somewhere else, you have only two ways out: you 
get killed or get caught, [either way] you are not going to receive a pension. No 
one can say “I offer my resignation”, that does not exist in the group. You have 
no life of your own, you live only for the group. But then you have the opportunity 
of living with your family. You have a difficult life – you are stigmatised, 
humiliated – but you are with your wife and children, because even your siblings 
reject you. That is worth everything. That is the only thing we‟ve got from the 
demobilisation process, and it is hard to keep going, but it is worth it.  
(Interview grass-roots No. 6) 
Furthermore, in the absence of a reintegration programme (or problems in the access to 
it), the combatants are most likely to rely on their family and community networks 
(Karamé, 2009:506). These bases of support, in turn, may have a significant positive 
impact on their economic reintegration. For instance, ex-combatant businesses overseen 
by the Medellín Mayoralty tend to be more successful when there is a level of support 
provided by the family network (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007:29; Reintegration Officers 
No. 31, 49-51). One should, however, be wary of idealising these relationships: on the 
other side of the coin, both families and communities can also become a compelling 
reason for enrolment in the armed groups. The family may itself be collaborating with 
one of the warring factions or, in areas effected by the conflict, young people may 
decide to sign up as an alternative to their oppressive social and family conditions, such 
as poverty or domestic violence. Additionally, where there is some form of payment 
associated with participation in the armed groups, family relations may become strained 
when the ex-combatants return home unemployed after their demobilisation and family 
members expect the same money and lifestyle they previously enjoyed (Reintegration 
Officers No. 58 and 93). Therefore, although family plays an integral role in the 
development of citizen identity and acts as a strong incentive not to return to crime 
(Özerdem, 2012: 55), its networks are also caught up and influenced by those same 
social and political conditions in which the activities of war are embedded.  
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Community: invisibility, acceptance and rejection 
 
As explained in the third chapter, the Colombian DDR process originated as a security-
oriented strategy with a focus on providing benefits for the demobilised, thereby 
ignoring the needs of other sections of the wider population. Thus, although the PRVC 
encountered strong resistance to the demobilised in the recipient communities 
(OACP/ACR, 2010:139), there was no strategy to tackle these issues. It was Peace and 
Reconciliation that first addressed community needs by fostering reconciliation and 
providing services to both ex-combatants and victims of violence through actions of 
collective reparation (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007a:14; Salazar, 2007:8). Conceptually, 
channelling resources and economic projects to the recipient communities was seen as a 
way of preventing the relapse of violence, and four strategies were developed for doing 
so: a) implementing projects for social benefit and cultural and artistic activities to 
promote integration; b) preventing recruitment into illegal armed groups, and promotion 
of non-violent conflict resolution; c) institutional strengthening to foster articulation and 
awareness across different sections of society, including politics and academia; and d) 
prevention and control of the causes of violence (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007a). 
Likewise, the PAPDRB developed projects for communities to facilitate reconciliation 
and inclusion, cultivating awareness in the community of the importance of integrating 
ex-combatants and encouraging coexistence
122
 (Villamizar, 2005:18). This included 
installing a library in a marginalised area, some recreational and artistic activities, and 
talks from the demobilised in public schools (PAPDRB, 2010:46, 58).  
 
Similarly, the ACR found that the equal distribution of benefits between the 
demobilised and the community contributed to the reconciliation process (OACP/ACR, 
2010:350). The Community Work Unit (CWU) coordinated three types of projects 
(citizenship formation, citizen initiatives and symbolic actions) and two strategies 
(preventing illegal recruitment and prioritising the communities) (OACP/ACR, 2010: 
213; Reintegration Officer No. 20). These activities sought “to strengthen the social 
fabric and to promote reconciliation and peaceful coexistence. In these activities, the ex-
soldiers, their families and the wider community receive training in peaceful 
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(PAPDRB, 2010:56-60). 
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coexistence and leadership, citizenship and legality, peaceful problem-solving and 
human rights” (OACP, 2010:6). In 2008, the CWU launched a national policy of 
community reintegration financed by the European Union, whose purpose was to 
“create and strengthen the relationship between the social actors by starting public affair 
debates that allow the restoration of trust, coexistence and reconciliation among the 
members of the community and at the same time create legitimacy for the state” 
(Conpes 3607, 2009:3). This policy also broached the prospect of producing active and 
autonomous citizens and of conflict resolution by peaceful means. Between 2007 and 
2009 there were 68 community interventions in 57 municipalities (OACP/ACR, 
2010:217). These activities aimed to benefit the community by improving public spaces 
such as parks and schools (Reintegration Officer No. 20).  
 
However, a report from the MAPP concluded that these community-based reintegration 
projects and activities suffered from low levels of participation among the demobilised, 
due to factors such as project location and the time and money required to travel there, 
stigmatisation, security problems, or general lack of interest on the part of the 
demobilised (MAPP-14, 2010). As one former fighter said: 
 
I don‟t want to take part in the activities of the ACR, because we, the 
demobilised, are always singled out. So, as soon as a demobilised does 
something, makes a mistake or does something [bad], the people say “all the 
demobilised are the same”. So I try not to let the people know, because then my 
clients would leave. Or the neighbour would say “that person is demobilised” 
and then you are marked out […] 
 (Interview ex-combatant No.21) 
 
A question mark remains, then, over the extent to which these community interventions 
facilitate a long-term relationship between the ex-combatants and the communities, and 
between both parties and the national institutions. The responses given by the former 
combatants around feelings of acceptance by the community shed some light on this 
matter: specifically they show that dynamics of acceptance or rejection are not 
necessarily linked to the implementation of community-based activities, but more so to 
the social conditions into which they are placed (Figure 10, Annex N).  
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Most often, the ex-combatants choose to systematically hide their past in the armed 
groups from the immediate community, and sometimes even from their own family. 
There may also be differences based on the type of demobilisation: those who 
demobilised collectively may have chosen to live in areas already under paramilitary 
control – where the community had to accept them, by conviction or by force – while 
the ex-guerrillas were given no option but to migrate to an entirely new community 
(Reintegration Officers No. 47, 90, 95, 107). However, a government study in 2008 
revealed that the demobilised tend either to move to the larger cities (51.7%) or to 
remain in very poor ones (33.6%) (Conpes 3554, 2008:14). Previously, in 2005 Peace 
Commissioner Restrepo calculated that 70 per cent of the demobilised wanted to 
migrate into the cities (2005:204). This because the potential for better access to 
institutions and opportunities for social mobility via education and employment for 
themselves and their families. As a result, on arriving in a new place, they prefer to hide 
their previous identity as members of the illegal armed group. In doing so, they feel a 
sense of rejection, and in many cases this came as an unexpected shock to those who 
took part in the collective demobilisations: 
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     Figure 10. Do you feel accepted by the recipient communities? 
A: In my case, where I live, I worked there when I was in the group and 
everybody knew who I was. People there show their appreciation. Everybody 
knows that I am demobilised and that I worked with the group and I haven‟t had 
any problem.  
B: Because you are in the same area. You are in the same area where everybody 
knows you, so it is not so strange. However, if you live in a big city and say “I am 
demobilised”, everybody would look at you and uchhhh!! [rejects you]. 
(Focus Group ex-combatants No. 29) 
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In addition, the ex-guerrillas may face security problems if they disclose their past. 
During the demobilisations of rebel groups in the 1990s, many ex-fighters were 
systematically killed by spoilers of the process or by their former enemies (Villarraga, 
2006). During this particular DDR process, of a total of 46,296 demobilised who 
participated in the ACR programme, 1,676 had been killed by 2008 (4%) (Conpes 3554, 
2008:17), a figure that increased to 2,552 by 2015 (5.25%)
123
. Allegedly, these murders 
were linked to the action of criminal groups created after the demobilisation, but it is 
difficult to establish whether the demobilised were victimised for their refusal to join 
these criminal bands or because they took an active role in them. Moreover, as the 
armed conflict continues and other armed groups are still operational, there remain 
entire rural areas and even neighbourhoods in the cities that are very violent (Group 
Interview teachers CEPAR; Focus Group ex-combatants No. 5 and 31), meaning that 
the ex-combatants‟ security and that of their family are inextricability linked to their 
capacity to hide their past:  
In my case, nobody knows that I am demobilised. Nobody knows and I am not 
interested in them knowing because it is a „hot‟ neighbourhood. There are still 
many active [members of the guerrilla].  
(Focus Group ex-combatants No. 31) 
Had I said that I am demobilised I would be dead already. 
 (Focus group ex-combatants No. 5) 
Conversely, in second and third place, feelings of acceptance and rejection seem to be 
more or less equally present. On the one hand, as the majority of ex-combatants belong 
to the poorest and most marginalised sections of society, in many cases victims and 
perpetrators belong to the same community. For example, victims of forced 
displacement might have a son or nephew who serves with the guerrillas or the 
paramilitaries (Reintegration Officer No. 143). As the Colombian conflict does not 
follow ethnical lines, it is common to find members of the same family fighting for 
opposing armed groups. On the other hand, victims‟ associations may act in contrasting 
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ways when it comes to social reintegration. Some are seen to reject and isolate the 
demobilised (Reintegration Officer No. 90), but it does appear as though there is a 
stronger tendency to understand the reintegration of ex-combatants as a process that 
contributes to the general peace (Reintegration Officers No. 23, 30, 66, 73, 143, 158, 
159; Aguirre, 2010:62).   
 
Finally, in the last group of responses, the demobilised expressed that their acceptance 
in the community was dependent on a variety of factors: in some cases, for example, it 
is the individual‟s behaviour that determines whether they are accepted or not.  
It all depends on the behaviour. If you behave badly, people will treat you badly. 
If you behave well, people will treat you well. 
 (Focus Group ex-combatants No. 23) 
Well, I have seen [rejection], but I don‟t know, you bring the reputation on to 
yourself, because there are some demobilised who are rude, so that if someone 
looks at them, they immediately insult people, swearing. So people reject them for 
that. 
 (Interview ex-combatant No. 2) 
It is therefore important to differentiate between specific sections of the community in 
order to understand exactly where the rejection is most prevalent. For instance, the ex-
combatants may encounter rejection when looking for a job, but then they may also find 
acceptance from their immediate community (Interview Negrete). More crucially, there 
is an evident belief among the demobilised that rejection comes not necessarily from the 
communities, nor from the victims, but from other sections of society that do not 
interact with them on an everyday basis: 
Q/ Do you feel that you have been discriminated against? 
R/ Yes, but not by the community who are poor like us, but by those who believe 
that they are better than us, those that have the power. They discriminate against 
us. But the lay people don't: they are supportive. Some victims have even said 
"you [the demobilised] are facing more problems than us". [..] Supportive, truly 
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[...] yes, the victims are supportive, respectful, without shouting at us, without 
pointing their fingers, without offending us. 
 Q/ So which parts of society do discriminate against you? 
R/ The entrepreneurs, the institutions, the NGOs that claim to talk about peace. 
They do point their fingers; they do not investigate if there is one murder, if there 
is one crime [they rush to say] “it was them”. But the lay people do not do that. 
(Interview grass-roots No. 3) 
 
Q/ Have you told people [in the community] that you are demobilised?  
R/ No, I never told them. But I told some co-workers, because they were from the 
area [I used to live in]; they were forcibly displaced. Then you discover people 
from the same area you come from and [you trust them]... these are people who 
are escaping from the same situation.  
(Interview ex-combatant No. 2) 
 
Historically, too, despite successful reintegration of many ex-combatants into the 
civilian life during the peace processes of the 1990s, the Mayors of Bogotá has said that 
the demobilised were still stigmatised by citizens and even by public servants (Garzón, 
2006:18, 19). In addition, as will be explained in the next chapter, at beginning of the 
process, the wrongdoings of paramilitary leaders in Medellín created a negative image 
of all the demobilised. The demobilised also feel that the press has had an especially 
significant role in creating and propagating negative stereotypes: with news reports 
choosing to focus on cases of recidivism rather than on successful reintegrations 
(Interview ex-combatant No. 18; Focus group ex-combatants No. 8): 
[A]nyway, the damage done to society was very great and society does not 
understand that we want to compensate for that. Society has been very harsh to 
us. Here we had a problem with the press. At the beginning they stigmatised us a 
lot and this influenced society not accepting us as we had expected. 
(Interview ex-combatant No. 18) 
 
Some reintegration officers said that this fear on the part of the demobilised to appear 
in front of the community seems to be more powerful than the fear the community itself 
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holds of entering into contact with the demobilised population (Reintegration Officers 
No. 93, 117, 119, 120, 143). Clearly, then, the activities for social reintegration need to 
find a balance between this very real fear of being exposed and the desire to diminish 
discrimination by informing communities that there are demobilised living among them  
(Reintegration Officers No. 20 and 23). Furthermore, self-concealment could be more 
beneficial to the demobilised, especially in areas where the conflict rages on and the 
state‟s capacity to protect its citizens is weak (Aguirre, 2010:190). Equally, disclosing 
their past to their communities may jeopardise their achievements in their new life 
(Reintegration Officers No. 20 and 120), thus invisibility can also be understood as an 
earned right of the demobilised (Reintegration Officer No. 50).  
 
At the same time, however, such tactics of subterfuge hinder society‟s ability to prepare 
for having the demobilised in its midst (Morales, 2005:87, Nussio, 2012): these tactics 
may instead result in the creation of a functional coexistence that does not necessarily 
translate into the construction of solid social links (Reintegration Officer No. 154). 
Nonetheless, achieving a straightforward level of coexistence between victims and 
perpetrators may only represent the first step in a longer process of reconciliation: “It 
might be counterproductive to press on with reconciliation when the wounds are still 
open” (Cartagena Contribution, 2009:79). Ultimately, working towards a pacific 
coexistence in the first instance could be a more realistic goal.  
 
In sum, the reintegration of combatants into the communities needs to be analysed on 
several different levels. Most pressingly, it is important to identify those social groups 
that reject the demobilised and design intervention activities most appropriate for them. 
On this point, community workshops do not seem to have yielded significant positive or 
long-lasting results, especially if the precarious security and employment situation of 
the demobilised remains unresolved and they need or prefer to conceal their past as 
fighters in the armed groups. A further, recalibrating approach to the reconciliation and 
creation of community links would be to address services to the demobilised not as 
individuals but as part of a family and of a community. 
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6.3 Psychosocial reintegration 
The UN has recognised that reintegration also includes psychological transformation at 
the individual level, which in turn mirrors the transformation of the wider society: 
 
Demobilisation, as a component of the DDR process, officially certifies an 
individual‟s change of status from military to civilian. Demobilisation is 
generally a lengthier process than disarmament, and involves the psychological 
transformation from military to civilian. As such, it lays the groundwork that is 
essential for the reintegration of the individual into civilian life. 
 (UNDP, 2006, 4.20:2) 
 
However, and as a result of the wide variety of approaches and psychological schools of 
thought, there is an overly disparate understanding of what psychosocial reintegration 
should be. Martín-Baró had already forewarned that psychological services might be 
reduced to trivial activities such as group work or relaxing massages (1983:4). In South 
Africa, for instance, the Trauma and Transition Programme hired contractors for 
services that included the following: “individual counselling; telephonic crisis; body 
mapping; massage therapy; story telling; psychological assessment; and personal 
support from other ex-combatants. Some [contractors] offered interventions at a group 
level like group work; soft skills workshops; and self-development workshops” 
(Bandeira, 2008:49). In Liberia, the various reintegration programmes hired 
psychologists to deal with “health issues, HIV/AIDS, violence, gender issues, drugs and 
to engage in recreational games”; however, these services were of poor quality as the 
activities were rarely performed by a trained counsellor (Söderström, 2011:96).  
 
Bandeira has shown that most of the literature and research on psychological 
counselling for war veterans is aimed at supporting soldiers of wars fought by 
developed countries on foreign soil (2008:22). In the case of DDR programmes, the UN 
has noted that psychosocial support and counselling should address issues of post-war 
trauma and mental illness, alcohol or drug abuse and domestic violence (UNDP, 2006, 
4.30:23). Similarly, Gleichmann et al warn that the consequences of trauma in ex-
combatants may take the form of anxiety, paranoid delusions, drug abuse, psychosis 
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and psychosomatic disorders (2004:89). Certainly, the resulting research has tended to 
focus on the study of mental pathology, disabilities or illnesses such as Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorders (PTSD), drug abuse, interpersonal violence or psychosis (see LeBeau, 
2005:34; Odenwald et al, 2007:110).  
 
Conversely, other evidence suggests that the presence of mental illness among former 
combatants is not significant. One survey reported an incidence rate for serious mental 
health problems of 16 per cent among ex-combatants in Somalia, and five per cent in 
Somaliland (Odenwald et al, 2007:119). In their comparison of DDR processes, 
Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer found no evidence of relevant psychological 
problems in Ethiopia and Uganda, whereas in Namibia there were a low number of 
cases of, in their words, “dependency syndrome” or “severe mental stress” (1996:55). 
In another study, of ex-guerrilla members in El Salvador suffering long-term physical 
disabilities, 18 per cent were diagnosed with PTSD but only a minority of them 
required psychological treatment (Hume and Summerfield, 1994:19). 
In a similar vein, the psychologists involved in the Colombian DDR found that the 
majority of ex-combatants had not been left traumatised by their experiences (Cartagena 
Contribution, 2009:49). Problems related to alcohol dependency were calculated at 0.59 
per cent and drug-addiction at 2 per cent (ACR, 2011a:12). The problem, rather, lay in 
how their wartime experiences and their background in poverty impinged on and 
limited their potential for establishing viable social relationships in non-war situations. 
Additionally, the authoritarian systems and vertical hierarchies that were in place during 
the war contrasted sharply with levels of responsibility and autonomy required for their 
lives as civilians (Conpes 3554, 2008:20; Reintegration Officer No. 48). A survey 
conducted by the IOM found the foremost reasons for requesting psychological 
counselling to be, in the following order: domestic violence; partner relationship issues; 
bereavement; drug and alcohol abuse; psychological breakdown; uncertainty around 
raising children; and family relationship issues (ACR, 2009:282). Similarly, reports 
from the Peace Homes reiterated that the most common psychological problems were 
caused by: abuse suffered inside the armed groups; frustration and disenchantment with 
the civilian life; discrimination from communities towards the demobilised; problems in 
dealing with family relationships; and the lack of a life-project after the war 
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(OACP/ACR, 2010:134). The problems mentioned above, rather than originating from 
mental pathology or illness, were instead grounded in questions of how to deal with 
their past, how to interact with their partner and children, and how to reorganise their 
lives around new patterns of behaviour and social conventions. As one reintegration 
officer stated: 
We realised that they had participated not in the classical model of socialisation 
– that we assumed all people have experienced – but in another socialisation 
through which they have learned different things. This is not to judge these things 
as good or bad, but they have learned other things.  
 (Reintegration Officer No. 48) 
Although the Colombian DDR process endured critical changes in its political and 
judicial framework, there was nevertheless a workable sense of stability with regard to 
the psychosocial approach, and the emphasis on the creation of social bonds rather than 
focus on purely individual preferences, personality traits or mental pathologies. This 
included the key question of how best to help the demobilised to address the problems 
they faced in interacting with their social environment and with starting and managing 
social relationships. In the following sections I will show how the ACR programme and 
the work of the reintegration officers contributed to measurable behavioural change in 
the former combatants. From the outset, the development of psychological models 
brought in a framework that was then implemented through workshops and counselling. 
These became the main ACR activity and were compulsory to all the demobilised. 
Furthermore, punctual attendance of these activities was subject to strict controls and 
defined both the type and amount of economic aid provided in return. Subsequently, the 
tutors charged with implementing the psychological models, and with perpetuating the 
reintegration policy more broadly, became especially important figures for the ex-
combatants in their care. 
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Psycho-social models for ex-combatant reintegration  
 
It is worth remembering at this point that Peace Commissioner Restrepo himself was a 
trained psychiatrist and philosopher. His own approach to negotiating with and 
demobilising combatants was based on principles from psycho-pedagogy and clinical 
psychology that work on the social realm to produce a change in individual behaviours 
(Restrepo, 2006:317; Restrepo and Álvarez, 2006:333). During the collective 
demobilisation ceremonies, for example, a psychosocial team supervised orientation for 
the ex-combatants. They debriefed the demobilised in what was expected of them: 
motivation and good attitude towards the process, and the renouncing of feelings of 
revenge or of the use of violence as a means to an end:  
 
The government is giving you an opportunity to move from the illegal world to 
the legal life, and for you to obtain citizenship in the full sense of the word, so 
that you can get all the rights of a normal citizen, as well as all the 
responsibilities that it entails
124
. 
 
As a result, the PRVC included psychological counselling to help ex-combatants to 
overcome their experience in the conflict and in the armed groups, with the aim of 
providing emotional stability and support during the transitional period in which they 
would adopt legal and civil behaviours (Angel, 2005:217; OACP/ACR, 2010:141). This 
counselling was rooted in the change of behaviours and attitudes, conflict resolution in a 
peaceful manner, creation of social bonds, managing emotions and the creation of 
healthy life-habits (Rodríguez, 2005:348). Each CRO (PRVC regional office) was 
assigned one psychologist to provide the following services: citizenship education 
workshops, intervention in crisis, and counselling in educational and personal 
development, as well as the creation of institutional and social supporting networks 
(Angel, 2005:205). Similarly, the Peace Homes had to provide psychological services as 
part of their contract with the government; in reality, however, due to a lack of 
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 Álvarez (2006:398), psychosocial team representative and assessor for the Peace Commissioner‟s 
Office. „One opportunity for change‟.  Recording of the speech given at the demobilisation ceremony of 
AUC‟s Vencedores de Arauca Block on 21st December 2005.  
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guidelines their approach was dependent on each contractor‟s own arrangements 
(Reintegration Officer No. 28; Pax Christy, 2006:33).  
 
More importantly, Peace and Reconciliation in Medellín introduced Return to Legality 
as a model for psychosocial intervention based on the assumption that restoring or 
creating healthy and resilient social fabric in their civilian lives would bolster the ex-
combatants‟ mental health and reintegration (Reintegration Officer No. 48). Equally, it 
targeted the transformation of the militaristic and authoritarian behaviour of the ex-
combatants by strengthening family bonds and the social fabric, as well as changing 
their roles within their family dynamics so as to transcend their role as mere money 
providers. Return to Legality assumed that developing new forms of socialisation, 
leadership and commitment to the civilian life would allow the demobilised to limit 
their aggressive behaviour, as well as their abuse of drugs and alcohol (Alcaldía de 
Medellín 2007a:22; 2007b:17, 281). It aimed to “provide services in psychology as well 
as family and community counselling, create and strengthen trust, promote the 
development of the community and establish a process of reparation and reconciliation” 
(Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007a:13).  
 
This would operate at three different levels: a) the individual, providing support in 
health, education, recreational activities and prevention of recidivism; b) the family, 
including counselling services in partner relationships, family therapy and domestic 
violence; and c) the community, fostering social organisation and participation 
(Alcaldía de Medellín, 2006:128). Moreover, an initial diagnosis of each combatant 
helped the tutors to design strategies for providing support within the broader purview 
of a life-project, as well as planning personalised outlines for their social and economic 
future. This diagnosis also aimed to identify those ex-combatants suffering from PTSD 
or addiction problems, which would require further and more specialised therapy 
(Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007a:78; 2011b:22). In Return to Legality, then, the 
psychosocial services constituted the keystone around which all other services were 
built, by helping the demobilised to construct their personal needs and preferences in 
education, training and working life, but also taking into account the context they were 
living in (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007a:25). However, in practice these services were 
implemented locally in Medellín and were only voluntary for the demobilised. 
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In 2008, the ACR developed a new psychosocial model – MAPAZ 125  – which 
maintained some continuity with Return to Legality but also had a distinctive approach 
of its own: placing further emphasis on the measurable individual and social 
competencies acquired by the demobilised. On the one hand, MAPAZ assumed that the 
treatment of aggressive or criminal behaviour should take into account the 
characteristics of the social context in which the demobilised lived (ACR, 2011a:4). As 
such, it aimed to counteract the problems created by the interaction between the 
demobilised and their new environment: family, community, working place and 
education institutions (ACR, 2011a:21; Conpes 3554, 2008:27). On the other, MAPAZ 
intended to develop four specific personal competencies: assertiveness, non-violent 
conflict resolution, responsibility and capacity in planning, and achievement of goals 
(ACR, 2011a: 16; OACP, 2010:4; OACP/ACR, 2010:177).  
 
The MAPAZ model proceeded as follows: based on a series of tests and interviews, the 
tutor would assign each participant a personalised set of services based on a) level of 
skills: basic, intermediate I, intermediate II or advanced (ACR, 2011a:13); and b) any 
specific circumstance: gender, youth, the elderly (those aged 62 and over), the 
physically disabled, mid-ranking soldiers or therapy when drug and alcohol abuse is 
present (ACR, 2011a:12; Reintegration Officer No. 16). Additional protocols were put 
in place to provide tailored services to those demobilised living in remote areas or 
facing security problems (ACR, 2011b:11). The majority of psychosocial services took 
the form of workshops, but tutors would also make visits to the homes of the 
demobilised as well as other family and social activities. Once the ex-combatants had 
reached the advanced level, their progress would be assessed by a test of psychosocial 
competencies (ACR, 2011a:42).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
125
 Acronym in Spanish: Modelo de Atención Psicosocial para la Paz. 
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Institution 
Peace Commissioner 
Office 
Peace and 
Reconciliation 
ACR 
Psychosocial 
model 
Clinical psychology and 
psycho-pedagogy 
Return to Legality MAPAZ 
Principles 
Articulated  individual 
counselling and social 
actions would change 
individual behaviours 
Restoring or creating 
healthy and strong social 
fabric would underpin the 
ex-combatants‟, mental 
health and reintegration 
The need to address the 
interaction between the 
demobilised and their 
new environment 
Aims at the 
individual level 
-  Change of behaviours 
and attitudes  
- Conflict resolution in a 
peaceful manner 
- Creation of social bonds  
- Managing emotions 
- Creation of healthy life-
habits 
- Design of a life-project 
- Diagnosis of mental 
illness and addictions 
- Support in health, 
education, recreational 
activities and prevention 
of recidivism 
 
To develop social 
competencies in: 
- Responsibility and 
capacity for planning 
- Achievement of goals 
- Assertiveness 
- Non-violent conflict 
resolution 
Support to 
family and 
communities 
None - Family counselling for 
partner relationships and 
prevention of domestic 
violence 
- Support in social 
organisation and 
participation 
- Services to other 
vulnerable groups 
- Community-based 
workshops 
- Projects to benefit the 
community 
Measurement 
None None Test of psychosocial 
competencies 
Table 8. Comparison between the different psychosocial reintegration models. 
 
Although ranging in emphasis, the different models outlined above (Table 8) adopted a 
shared approach from social psychology, one which fundamentally opposes the 
traditional schools of thought based on methodological individualism. Their priorities 
lay instead in the links between the individual and his social context, rather than 
encouraging mere changes in individual behaviour. However, a report from the 
Colombian government noted that, in practice outsourcing services might bring with it 
certain problems, including service variation and inconsistency, with each company 
operating autonomously and according to their own approaches and techniques 
(Rodríguez, 2006:113). Subsequently, in the transition from the PRVC to the ACR in 
2007, one of the main challenges was to unify concepts and practices in the 
psychological services, as well as coordinating the services of psychology, education 
and vocational training to work in tandem with one another. The ACR programme, 
then, had a defining role to play in establishing a reintegration strategy that was 
coherent and compulsory for the demobilised nationwide and which approached the 
combatants as composite part of their social environment, not wholly separate from it. 
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Furthermore, the implementation of the ACR programme also prompted the 
development of an overarching reintegration bureaucracy. Provided that the 
psychosocial services articulated all the other required activities and benefits, the hiring 
and training of those who would implement the MAPAZ was made at the central office 
in Bogotá, but they were to deliver services at the 29 ACR regional centres.  
 
The role of the tutors 
 
By 2008, the ACR had a staff of around 700 people, 70.8 per cent of whom worked in 
the regions and 79.9 per cent of whom directly provided services to the demobilised as 
reintegration officers (ACR 2008; 2011b). The psychosocial tutors constituted roughly 
one quarter of the reintegration officers and were tasked with providing support in 
establishing and strengthening socio-affective links through personalised and direct 
attention to the individual (ACR, 2009:17). As a result they became the most important 
link between the demobilised and the ACR, and represented a crucial point of reference 
in the ex-combatants‟ everyday lives. 
 
During the fieldwork it quickly became apparent that the tutors played a fundamental 
role in the reintegration process of each combatant. When I asked the ex-combatants to 
whom they would go with any complaint about the programme (Figure 11, Annex O), 
the tutor was the most frequent response. Second to this, they said that the regional 
offices were their best point of reference in case of problems. Both answers may at first 
glance seem obvious, since any bureaucratic process of this type is channelled through 
either of these two parties. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, in certain cases, the 
demobilised display a positive appreciation of the tutors and the regional offices, but a 
negative opinion of the ACR National Offices or other national institutions: 
I do not believe in what those people say, [they tell] many lies. The previous 
programme [PRVC] and this one [ACR] are the same. The only nice thing, I 
reckon, is the tutors: they can be good or bad but they always give you advice. 
 (Focus group ex-combatants No. 27) 
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The only people who listen to us are the psychologists, the psychosocial officers. 
Because at the ACR [regional office] most of the time they do not even listen to us:  
„[The manager] is not here, he hasn‟t arrived yet‟. Always excuses. The same with 
complaining to Bogotá: to phone them is a problem. 
 (Focus group ex-combatants No. 15) 
I don‟t complain to anyone. At the beginning the service was good: they listened 
to us. Now there is no solution to anything: “you‟ll have to come back later” or 
“we are just starting [the activities] again”. Well, lots of excuses. And maybe they 
are not the ones to blame because they are employees. It‟s down to the ACR, to 
Bogotá; that‟s why the programme is getting worse.  
(Focus Group ex-combatants No. 11) 
There were also two other contrasting opinions. On the one hand, a group of 
demobilised said that thus far they had had no complaints or problems at all with the 
process. This can be interpreted as a positive evaluation of the reintegration process. On 
the other, some demobilised held onto the belief that there was no point in complaining: 
since nobody listens or solves their problems, they have developed an unfixable distrust 
towards the reintegration institutions. Finally, a participant in a focus group mentioned 
having had problems with the security services in a case of corruption, and that they had 
filed a complaint with the Fiscal Office.  
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Figure 11. When you have a complaint about the reintegration programme, who do you talk to? 
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Most significantly, when asking for their opinion of the psychosocial services (Figure 
12, Annex P), in almost all of the interviews and focus groups there was a positive 
evaluation of them. The demobilised claimed that the tutors had helped in the following 
ways: changing their previous mentality and/or modifying their aggressive behaviour; 
improving their sociability skills with both family and immediate community; 
orientating them in their new life as citizens, or telling them how to comport themselves 
on a day-to-day basis. Conversely, references to psychology in the more traditional 
sense of overcoming post-traumatic stress or mental illness were present but minimal.  
Yes, they have helped me. When I was there [in the group] I was very aggressive. 
And now I have changed, it is not like before. I had another face there, here the 
face it is different. I mean that I changed a lot, thanks to the psychologists who 
are always attentive to us.  
(Interview ex-combatant No. 24) 
For me [the psychologists] are a good thing. Because, again, had there been no 
psychosocial workshops we would be worse, crazy. Because that‟s where we can 
find out about all [the services] from the government. Even how to ask for 
membership to the health service; had the psychological workshops not existed, I 
would not know how to get [those services]. When you get closer to the 
psychologist, you ask for family counselling, and although they won‟t give you an 
appointment [for personal counselling] they try to give you some advice on the 
problems that you may have at home.  
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 8) 
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          Figure 12. How do you find the psychosocial services? 
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Negative opinions were relatively few, and included those demobilised who found the 
psychological workshops boring, child-like or useless. It is worth noting here that due to 
the changes in the laws or because they had moved from one city to another, some 
demobilised had attended the workshops over a long period of time without being able 
to progress in the programme, and consequently had been made to attend repeated 
workshops:   
We have done this for years. I find it boring, it is the same as what I saw when I 
started the [reintegration] process. I am doing it [all over] again: “here you 
have some ping-pong balls, put them in the basket, find out how”. 
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 14) 
I have to be honest, the psychosocial [service] has done no good, because yes, 
you gain knowledge of many things [...], about the city. But we go to play, 
because they make you play. I am an adult, I don‟t play games, I am a serious 
person. Teach me how to work in something that I don‟t know, teach me a craft, 
to make tapestry, something. I would like for the people to learn something […]. 
But going to play for two hours in a psychosocial workshop – personally – I don‟t 
find it helpful at all. [It‟s] pure recreation. 
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 31) 
A third group of demobilised talked about having disagreed with the psychologist on a 
personal basis or in the way they ran the workshops. Rather than a negative opinion of 
the service, this corresponds to a process of accommodation on both sides:  
The thing is that some tutors… sometimes we get topics that are too complicated 
and we start to debate, then they do not let you give your opinion. So I told the 
tutor: “so you think that you are too good [for us] and we have to come and 
listen to your opinions? No, we are not here for a political diatribe. We all have 
the right to say something” [...] But thank God the tutor understood and we were 
able to move on.. 
(Interview ex-combatant No. 28) 
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I have learned a lot from the psychologist, but I have also had my problems with 
her. I‟ve made mistakes and I tell her “Doc, I have been here for eight years”. 
When she started, at the beginning she wanted to manipulate us and at the time 
we had already been in the process for four years […]. So she finally realised. 
Because many psychologists think that working with the ACR means that [they 
are more important than the demobilised]… but no, everyone should be equal. 
We should learn to respect people, love people. 
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 28) 
In two of the focus groups it was also mentioned that the effectiveness of the 
psychosocial workshops depended not on the tutors but on “the attitude you come with” 
or on “your relationship with the tutors”. Finally, it is significant that on only two 
occasions the demobilised mentioned the control and surveillance functions of the 
workshops. According to the new regulations introduced by Law 1424, in order to 
receive their monthly allowance participants needed to achieve a 90 per cent attendance 
rate for the compulsory activities, or a minimum of four sessions per month for the 
workshops and educational courses
126
 (Reintegration Officer No. 47). Both the tutors 
and the ACR also keep detailed records for each ex-combatant, including their personal, 
family and employment status. Failing to attend the compulsory workshops or courses 
has severe consequences, whether they be expulsion from the programme; loss of 
benefits; or the subsequent opening of criminal legal proceedings. Indeed, although 
“they have been framed” (Aguirre, 2010:66), only a few of the ex-combatants I spoke to 
seemed outwardly concerned with this aspect of their psychosocial activities:  
 
This is not easy. Maybe our life at this moment is harder than the life of the other 
citizens because they are not being monitored. Whether we like it or not, we are 
being monitored. I said to the tutor, if we say “I want to withdraw”, [the answer 
is] “no, you must carry on or else you go to jail”. They tell you that in different 
terms, but that is the reality. “Even if I didn‟t kill or participate in…?”; “no, you 
have to [attend], because this is a process”. Unfortunately life is like that.  
(Interview ex-combatant No. 16) 
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[I want] to improve what we have now. Before they used to give us 480,000 
pesos, then they lowered it to 400, 300 and 160. […] I want to withdraw from the 
programme, not to come to workshops. I know I won‟t get the 160.000 pesos, but 
I can just come to sign or call [the psychologists]. But the tutor tells me that I 
can‟t, that I will have a legal issue. 
 (Focus Group ex-combatants No. 28) 
 
In his research in Sudan, Baas (2012:201) questions the efficacy of the international 
DDR bureaucracy in achieving the reintegration of ex-combatants and preventing the 
relapse of war. He argues that, in reality, the actions of local agents are essential to 
resolving the everyday social and political issues on the ground. Certainly, the ACR 
programme in Colombia developed precisely this form of local bureaucracy, one which 
operated primarily through the regional offices with oversight from their headquarters in 
Bogotá. 
  
Weber has proposed that bureaucracy is created whenever the state needs to impose the 
rule of law over a larger territory, and that the legal administration of a state becomes 
more complex, impersonal and rational in a democratic political system and capitalist 
economic system (1920:956). This allows for the disruption of hierarchies based on 
patrimonial privilege and bestowals of political favour, and a movement towards a 
system that instead bases its authority on people appointed according to their expert 
qualifications and applies rules that go beyond any sense of personal volition 
(1920:958). Weber also ventures that bureaucracy develops towards “dehumanising” the 
administrative relations, “eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely 
personal, irrational and emotional elements which escape calculation” (Weber, 
1920:975). By contrast, the role of the psychologists as bureaucrats was deeply related 
to the expert management of emotions. Their function was mainly therapeutic rather 
than technical, and required the systematic social and emotional engagement with the 
demobilised themselves (Reintegration Officer No. 154, 129).  
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Through a therapeutic intervention the aim is that the participant can re-signify 
his/her life, solve personal problems and reduce the discomfort produced by past 
and present experiences; this is achieved by a professional in psychology who 
supports the process through activities […] which are offered as a differentiated 
set of services for each participant. 
 (ACR, 2009:12) 
 
In turn, the ostensible changes to individual behaviour are made possible by the 
therapeutic relationship forged between tutors and ex-combatants:  
 
[For] the people who at some point have had problems with drug abuse, some of 
them are alone and that does not help the process. Because they need to feel 
stimulated, motivated by their families, so that [they feel that] the family does not 
abandon them in the process. So sometimes we have to take over that role and 
say “don‟t worry, I will be here, I will help you, you won‟t be alone”, because it 
is our responsibility that the ex-combatant progresses in the process. This goes 
beyond our duty, but looking at it from the point of view of our responsibility, we 
want that person to progress and to benefit from the programme, meaning that 
they can be stable and keep the balance [...] 
 (Reintegration Officer No. 129) 
We understand something that psychology has known for a long time: the 
possibilities for transformation in the [therapeutic] work with the other person 
exist – there are many names for it – in transference (as psychoanalysis would 
call it), in empathy (from humanist and also cognitive psychology), in interaction 
(from social psychology). I mean, it is in the relationship with the other that there 
lies a real possibility that the link one establishes can make for something 
transformative.  
(Reintegration Officer No. 48) 
 
Ultimately, then, the on-going work of officers – and in the case of Medellín, also of the 
CEPAR teachers – devoted to socialising the demobilised in capacities other than their 
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military skills, seems to have worked in favour of ex-combatant reintegration. Crucially, 
tutors were not restricted to technical roles but to forming a therapeutic relationship 
with the demobilised. Despite the difference in the approaches between the PRVC, 
Return to Legality and MAPAZ, the psychosocial services formalised an institutional 
setting that allowed and prompted the fostering of social connections different to those 
entrenched in the armed group. At the same time, the psychologists were successful in 
prescribing and controlling behaviours that are more suitable and desirable to their new 
life as civilians. Arguably, the contradictions and ambiguities inherent in the national 
policies – caused by a shifting legal framework and an unpredictable political landscape 
– were resolved or mitigated by the psychologists and social workers in their everyday 
work with the demobilised. The tutors themselves took on the task of communicating 
changes in legislation to the ex-combatants, and explaining the implications for each 
individual. For instance, during the fieldwork, the tutors were directly responsible for 
contacting the demobilised and guiding them through the recent changes to the 
implementation of Law 1424. Moreover, rather than simple one-way communication, 
the tutors endeavoured to provide orientation and a therapeutic space in which the 
demobilised could re-signify their lives as civilians and sustain emotional stability and 
cognitive equilibrium in the face of their highly contested and unsettled legal context. 
Furthermore, as will be explained in the next chapter, these reintegration bureaucrats 
proved to be the lynchpin in creating functional links between the demobilised and the 
state, and in transforming patrimonial and hierarchical relations into egalitarian and 
democratic ones. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the progressive destruction and creation of social links. For 
the literature on DDR, breaking down the embedded military ties and hierarchies 
constitutes the quintessential stage in the DDR process. Yet, for the demobilised, it 
could be the social fabric into which they are returned that proves more important.  
In the case of the paramilitaries, many ex-combatants claimed that they demobilised 
purely based on orders received from their commanders. Some of them were forced into 
it, but a significant number said that they were tired of the war and already wanted to 
leave. For the guerrillas, tiredness from the war and problems with their comrades or 
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commanders forced them to risk their lives and desert from the ranks. It can be 
concluded, then, at least for the rank-and-file ex-combatants, more than expecting the 
continuation of the military order after their demobilisation, many were actively looking 
to escape the groups and abandon the war. In addition, two key elements have been 
identified but with contrasting value: on the one hand, the desire to reconnect with or 
raise a family play a vital role in the decision to leave the group; on the other, 
government promises and incentives in terms of money, education and employment 
were mentioned only a handful of times, and would thus appear not to have played a 
decisive role in abandoning the armed activity. 
The creation of social links has been flagged as an integral part of the reintegration 
experience. First and foremost, family is a primary motivation for demobilising and for 
their perseverance outside of military or criminal activities. Family clearly represents 
the most important social relationship for the demobilised as a source of mental and 
emotional stability. However, it is also important to bear in mind that families are not 
immune to the implications of the wider social and political context, to the extent that 
they could also be a causal factor for involvement in the armed groups or in criminality. 
Turning to the community aspect of reintegration, rejection of the demobilised is very 
common, but paradoxically does not necessarily come from the direct victims of 
violence. As the armed groups in the Colombian conflict are not created along ethnical 
lines, family and community members may, indeed, belong to opposing sides. Victims 
may also choose to proactively support the demobilised in their transition to the civil 
life as a contribution to the broader peace. Meanwhile, the tide of rejection is felt 
stronger among other sections of society, especially in the private sector and the 
workplace. As a result, the ex-combatants tend to hide their past and their demobilised 
status to avoid problems in obtaining employment or dangers to their personal security. 
In turn, although the literature on DDR has assumed that the reintegration of ex-
combatants takes place at the community level, it is also important to account for those 
specific elements of society that tend to either impede the reintegration of the former 
fighters or reject them altogether. The receiving communities themselves seem for the 
most part to accept the demobilised, either because they sympathised with the armed 
group, or on the contrary they are unaware of the ex-combatants‟ true identities.  
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Finally, this chapter has shown that, in the ACR programme, the psychosocial was 
introduced as the founding dimension around which all the other elements of the 
reintegration process were organised. This approach addressed the former combatants as 
part of their social environment, rather than as isolated individuals. The models of 
psychosocial reintegration implemented by ACR placed a firm emphasis on the creation 
of robust social fabric. This further prompted the creation and up-skilling of a 
reintegration bureaucracy that, rather than assuming merely technocratic role, actively 
served to establish a functional, two-way therapeutic relationship with the demobilised.  
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Chapter 7  
Political Reintegration: Building Citizens 
Söderström (2011:53) has claimed that research around political reintegration has 
focused on three main areas: the general political consequences of DDR programmes; 
the transformation of armed groups into political parties; and the individual level of 
political engagement. Her research is devoted to the last of this, and specifically how 
ex-combatants relate to politics through the development of mechanisms for improving 
access to and interpretation of the democratic process (2011:20). Similarly, Mitton has 
argued that the success of political reintegration should be assessed beyond the group‟s 
ability to become a political party or to share power. Instead, other elements should be 
taken into account such as the participation of the demobilised in civil society groups or 
public discussions, as well as their interaction with political institutions (Mitton, 
2008:217).   
Moreover, Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis have claimed that DDR programmes can 
influence political participation at three different levels: the legitimisation of the post-
war political order at the macro-level; the transformation of armed groups into political 
organisations at the meso-level; and creation of resources and skills development for 
individual ex-combatants and civilians at the micro-level (2012:13-14). This chapter 
explores the meso- and micro-levels in depth to argue that DDR bureaucracy does 
indeed have a role to play in the political reintegration of the demobilised at the 
personal level: as citizens. The first section explains how the transformation of 
paramilitary leaders into political parties did not succeed for a variety of reasons. In turn, 
the second section explores how, although some grass-roots organisations were 
established, they failed to congregate the demobilised and to effectively channel their 
grievances. As a result, the ex-combatants reintegrate politically at the individual level, 
rather than with a common political or civic project. Thirdly, a brief account of the three 
different levels of political participation at the micro-level evidences that the ex-
combatants show little interest in the standard approaches to political participation, in 
the sense of forming grass-roots organisations or voting and participating in elections. 
The fourth section looks more closely at the expectations of the former combatants in 
regard to DDR: both in terms of their own personal process and their perspective on the 
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authorities. Paradoxically, while there is a highly negative perception of the authorities, 
the DDR process has proved to be a positive experience at the personal level. The fifth 
section underlines how the ACR programme enabled mechanisms for the access to and 
interpretation of democracy by the ex-combatants, which have consequently brought 
about the development of behaviours to replace those of a combatant, and more proper 
to a fully-fledged citizen.  
7.1 The (failed) political project of the paramilitary leaders  
Carlos Castaño had originally formed the National Movement of Demobilised Self-
Defenses (NMDS) in 2002, as an attempt to create a political organisation that could 
engage in direct negotiations with US representatives, and to separate the AUC‟s 
political project from the influence of the drug-traffickers (Semana 29/07/02). As noted 
in the introduction, the paramilitary groups have a history of entering into alliances with 
politicians and achieving enormous influence over the democratic institutions of the 
country. Hence, the expectation of some of their leaders post-demobilisation was to 
directly transpose their military power into the political arena. As Mancuso declared for 
instance:  
I am already there [in the political arena]. My current activities will inevitably 
take me to an election post as soon as the law allows it.  
(Interview in Semana, 18 April, 2005) 
However, the transformation of the paramilitary leaders into politicians proved less 
successful than their initial expectations. On the one hand, their efforts in being 
recognised as political figureheads during the negotiations with the government 
revolved principally around avoiding extradition to the US. On the other, they lacked an 
ideology and political agenda, although Carlos Castaño made several attempts to 
articulate one
127
.  
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 Letter from Carlos Castaño to the Red Cross International Committee, the Commission of National 
Reconciliation and Cambio 16 Journal. In Observatorio para la Paz (2002). Annex 22:326-341. 
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After the demobilisations took place, a few paramilitary leaders
128
 stood as candidates 
in electoral posts for the 2006 and 2007 elections (Semana 12/02/06). The failure of 
their political project will be explained below: suffice it now to say that they only 
constituted a small proportion of the paramilitary population, whose aspirations were 
quickly halted by the democratic institutions of the country. More significant was the 
creation of NGOs and civil organisations as a strategy for the continuation of their 
power. Specifically, as part of the Ralito Agreement, the paramilitary leaders created the 
NGO Corporation Democracy, whose main function was to support the reinsertion and 
reintegration of troops from the two groups that demobilised in Medellín – the Cacique 
Nutibara Bloc in 2003 and Héroes de Granada two years later:  
The government recognises the NGO „Corporation Democracy‟ as the 
organisation that represents the demobilised from the Cacique Nutibara Bloc. 
[The government and BCN] will work in tandem to support, implement and 
monitor the process of reincorporation. The national government, the Medellín 
Mayoralty and Corporation Democracy will design any programme needed for 
the support, development and monitoring of the reinsertion phase. 
(La Ceja Agreement, 2003) 
Corporation Democracy thus assumed the function of providing support and orientating 
the ex-combatants during the different stages of the process, as well as informing them 
of the benefits and services they were entitled to receive, including the creation of 
Business Plans. It also maintained some semblance of order among the demobilised, 
and encouraged their participation in the activities offered by Peace and Reconciliation. 
Additionally, Corporation Democracy coordinated another fifteen or so small NGOs 
with similar functions (ODDR, 2009:19). As part of the DDR policy, some of these 
NGOs were rewarded with contracts from the national and municipal authorities for 
projects based around ex-combatant reinsertion activities, as well as others for the 
benefit of the communities. This scheme also granted preferential treatment to those 
larger construction companies that voluntarily included job quotas for ex-combatants 
associated with these NGOs in their contracts with public institutions (Árias and 
Guáqueta, 2008:17; Verdad Abierta 10/02/10).  
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However, Corporation Democracy was also accused of being a façade for the 
continuation of the social order created by the paramilitaries in Medellín: particularly as 
it was headed by drug-trafficker Don Berna, who was still in the process of negotiating 
his political status with the government. Allegedly, Corporation Democracy was 
involved in criminal networks: the social controls imposed by the Envigado Office were 
often perpetuated through the participation of ex-combatants in vigilante groups; this 
was also true of their political control over the Juntas de Acción Local (JAL) and Juntas 
de Acción Comunal (JAC) (Personeria, 2005:18; ICG, 2004:14). JALs and JACs are 
local and important institutions for citizen agency in neighbourhoods and small rural 
communities
129
. Additionally, some of the demobilised from the Cacique Nutibara Bloc 
were found to have stolen money and resources from those construction firms that 
offered them employment (Verdad Abierta, 10/02/10; 23/03/11). Reports also emerged 
of local convenience store-owners falling victim to extortion, forced into buying 
products from certain ex-combatants‟ Business Plans (Reintegration Officer No. 53).  
In August 2006, one week after he was inaugurated for his second presidential term, 
Uribe announced that the paramilitary leaders would be imprisoned, supposedly because 
of the continuation of criminal activities after the demobilisation. The legal imposition 
used was not an arrest warrant but a voluntary confinement, yet most of the leaders 
complied voluntarily and were jailed in a former recreational centre in La Ceja, 
Antioquia. In November that year they were then transferred to a high-security prison in 
Itagui, Antioquia (Semana 01/12/06). The leaders reacted by inciting protest riots in 
areas under their control, in Medellín in particular (Pardo, 2007:160), but they remained 
in prison. Consequently, they tried to revive the NMDS in 2007: the paramilitary leader 
and former director of Corporation Democracy, Severo Antonio López, became its first 
director and ex-Congress member Rocío Arias was named as its civil representative 
(ODDR, 2009a). López, however, was assasinated months later as part of internecine 
clashes (Semana 28/07/08) and Arias was later heavily implicated in the para-politics 
scandal and the criminal enquiries that followed. 
In parallel to this, the Colombian legal system was reacting against the apparent 
impunity of the paramilitary demobilisations. On 18
th 
May 2006, the Supreme Court of 
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Justice enacted the first of several amendments to Law 975. In 2007, Decree 128 was 
modified to establish that “the benefits cannot be given to [those demobilised] who have 
been charged with or sentenced to crimes governed by the Constitution, the law, or 
international treaties signed by Colombia”130. The Constitutional Court likewise ruled 
that electoral activity on the part of the demobilised was not permitted until they had 
completed their reintegration process
131
 (ICG, 2006:6). In addition, other institutions 
such as the Defense of the People and the Inspector General‟s Office formally opened 
legal investigations against those ex-combatants still involved in criminal activities. 
Ultimately, under the new regulations of Law 975 the ex-paramilitary leaders were 
forced to confess their crimes and to reveal information that unravelled the web of para-
politics.  
 
By 2008, having remained in prison for around two years, the paramilitary leaders had 
already lost much of their power. Uribe then decided to extradite twelve of those leaders 
held in Itagui
132
, it was argued that they were not truly committed to the DDR and had 
continued in drug-trafficking. As a consequence, Corporation Democracy began to fall 
apart, a process exacerbated by its own internal criminal dynamics: in 2009 four of its 
leaders were killed in internecine struggles for power while other leaders were arrested 
for their involvement in criminal activities after the demobilization
133
. 
This brief account of the NMDS and Corporation Democracy highlights the difficulties 
that the paramilitaries faced in consolidating a political proposition. Firstly, the 
systematic killing of their own political leaders rebounded on them, producing yet more 
fragmentation within the paramilitaries and making it harder for drug-traffickers to 
disguise their illegal activities behind a political façade. Secondly, the paramilitary 
phenomenon never achieved a political identity aside from its counterinsurgency aims, 
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thus impeding any formal transition into a political party
134
. Thirdly, the transformation 
of an illegal army into a legal political entity is by no means straightforward. For 
example, Gutierrez and Jaramillo have argued that the leftist militias that demobilised in 
Medellín in 1994 failed to recast their military power into electoral support: their 
internal military organisation and dynamics contrasted sharply with those needed to 
stand as a political party and to take part in elections (2004:24). Fourthly, the high 
levels of rejection felt in the community towards ex-combatants undermined the 
possibility of their ever achieving broad electoral support (Reintegration Officer No. 66). 
Guáqueta, for one, has claimed that the widespread territorial and electoral control of 
the paramilitaries over one third of the country did not translate into viable long-term 
support due to their rejection by the electorate in the cities and amid international 
context intolerant to drug-trafficking (2009:34). Finally, the judicial system, and in 
particular the High Courts of Justice, impeded the direct participation of paramilitary 
leaders and drug-traffickers in the political arena, and further undermined their 
influence in politics through criminal investigations of para-politics. Already beset by 
this combination of factors, the extraditions ordered by Uribe finally destroyed any 
remaining potential for political organisation.  
Certainly, fears around the continuation of the hierarchy and power of armed groups can 
be applied to the paramilitary experience: the NGOs and civil associations created by 
them followed the structures and rationales from both their military and criminal 
precedents. However, these dynamics are very poorly suited to democratic practice, and 
hence have a low probability of succeeding in the long-term. More importantly, as will 
be explained in the last section of this chapter, any move towards accepting state 
authority and the rule of law implies a critical break with the vertical military 
hierarchies, and the embracing of a more horizontal relationship among and between 
fellow citizens.  
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7.2 Grass-roots organisations 
Associations and grass-roots organisations formed by ex-combatants were another 
potential source of political pressure on the government. In the US, for instance, World 
War II veterans campaigned for the enactment of the GI Bill, which brought with it for 
the very first time extended and special welfare benefits for ex-combatants (Söderström, 
2011:43; Mcmullin, 2012:59). In more recent times, demostrations in Namibia, 
Mozambique and Liberia have forced the respective governments to comply with 
promises made during the demobilisation (Mcmullin, 2012:230). However, in Colombia, 
apart from the street protests mentioned in the fourth chapter, these grass-roots 
organisations failed in their attempts to congregate the demobilised and provide an 
effective, collective platform for their grievances. 
In interviews with the leaders of six of these grass-roots associations, it was clearly 
apparent that they were formed of very few members and held little political leverage at 
both national and regional levels (Grass-roots No 1-6). Similarly, in Antioquia, Aguirre 
(2010) found that the demobilised themselves had only minimal influence within the 
municipalities, and little capacity to bring together associations among ex-combatants.      
At the beginning of the reintegration phase, Peace and Reconciliation had in fact 
encouraged the organisation of small units of political participation among ex-
combatants (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007a). However, these efforts were halted to 
prevent the continuation of the social and political structures that underpinned the 
strength of the drug-traffickers in Medellín. The ACR would also support the creation 
of grass-roots groups and civil organisations to assist the demobilised in speaking up. 
For example, the ACR regional offices held elections of representatives to form 
Regional Working Groups
135
, whose main function was to represent the ex-combatants 
before the ACR or other institutions. Yet once again this process was brought to a 
premature end by the presidential elections in 2010 and the subsequent enactment of 
Law 1424. During the fieldwork in 2012, I found that some of these working groups 
were attempting to start up again (Reintegration Officers No. 93, 154; Interview ex-
combatant No. 18, Interview grass-roots No. 3 and 4), but they had encountered little 
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interest among the majority of the demobilised in engaging in any of these social or 
political movements. As will be expanded in the next section, there was hardly any 
capacity or willingness whatsoever among the former combatants to organize 
themselves around this type of association. 
7.3 Levels of political participation  
Around the time of the fieldwork for this thesis, a former member of the M-19 guerrilla, 
Gustavo Petro, was democratically elected as Mayor of Bogotá for the first time
136
. 
Although this was a topic for discussion in the interviews and focus groups (Figure 13, 
Annex Q), the majority of ex-combatants expressed little interest in participating in 
democratic elections, especially given the widespread perception of corruption in the 
political arena. During their own experiences inside of the armed groups, they had 
personally paid witness to the activities at the root of the para-politics scandal, and the 
subsequent deals made between criminal agents and corrupt politicians:    
We [the paramilitaries] were the puppets of Congress members and politicians, 
and we lost out to them. But if we get to elect people who have principles, there 
would not be so much corruption and the public money would be [distributed 
evenly] among everybody. There are many thieves, a lot of corruption. All the 
politicians want is to fill their pockets. 
 (Focus group ex-combatants No. 4)  
Furthermore, the ex-combatants argued that standing as leaders or members of political 
or activist groups would undermine their efforts at concealing their status as 
demobilised. Taking on a political role in this way may force the public disclosure of 
their previous wrongdoings, and increase the related risks of falling foul of internecine 
power struggles. Some of the demobilised, equally, were conscious that their 
unresolved legal situation forms a further barrier to their participation in the political 
arena. Finally, the ex-combatants also felt that they lacked a figurehead capable of 
taking on the leadership of their associations and of voicing their grievances in public. 
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                 Figure 13. Have you had any form of political participation?  
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For those ex-combatants who did express a desire to participate in politics, the JALs and 
JACs are their preferred option. It is worth noting here that this represents a different 
situation than the one mentioned above in which the paramilitary leaders saw in these 
organisations the chance to continue and prolong their power. In this case, the ex-
combatants‟ aim is to be elected as part of the community to which they now belong, 
rather than within the schematics of paramilitary power. Indeed, one person said that he 
would like to play a part in politics through the grass-roots organisation that he had 
created along with some victims of the conflict:  
I would like to participate in politics. I am living in a slum. I want to work with 
the finances of the JAC that we want to create; it hasn‟t been formalised [yet], 
but we are in the process [of legalising it]. [I have participated] in the meetings 
with the community and all of that.  
(Interview ex-combatant No. 15) 
Finally, a group of participants stated that they took part in politics just as any other 
citizen would: either by voting or by attending certain activities during electoral 
campaigns. However, they tend to avoid any further engagement due to lack of time, 
knowledge or interest. And yet again, their unsolved legal status or their efforts at 
invisibilise mean that they prefer to keep a low profile rather than becoming public 
figures or speaking out for the demobilised. In sum, the following exchange neatly 
summarises the various positions uncovered on the theme of political participation:    
A: By law we can‟t [take part in politics]. 
B: The jobs for politicians are all taken. […] 
A: Petro [Bogota‟s Mayor], if we‟re talking about the M-19, there are a few 
people who are still alive […] Most of them were killed.  
C: Out of 100 there are still around 20. That was the fear for all of us at the 
beginning [to be killed]. 
A: I would like to participate, let‟s say as President of the JAC, in order to make 
things happen. I like living in the countryside and I have my Business Plan for the 
countryside. Why then can‟t I take part in politics within my community if there 
are things that effect me and my Business Plan?  
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 16) 
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Nevertheless, other forms of political engagement were identified in the interviews and 
focus groups on a range of levels: for example, responding to both the authorities and 
the broader legal and political contexts they represent, and to their own personal 
reintegration. In turn, further analysis of their relationship with the tutors allows us to 
better understand how the transformation of ex-combatants into political subjects 
operated, and how the ACR programme fostered the creation of a social contract and a 
citizen identity.  
7.4 Expectations on the authorities versus personal expectations 
Nussio‟s research with Colombian ex-paramilitaries also found a low level of political 
interest or engagement among the demobilized (2012:243), but concluded that the 
relationship between the ex-combatants and the state proved to be a far more salient 
topic (2012:241). As such, he identified three key components that favoured the 
creation of a social contract with the state: fulfilled promises by government; positive 
interactions with state officers and institutions; and the existence of sanctions for those 
who relapse into violence or criminality. Conversely, unfulfilled promises, a negative 
experience with the officers, and a lack of active state presence tend to weaken their 
trust in state institutions (2012:175-177).  
When asking the demobilised about their expectations regarding the authorities, the 
government‟s failings to fulfill its promises was the most common response (Figure 14, 
Annex R, see also Figure 3. As explored in the fifth chapter, it is important to remember 
that these expectations revolved around judicial benefits, but this time they mentioned 
more the economic aid: aside from direct monetary stimulus, the Seed Capital and basic 
education and training for working skills, the ex-combatants repeatedly insisted that 
they had been promised housing. However, there is no official record of this promise, 
and it was not until Law 1424 that the reintegration aid was made available for 
investment in the form of down-deposits for buying property. Arguably, although the 
government provided most of the help it promised, the level of expectation created was 
relatively high; by contrast, the economic and employment situation faced by the 
majority of the demobilised remained precarious, which may only have fuelled the 
perception that the reintegration aid was not good enough:  
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I think that what we deserve is a house – and we don‟t have it –, [we deserve] 
help, jobs to be able to at least pay the rent, because we are paying rent. I‟m 
short in paying the rent and I don‟t know what to do.  
(Interview ex-combatant No.14) 
  
[What we need is] support. So that if they ask you “what do you need” and then 
“well, I need a house”, then they give you a project for you to get your house. Or 
[if] another person [says] “I want to keep studying” then they create a project or 
training according to that person‟s needs.  
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 29) 
The expectation for their judicial situation to be resolved was the second most frequent 
response to this question. Not surprisingly, and particularly for those ex-paramilitaries 
who had been promised full amnesty within 18 months, the reality of several years of 
obligatory workshop attendance and diminishing economic incentives has resulted in 
feelings of fatigue and apathy toward the reintegration programme as a whole. 
Additionally, although most of the rank-and-file ex-paramilitaries participating in the 
reintegration process would not face jail under Law 1424
137
, the possibility of losing 
any legal favour remained real if further criminal investigations pointed to their 
involvement in human rights abuses:  
[I wish] that they [the government] would comply with their promises. They told 
us that it [the process] would take one or two years and that we would be free, 
but no, we are still here. 
 (Focus group ex-combatants No. 19)    
 
So before, they [the government] told us that those who hadn‟t committed crimes 
against humanity would go clean, I mean, [be treated] like a normal civilian. But 
this didn‟t happen. We are still treated like criminals, terrorists […], like 
accomplices. And we were told that [after] signing a piece of paper we would be 
free of all that. 
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 9) 
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Figure 14. What expectations do you have of the authorities 
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Corruption on behalf of the authorities was the third-most given response: either 
because some demobilised have had problems with the police or other public servants, 
or simply because they have no trust in them:  
 Here it‟s up to the army to get the control of the city, and send the police away. 
Because they are the most corrupt: the police […]  
(Interview ex-combatants No. 17) 
As they [the authorities] caught the mafia, they should also put in jail corrupt 
people. 
 (Focus group ex-combatants No. 4) 
In fourth place, some of the demobilised retained a positive perception of the 
reintegration programme, considering it to have brought benefits to them personally or 
to the country as a whole. As such, they expect the authorities to keep the ACR 
programme running: 
For me, [I hope] that they continue supporting this programme, because it is 
needed. Through this programme the war has lessened, because people go out 
and don‟t get involved in another group, but come here instead. And many have 
benefited from it, [so] that people change their mentality and create a family to 
achieve something in life. 
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 2) 
Finally, some demobilised envisages the authorities as providers of welfare to citizens 
in general, a group to which they now belong. Security in particular was mentioned 
several times, as the areas in which they live in the cities may suffer from high levels of 
petty or organised crime: 
[We need] more security for the city, because there are a lot of rapists who target 
women and children. [There is a need] they [the government] provide more 
security in the city. 
(Interview ex-combatant No. 1) 
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In sum, in spite of the fact that government promises did not play a major role as 
incentives to demobilise (as shown in the previous chapter), the level of expectation 
created by the government in terms of economic aid and judicial favour were to prove 
critical in how the ex-combatants perceived the authorities. On the one hand, their 
precarious economic situation and their problems in securing formal employment 
spawned their negative perceptions of the authorities. On the other, the creation of 
sanctions for those who did relapse into violence or criminality also impacted in the 
legal uncertainties surrounding those who had complied with their reintegration.  
By contrast, when asking the demobilised about what expectations they had for their 
own reintegration process (Figure 15, Annex S), the responses highlighted other factors. 
Concerns regarding the unfulfilled government promises and their unresolved judicial 
situation were repeated, especially on the part of the paramilitaries, which reinforces the 
point that they were worse effected by the changes to the legal situation of the ex-
combatants than their counterparts from the guerrillas. However, a significant majority 
also said that they aimed to improve their own quality of life, which in turn was directly 
contingent on their finding a permanent job or a more secure source of income.  
My expectations are to get a permanent job so I can change my personal 
situation, more so than when I was in the group. Here, thank God that I have a 
job and at least I am not hungry. 
 (Interview ex-combatant No. 28) 
What I expect is to finish my studies and to have some support for improving our 
situation, not so much in studying but in having a job on your own. That way I 
can improve the situation of my family with the help of the government. 
 (Focus group ex-combatants No. 3) 
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Figure 15. What do you expect from this reintegration process?. 
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Achieving social acceptance was another important factor, underlining the problems the 
demobilised face in adapting to their new life or fitting in with the wider community. 
Within the same group of answers it was the desire for equality and to become a fully 
accepted member of the community, as opposed to receiving privileges for the wrong 
reasons:   
I hope that people treat us like the human beings that we are, that they do not see 
us as many people still do. We are already out of the groups, but there are a lot of 
people who look at us strangely, they treat us… I hope to be treated normally, 
like any human being. 
 (Focus group ex-combatants No. 16) 
Where I used to live, I arrived and they welcomed me, but behind my back they 
spoke about me. Why? Because it is like that, they do not have respect but fear. 
Now, I want a normal life, normal means normal. […] That I can meet with my 
neighbour and he has the guts to tell me off, to tell me anything: “Look what your 
children are doing”. But where I was, they wouldn‟t dare tell me, they could see 
my children doing something wrong and they wouldn‟t tell me. Why? Because 
they were afraid. I want a normal life, normal, where one can have problems with 
a neighbour, a dispute, and they can make any complaint with no fear. Not that 
they don‟t say anything for being scared.  
(Interview ex-combatant No. 9) 
Interestingly, several of the demobilised also mentioned that their expectation was to 
pursue community work and activities to support the victims of the conflict. In one case, 
a group of ex-paramilitary members had organised a public event specifically to ask for 
forgiveness from the community. Although small, the group is very active in terms of 
social participation; as a result, both the municipality and the local police supported the 
event. Despite being in the minority, examples of this kind showcase the role that ex-
combatants can potentially take in bringing reconciliation and reparation to victims, as 
they may sow the seeds for spontaneous initiatives in social participation:   
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I expect the [ACR] programme to continue. [We go] wherever they want to take 
us as long as they can help us. I never committed crimes against humanity but [I 
want to] help other people. Reparation to victims, reparation, even though I 
didn‟t do [any wrongdoing], I would like to take part, to do something, because 
we reintegrated. There are many people who committed those crimes, I don‟t 
have those crimes [against me] but I did participate [in the group].  
(Interview ex-combatant No. 1) 
Now, with the guy I‟m working with, who is also demobilised, we have been 
looking in many places and we are going to start a business. We have it all ready 
and we are working very hard and people are surprised at how far we have 
progressed. […] Our aim is to create at least 20 jobs [for the demobilised] so 
they will be able to work and finish their [reintegration] programme without any 
problems. That‟s my goal. 
 (Focus group ex-combatants No. 31) 
 
Finally, only in two cases, the demobilised were pessimistic in the face of their 
precarious economic outlook, and held no expectations in terms of enhancing their 
quality of life:  
It‟s not that I don‟t want to learn but I have seen many [of my] peers who study, 
make things. Many people study and take one course […] because they want to 
get a better job and improve their lives. And many have done so, they completed 
[school] but they have not been able to get a job, so there is no solution.  
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 20) 
Overall, I found that the demobilised talked more positively than negatively about their 
personal reintegration process (Figure 16, Annex T). Despite frequent complaints 
around the government‟s broken promises, a significant majority of the ex-combatants 
felt that the process of reintegration has offered them an opportunity to overcome not 
only a harsh existence inside the illegal armed group, but also the conditions of poverty 
or marginalisation that brought them there in the first place:   
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That is what you want, to have a resolved legal status, so you can be with your 
family. The process has helped because it has changed your mind. Arms, you 
have left the arms, you now have a psychological component, like being with your 
family, your parents, your children. That is the big change compared with what 
we had there [in the group]. It was a change from being aggressive all the time, 
also among fellow combatants […] I studied, [now] I am a technician. There are 
things that you don‟t adapt to, but you have to… like you adapted to life in the 
forest, one also has to make the effort and adapt again. 
 (Focus group ex-combatants No. 16) 
[In the guerrilla] it‟s hard, you suffer, you‟re starving, and you have to walk. You 
know that there is no payment, you know. You are there because of the ideals, 
supposedly, to achieve their political project. But from the moment that you 
decide to surrender to the Army you start seeing the change, despite [the fact that 
they] offered you things that were never fulfilled. Look at the difference. For 
instance, I am studying, I will finish high school soon. [In the guerrilla] they also 
study […] but life there is very hard compared to life here.  
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 8) 
Negative references to the process, meanwhile, are centered on how the government 
handled the process rather than their own reintegration as such: they reaffirm that 
government promises were never fully realised, or the high level of rejection that 
confronts the demobilised in general. In five of the focus groups, respondents claimed 
that they were aware of the problems they would face they would have preferred self-
reintegration to pursuing the official DDR process and the ACR programme: 
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Figure 16. Their experience on the reintegration process has been….  
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A: Had I known that the government would not fulfill its promises, I wouldn‟t 
have demobilised. I wouldn‟t have screwed up my CV.  
B: I wouldn‟t have demobilised. 
C: Me neither. 
A: Because I have worked in companies and I have damaged my CV. 
C: They lied. 
A: I worked as a security guard, but I was fired because they found out that I was 
demobilised. Then I came to this city and the boss fired me because I could not 
open a bank account because I am demobilised. So what are the benefits? 
  (Focus group ex-combatants No. 22) 
 
A: Society still distrusts us, as we are still [seen as] criminals. Reintegration is to 
become a civilian like anybody else. But people do not accept us like that […] 
They always feel distrust: “that man will steal, what is he gonna do?”, things are 
not like that. 
B: Or “who are they gonna kill?”. They think of us like that. 
A: The programme is [a] good [one], but demobilising was a mistake. Because 
you screw up your CV and then you have problems because of that. 
 (Focus group ex-combatants No. 3) 
 
Thirdly, some excombatants mentioned having had problems in adapting to the civil life, 
while in fourth place others mentioned that they felt as though the ACR programme was 
a means of controlling their activities. In fifth place, one group of respondents had come 
to the conclusion that despite their disappointment with the government they did not 
regret their decision to leave the group. Finally, some demobilised intimated – or 
threatened – that they may return to their armed group. 
Paradoxically, then, despite the ex-combatants‟ recurrent complaints of being misled by 
the government and concerns for their own judicial and economic situation, a significant 
number of demobilised respond positively to their own experience of reintegration, 
particularly as an opportunity for personal development. Contrary to what Nussio has 
argued, these broken expectations have not had a conclusive role to play in the creation 
of a social contract. Arguably, the work of the tutors in defining each participant‟s 
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personal needs, preferences and future life-projects may also have contributed to the 
demobilised becoming more capable of distinguishing between a larger institutional 
process and their own personal experience of it.  
The ex-combatant‟s interactions with state officers will be explored in more depth in the 
next section. Nussio has argued that these interactions in the implementation of DDR 
programmes may represent a window of opportunity, as it could be the first positive 
contact between ex-combatants and state institutions (2012:227). In the previous chapter 
it was shown that the relationship with the tutors was positively perceived by the 
demobilised; I will now turn the ways in which the provision of psychological services 
to the demobilised may also have had a transformative effect on their relationship with 
the state, and as a result, on their own behaviours. 
7.5 Building citizens 
Söderström has claimed that DDR programmes can shape the ex-combatants‟ 
relationship with politics through the enabling of access and interpretive mechanisms 
that define their practice in a democratic system (2011:43). Access mechanisms refer to 
the provision of material and cognitive resources that expand access to political 
participation, while interpretive mechanisms are structures of meaning, norms and 
values that are internalised by individuals. Thus, the creation of resources and point of 
contact with public institutions is beneficial to the emergence of a social contract 
between the ex-combatants and the state (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2012; Mitton, 
2012). Using Tilly‟s and Turner‟s definition, citizenship is a category that establishes 
mutual rights and obligations in relation to the state, at the expense of any other 
authority, and takes form in a set of practices that defines a person as a competent 
member of society (Tilly, 1996:8; Turner, 2000:ix). The literature on DDR, meanwhile, 
has been largely devoted to the process of transforming combatants into apolitical 
civilians while at the same time emphasising the importance of building democratic 
institutions. My contention is that both processes are deeply entangled with one another 
and that more attention needs to be paid to the problem of transforming the combatants, 
through their direct inter-relationship with the democratic institutions. Thus, going 
beyond the concept of “civilianization” proposed by Berdal (1996:45) and Duclos 
(2012:3), the combatants need to develop not just a civilian identity, but a citizen one.   
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Access Mechanisms: Citizenship Education  
As most ex-combatants hail from peasant backgrounds and from isolated rural areas or 
marginalised areas in the cities, they lack basic knowledge of social dynamics typical of  
modern cities, such as traffic laws or how to pay utility bills (Group Interview teachers 
CEPAR; Interview Police Liaison; Pax Christy, 2006:37). In some cases, their first 
meaningful contact with the modern world occurs after they demobilise:    
A: When I first arrived in [the city] I didn‟t know what a traffic light was. 
B: The same with me. I had only seen escalators and lifts in movies. The first time 
I got onto an escalator I got on it, up and down again and again, until the 
security guard stopped me.  
(Focus group ex-combatants No. 13) 
That is what we want, working experience we have [already], what we don‟t 
know is the city. If you tell me “move that car”, or “move that plane”, I won‟t be 
able to do that, because I never learned [how to do] that. I never lived among 
those machines. But if they tell me “one hectare [of land], go and cultivate it”, I 
know [how], because I made a living from that for a long time; I was born in the 
countryside. That is what we want, working experience we do have, we just do not 
know the city.  
(Interview ex-combatant No. 28) 
More significantly for this research, the demobilised had encountered problems in 
accessing public services, due to their shortcomings in basic education, or simply 
because they did not know (or were not accustomed to) the relevant procedures and 
requirements. Complex and bureaucratic paperwork, for instance, may prove 
challenging, but so may queuing or waiting to be served, especially when bearing in 
mind that the weapons they carried previously gave them a sense of power and 
privilege over the general population (Reintegration Officers No. 93, 94, 119, 129, 143).  
To address these problems, the PRVC designed a training course called Module Zero to 
provide citizenship education
138
 and assist the demobilised in understanding and 
complying with both general bureaucratic procedures and basic rules for coexistence 
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 Resolution 513/2005, Articles 15-16. 
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(OACP/ACR, 2010:162). Module Zero informed the ex-combatants about the services 
available to them, while also introducing them to topics such as democratic participation, 
everyday life in the city, and peaceful conflict resolution (Pax Christy, 2006:43). 
Similarly, the PAPDRB incorporated activities to welcome the ex-combatants as new 
citizens, including a sightseeing tour around Bogotá and a symbolic oath of 
commitment to the city (Interview Villamizar). 
By the same token, the National Policy for Reintegration enacted in 2008 set out to 
educate the demobilised in responsibility and autonomy. In turn, the ACR assumed the 
task of providing courses to inform and train ex-combatants in the mechanisms of 
citizen participation, accountability and control
139
 and to encourage the exercising of 
active citizenship (ACR, 2011:16; Conpes 3554, 2008:40; OACP/ACR, 2010:9). The 
syllabus of the psychological workshops therefore featured knowledge of and practice 
in citizenship rights and duties (Reintegration Officers 20, 27, 47, 90, 94, 95, 97, 120, 
116, 117, 141, 143, 146, 149, 157): 
[…] They know that here the benefits are the same for everybody. And if someone  
thinks that we are not providing a good service, that we are failing them, who 
feels that the State is not… [I tell them]: “Guys, even if I am sacked, it does not 
matter, make use of the mechanisms of participation that we have studied in 
class.” […] Because it would be wrong, if a person demobilises, [...] that now 
you are a Colombian citizen and I deny your citizen rights. [I tell them]: “Those 
are the rights that you acquired or recovered after the demobilisation: use them, 
apply them”. And in fact some of them have filed complaints. 
 (Reintegration Officers No. 75-77) 
It would appear, then, that the ACR reintegration programme may have facilitated 
access to democratic mechanisms in two ways: on the one hand, improving their 
literacy and education skills has eased the ex-combatant‟s transition into recognising, 
understanding and using the appropiate mechanisms for participation and accountability. 
On the other, compulsory courses and training in citizenship encouraged the 
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demobilised to know their rights as well as duties, while at the same time providing 
those material and cognitive resources needed to properly participate in democracy.  
However, bearing in mind the tendency among the demobilised to migrate to the cities, 
and that the fieldwork for this research was conducted in the capital cities, it is worth 
investigating the extent to which these access mechanisms were linked to, and therefore 
dependent on, the ex-combatants‟ migration (or capacity to travel to) the urban centres. 
Arguably, urban life improves access to government services in general, and to the 
democratic mechanisms of participation and accountability in particular. Concurrently, 
the barriers to accessing these same mechanisms remain strong in those rural areas and 
city slums where the armed groups still operate in force.  
Interpretative Mechanisms: Changing Hierarchies  
Some of the reintegration officers interviewed highlighted the change they had 
witnessed in the behaviour of the demobilised when making a complaint. At the 
beginning of the process, for example, resorting to verbal aggression and threats was a 
common occurrence among the ex-combatants. Yet these behaviours have been 
progressively replaced by alternatives that have been emphasised by the tutors in the 
workshops
140
 (Reintegration Officers No. 75-77, 95, 128, 129, 143, 147, 159). 
Moreover, the tutors recognised the ability of the demobilised to use legally established 
mechanisms to present complaints as a positive indicator of their advancement in the 
reintegration process (Reintegration Officer No. 75-77, 117, 154): 
There has been a lot of progress. Before, a participant used to come here, 
kicking, shouting, and threatening to break the computer because: “I haven‟t 
been served”. Now the participant says: “I will call customer services and file a 
complaint”. Or they write down a complaint in the office. For me that‟s nice, 
because it has been worth it. At this stage of the process, to have participants who 
I‟ve found out have called and made a complaint against me, that‟s nice. […] 
They know that it‟s through communication, through other institutions […]. 
Nowadays, they threaten you to go to the Ombudsman. But it is nice when they 
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 „Tutelas‟ and „Derechos de petición‟, in particular, are mechanisms available to any citizen, consisting 
of filing requests or complaints against public institutions.  
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say “I am going to the Ombudsman” rather than “I‟m gonna break your a… and 
I will shoot you three times”. 
(Reintegration Officer No. 117) 
I used to be aggressive, very aggressive and I solved everything [by] shouting. 
But now… I had a tutor last year who helped me with calming down. Now I am 
transformed completely […] I used to tell her my problems, that I used to blow up 
really quickly and then I wanted to kill someone. I looked for her advice and she 
told me: “when you have those problems, count from 1 to 10”. And I do so. I can‟t 
recognise myself.  
(Interview demobilised No. 13) 
Similarly, in Medellín, Peace and Reconciliation had also approached behavioural 
through education in the CEPAR. Aside from providing adult education, the teachers 
also played a vital role in creating environments that re-signified the reintegration 
process and subsequently led to the acceptance of basic coexistence rules and new 
authority figures. The CEPAR also instigated the role of Coexistence Officer, whose 
responsibility was to deal with any coexistence problems by enacting and enforcing a 
new system of protocols (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2011a:17-21): 
 
Saying that the people inside the armed groups had no rules is inaccurate. The 
people who belonged to the armed groups had rules and hierarchies. The role of 
the CEPAR is to introduce respect and communication into the relationships and 
regulations of a group, renouncing the use of the force. 
 (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2011a:21)   
As described in the fifth chapter, during the demobilisation and reinsertion phases, 
maintaining a sense of vertical hierarchy was crucial to avoiding a disorganised 
demobilisation or mass desertions. Similarly, as witnessed in the case of Corporation 
Democracy, the control exercised by the paramilitary leaders was key to maintaining 
discipline among the ex-combatants, and to forcing them to attend the workshops in the 
early stages of the DDR process. However, the leaders progressively relinquished these 
powers of leadership, and their control over their former troops faded away 
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(Reintegration Officer No. 66). Nonetheless, in the beginning the reintegration officers 
had little choice but to work within rather than against these entrenched hierarchies in 
order to transform them:  
It was like that in the small towns. When I arrived there was nobody [in the 
classroom]. Then the commander phoned them: “Miss […] is here, you all have 
to come here”. Then I had to work with the commander and tell him: “I am the 
psychosocial worker here, so I am the one that has to call them. I am the person 
that draws the boundaries… although you can help by bringing them to the 
workshops”. One had to use them as leaders, at the beginning it had to be like 
that, but different from [the leadership] they were used to. That leadership had to 
be understood from another point of view. 
 (Reintegration Officer No. 146) 
 
When asking the reintegration officers about the methods they employed in their 
attempts to break down the existing hierarchies, they claimed that they were strict in 
respect of basic rules and the egalitarian treatment of all ex-combatants, regardless of 
their previous armed group or ranking (Reintegration Officers No. 47, 49-51, 54, 66, 73, 
75-77, 94, 106, 116, 120, 146). It is worth recalling at this point that, when the ACR 
was created, one of its core tasks was to unify the treatment of the collectively and 
individually demobilised and to disrupt their vertical hierarchies (OACP/ACR, 2010). 
As a result, there was an institutional effort to avoid any differential treatment:  
Q/ How have you achieved the change of hierarchies? 
R/ It is [achieved] through interacting with them and by understanding the other 
person as equal […] For instance, in the workshops they have to interact with 
anybody, with whoever they have to, as in everyday life. And we work with that: 
before they used to respect because there was a commander, [from whom] they 
received orders. Now they need to respect because there is a norm. It is not only 
one person but the voices of many that are telling you that things should not be 
like that.  
(Reintegration Officer No. 94) 
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What you have to do is to unify those behaviours. Here at CEPAR nobody is 
paramilitary, guerrilla or victim. Here all are students and there is a manual for 
coexistence. You have to follow it […] the rule is for one and for all. So here we 
try to homogenise discipline: no one will impose things on their group […]. It 
really helps, to homogenise. In the end the teachers know that there are some 
particularities within the population, but that cannot constitute a benchmark to 
give to the class or to deal with the group or to talk to them.  
(Reintegration Officer No. 54) 
 
To give a further example, initially the CEPAR in Medellín had to schedule separate 
days for providing educational services to each group – guerrillas, paramilitary, victims 
of violence and vulnerable groups – in an effort to avoid conflicts. Then, at a later date, 
the groups were mixed together, forcing the ex-combatants from different groups to 
coexist and interact with other civilians. As a result of this approach, social links 
emerged spontaneously between them (Group Interview teachers CEPAR). Similarly, in 
spite of the security problems in the shelters in Bogotá, the coexistence between ex-
paramilitaries and ex-guerrillas did not reported incidents, but rather to the forging of 
demonstrable links of solidarity (Pax Christy, 2006:25; Villamizar, 2006). It is equally 
worth remembering that the taskforce of the PAPDBR also mixed together ex-
combatants, from guerrillas and paramilitaries alike, as part of their daily activities. 
Furthermore, despite the substantial economic differences in the amounts allocated to 
the individually and the collectively demobilised (be it in the Seed Plan and the monthly 
monetary allowances), the ex-combatants themselves view progress through the process 
as a product of personal effort or commitment, rather than it being associated with 
privileges for a specific group:    
We are all equal, all of us have the right to study. There are people who have 
finished primary school, then high school, and then obtained their degree as 
technicians. They completed three processes. Some others haven‟t finished 
primary or high school. [...] Those that made progress are people who took 
advantage of the process, the Business Plan, all that. Since the beginning we have 
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been committed to this, we have studied. More importantly, [we don‟t] to get in 
troubles again, we walk the line. 
 (Interview ex-combatant No. 21) 
Certainly, the transformation of vertical and patrimonial hierarchies into horizontal and 
equal relations constitutes the most crucial tenet of democratic rule. Political 
philosophers such as Hobbes, Spinosa and Rousseau have pointed towards equality and 
freedom as the central factors that make possible the individual‟s embracement of the 
rule of law. In the historical construction of the concept of citizenship, equality came to 
be considered as a natural right and a fundamental element of sovereignty, replacing 
membership of a religion or loyalty to a monarchy. Equality thus became the means to 
an end, and that end was security: “[…] in all kind of Government whatsoever, there 
ought to be a supreme and equall power” (Hobbes, 2010:43). Or to quote Spinoza, “[…] 
in the civil order, all men fear the same things, and all have the same ground of security, 
the same way of life” (2000:§3.3). Similarly, the Social Contract theory invokes a tacit 
agreement, not between people and their sovereign but among equal citizens:  
[A] form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common 
force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting 
himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before. 
 (Rousseau, 1923:§I.6,43) 
Therefore, if breaking the military hierarchies is one of the main aims of a DDR process, 
the question remains over how DDR programmes can then introduce the combatants 
into new democratic structures. First and foremost, these structures need to already be in 
place: arguably, the Colombian state has sustained its democratic institutions over many 
years, but its lack of a monopoly of force has left a broad array of marginalised groups 
without the means to access them. The Human Development Report for 2011, for 
example, found that the rural population in Colombia suffers a “deficit of citizenship”: 
finding itself in a generalised situation of poverty, and faced with a lack of labour rights 
and access to land ownership, as well as very limited possibilities for political 
participation (UNDP, 2011:28). The ACR programme, in turn, opened up access and 
interpretive mechanisms to the demobilised population, extending the rights of 
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citizenship to those that had lost or never had a positive political relationship with the 
Colombian state. 
Secondly, as explored in chapters five and six, the demobilised valued to a high degree 
their freedom from the military order and those vertical hierarchies to which they 
deferred during the conflict (Figures 4, 5 and 9). Thirdly, the equality of citizen rights 
inherently defines the role of a person with regard to the wider political order. Arguably, 
during the war, being able to differentiate between friends and foes, loyalists and 
traitors, is a matter of life and death; likewise, maintaining the military hierarchy is 
essential to the survival of the group and of each of its members. However, once war 
comes to an end and the armies are dismantled, this polarisation loses its critical 
function and the differences between armed groups, or between military hierarchies, 
become blurred. Thus, the institutional effort to minimise the differences among ex-
combatants, and between them and other citizens, resulted in the forging of social links 
on two important levels. On one level, it reified their relationship with the Colombian 
state as the provider of services and opportunities otherwise inaccessible in their 
condition as peasants or as combatants. On the other, their nascent equality is borne out 
of the creation of social fabric that binds them together with other people, with whom 
they might share the status of equal citizens.  
It is also important to recognise here that this equality of approach does not infer the 
total elimination of social hierarchies. On the contrary, reintegration programmes 
should also take into account the leaderships that inevitably emerge within any social 
group. Indeed, the tutors encourage the creation and active participation of new leaders, 
while making clear that equality of rights for ex-combatants and other civilians should 
be respected (Group Interview teachers CEPAR; Reintegration Officers No. 129, 131-
132, 146, 158, 159). When it comes to the emergence of negative leaders, rather than 
marginalising them, the tutors recommend their participation in additional courses or 
activities, a process which in general seems to have proved successful in re-orienting 
their leadership into something more positive (Reintegration Officer No. 54, 109; 
Group Interview teachers CEPAR). 
Remarkably, other differentiating factors in the situation of ex-paramilitaries and ex-
guerrillas – their social background, the internal organisation of the group, the process 
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of demobilisation – do not seem to define the outcome of the reintegration programme. 
When asking the reintegration officers about the differences they perceived between the 
collectively and the individually demobilised, or between ex-guerrillas and ex-
paramilitaries, they argued that these features informed the starting point of the process, 
but not necessarily its result (Reintegration Officers No. 16, 20, 66, 120). On the one 
hand, the deserters from the guerrillas had already gone through the emotional and 
psychological process of severing their social ties to the group. As a result, the tutors 
found it easier for them to commit to the reintegration and to establish a new plan for 
their future lives. On the other, the ex-paramilitaries demobilised under the assumption 
that they were part of an anti-subversive project, and hence expected to find acceptance 
– and gratitude – from society as a whole. In this case, then, the tutors had to make extra 
efforts to show them that they had also harmed innocent people in the process: 
[…] I was a soldier, I was in the war. They [the tutors] have helped me to 
understand that I got out of that and that life should be seen in a different light. 
And that one cannot keep thinking about harming other people. Life is not like 
that. [...] We demobilised with lies [from the government]. But now we 
recognise… how did we realise the harm that we had caused?. Through the 
psychosocial services that we had here, when we had to interact with the victims 
[…] 
(Interview ex-combatant No. 10) 
Finally, Rousseau brings into the discussion the role of identity and self-control, arguing 
that the social contract takes shape at the level of the individual personality: “each of us 
puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general 
will” (1923:§I.6,43). Thus, the result of the social contract at the individual level is the 
development of behaviours that are socially prescribed and legally established, and 
internalised in the form of the individual‟s self-control: 
I think it [the process] was good. When you leave those groups you have the wrong 
mentality: you want everything [to come] easily [...] But when you hear what the 
psychologist told us, that you should behave like a citizen, in telling you how to work, 
how to raise your children, treat your wife, and things like that.  
(Interview ex-combatant No. 11) 
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On the one hand, therefore, a reintegration programme can establish or resurrect links 
between national institutions and ex-combatants, achieved through the systematic 
training of the demobilised in the use of public services and participatory mechanisms 
that were unknown or inaccessible to them while serving within the military structure. 
On the other, the introduction of the demobilised to new social and political roles 
results in the development of new social and political behaviours in which the use of 
violence is no longer accepted or tolerated.  
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has evaluated the different pathways for political reintegration. The 
transformation of the paramilitary groups into political parties failed for a variety of 
reasons: first, their incapacity to consolidate a political proposition; second, the 
continuation of criminal activities and the internecine power struggles that followed; 
third, high levels of rejection at the national and international level; and finally the 
actions of the judicial system in blocking their promised amnesty, and the subsequent 
extradition of their leaders. Hence, despite the infiltration of paramilitary leaders into 
the political system and its democratic institutions, their attempts to become politicians 
were doomed to fail in the long term. 
In a similar vein, grass-roots organisations also fell short in their attempts to organise 
the ex-combatants, and in particular to channel and convey their political grievances or 
proposals. Furthermore, despite efforts on the part of the reintegration institutions – like 
Peace and Reconciliation and the ACR – to foster some form of social organisation 
among the demobilised, the forming of associations was confronted by two major 
problems: the lack of interest and willingness among the demobilised, and the attempts 
of the leaders to maintain their paramilitary power by instrumentalising these 
organisations. 
The use of traditional citizenship mechanisms such as voting or participating in political 
campaigns was only mentioned on a few occasions, and thus would not appear to 
represent a salient form of political participation for the ex-combatants either. However, 
other forms of political reintegration were identified in the interviews and focus groups: 
beginning with the largely negative response to their expectations on the role of the 
authorities, especially in regard to the unfulfilled promises made by the government, 
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and their on-going, unresolved legal situation. As a result, many ex-combatants argued 
that the aid offered by the authorities was insufficient or underpowered, especially in 
respect of their aims to get out of poverty, to find a stable job or income, or to buy a 
house.  
In stark contrast to this, the individual experience of reintegration is largely perceived as 
positive, having provided them with a real sense of personal development. It can be 
argued, then, that the specific efforts on the part of the reintegration officers to scope 
out a programme based on their present needs and future plans may also have helped the 
ex-combatants to develop their competence and confidence in distinguishing between an 
overarching institutional process and their own personal experience of it. Therefore, the 
different levels of analysis of DDR (macro, meso and micro) may not mirror each other; 
on the contrary, they may lead to different – even opposite – outcomes. 
Finally, the positive relationships witnessed in the ACR programme between ex-
combatants and their reintegration officers, in turn, have had significant ramifications 
for the creation of a social contract and a citizen identity, through the enabling of access 
and interpretive democratic mechanisms (Söderström, 2011). On the one hand, the 
improvement in literacy and educational skills and the emphasis placed on civic 
education have bolstered the level of access to government services in general, and to 
the democratic mechanisms of participation and accountability in particular. However, 
more research is required to gauge the extent to which this access has been limited to 
the cities and not extended as far as those demobilised living in more isolated rural areas. 
On the other, the interpretive mechanisms have facilitated the transition between the 
military estructure (vertical and patrimonial hierarchies) and modern-day democracy 
(horizontal, egalitarian relationships based on the rule of law). Subsequently, the ex-
combatants learned not only to respect but also to internalise these rules, which in turn 
find their expression in the development of individual behaviours of self-control.  
The sense of equality, in particular, has been raised as a crucial contributor to identity 
transformation: despite coming from divergent groups and demobilisation processes, the 
ACR programme and its officers purposely encouraged and applied egalitarian 
treatment to the demobilised. This may explain why the reintegration officers did not 
find any obvious differences between ex-combatants from guerrilla and paramilitary 
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groups during the reintegration process. In the same vein, the responses collected in the 
interviews and focus groups presented no obvious patterns (or were not skewed) based 
on which group they came from, as may initially have been expected. 
The literature on DDR has understood the political reintegration of former combatants 
in the light of a social contract. As such, it has two dimensions: on the one hand, the 
creation of institutions that reinforce the rule of law, and on the other the creation of 
moral codes and a common identity. While there has been a certain amount of analysis 
of the ownership and building of democratic institutions, if the ultimate objective of the 
DDR is to transform combatants into citizens, the inculcation of a political subjectivity 
needs to no longer be ignored. I would contend that, in reality, both of these processes 
are deeply entangled with one another: the existence or building of democratic 
institutions with which the ex-combatants can interact, their freedom from the military 
order and its associated vertical hierarchies, and their equality of rights with their fellow 
citizens are of the utmost importance in socialising the demoblised into the democratic 
system. This process of integration also coincides with the development of behaviours 
more suitable to democracy and the rule of law. Therefore, more so than placing the 
responsibility of reintegration wholly on the shoulders of the ex-combatants or their 
recipient communities, security and stability in a post-conflict setting is contingent on 
the form of political system into which they are being reintegrated, and whether this 
system favours or hinders the development of their political identity as citizens. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
241 
 
Conclusions and findings 
The central question of this research is how the ACR programme in Colombia 
contributed to the reintegration of ex-combatants. The first part of the thesis aimed to 
show the DDR programme design not merely as a technocratic activity, but as the 
byproduct of political dynamics in the negotiation between the warring factions. The 
second part presented the experiences of the demobilised across three different 
dimensions in the reintegration: economic, social and political. 
The analysis of DDR programme design revolved around four debates in the literature 
over the emphasis of security versus development goals. The two first debates refer to 
the scope of the programmes – between security-oriented and development-oriented 
approaches – and who best to target with reintegration assistance – inclusive or 
exclusive of the recipient communities. The scholarly and policy-making literature has 
highlighted the importance of going beyond standard security goals to address 
developmental aims and provide wellbeing for the receiving communities. The 
Colombian DDR initially ran contrary to this requirement and its original design was 
wholly security-oriented and combatant-based. This was caused by the demobilisations 
running as part of two different security strategies to deal with the guerrillas and the 
paramilitary, and therefore targeted the various ex-combatants in different ways. 
For one, President Uribe decided to enter into peace negotiations with the paramilitary 
groups. These groups had achieved territorial control over a third of the country, while 
also gaining important political leverage and control over central democratic institutions. 
However, these groups were faced with the threat of punishment by international law: 
the International Criminal Court could have prosecuted them for gross human rights 
violations, while the US requested the extradition of some of their leaders for their 
involvement in drug-trafficking. In turn, the negotiations between the paramilitaries and 
the government, the demobilisation of troops and the approval of transitional laws all 
became deeply entangled processes, and overtly contingent on the eligibility of 
paramilitary leaders to the judicial benefits that would provide them with legal amnesty 
or leniency. Decisions on the recipients of demobilised status thus, included drug-
traffickers while at the same time excluding child soldiers to avoid charges related to 
child recruitment.  
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In a parallel process, the Uribe government bestowed demobilised status on deserters 
from the guerrillas. This was a deliberate strategy to weaken the FARC and the ELN by 
diminishing their troop numbers and obtaining intelligence and collaboration with the 
military as part of their counterinsurgency campaign. Therefore, while the collective 
demobilisations of paramilitary groups were handled by civilian institutions, the 
desertion of guerrillas and their later treatment as demobilised depended on the security 
needs of the military institutions.  
In sum, the decision-making process around who would gain status as demobilised was 
driven by the debates on the political and legal situation of the paramilitary leaders and 
drug-traffickers or by the military needs of the army. The judicial benefits inherent to 
demobilised status hence became more important than the economic incentives. 
Conversely, the legal situation and reintegration of the rank-and-file combatants, as well 
as further development goals or benefits to the receiving communities, were largely 
ignored.  
Rather than assuming a proclivity towards the use of violence, this study has explored 
the challenges and difficulties combatants may face in their process of reintegrating into 
post-conflict society and adopting a new identity as citizens. It can be concluded that the 
political battles created around the status of the paramilitary leaders – and the emphasis 
on the applicability of judicial benefits – swallowed up with it the attention or interest 
needed for the planning of a sustainable reintegration strategy for the rank-and-file 
troops. Equally, these political clashes sparked uncertain legal situation for the former 
fighters that would last for nine years, and which also directly impacted on their 
everyday lives, including their ability to find jobs in the formal sector or a place to live. 
Finally, the lack of a unified reintegration strategy also subjected the ex-combatants to a 
period of trial and error of different reinsertion stimuli and activities by uncoordinated 
institutions. 
The third debate examined in this thesis refers to aspects of ownership and state-
building in the DDR policies and programmes. In spite of its initial design, the DDR 
process has been seen to evolve towards a process that included a clear reintegration 
strategy, complete with development opportunities and benefits for the wider 
community. The existence of strong institutions at the national and the sub-national 
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level permitted the contestation of Uribe‟s policy: on the one hand, the judicial system 
altered the legal framework under which the paramilitary leaders demobilised; on the 
other, the Mayoralties of Bogotá and Medellín stepped in to create reintegration 
strategies of their own to compensate for the pitfalls and shortcomings of national DDR 
policy. Both Mayoral Offices addressed the needs of the rank-and-file combatants head-
on, and urged the creation of a national programme of reintegration that would go far 
beyond the weak and short-termist reinsertion strategy first proposed by central 
government. Remarkably, in the absence of a formal reintegration strategy, the 
municipal programme designed by Medellín‟s Mayoral Office was ultimately adopted 
and implemented nationwide. At the same time, the Mayoral Office of Bogotá fiercely 
contested the DDR policy, organising public debates and flagging the problems created 
for the recipient communities. Together this process resulted in the creation of the ACR 
and its formal, national and unified programme for reintegration.  
It can be concluded that although the DDR literature has highlighted the need of 
ownership and state-building, more attention needs to be paid to the role that 
municipalities – and other sub-national authorities – may play in building state capacity 
from the bottom-up. The challenges that the municipal authorities face in reintegrating 
ex-combatants, as occurred in two of the country‟s major cities, may also propel them 
into creating strategies to deal with the demobilised, and which in turn may inform and 
contribute directly to DDR policy-making at the national level.  
The fourth debate revolves around the relevance given to the reintegration phase of the 
process. For reasons explained above, in the Colombian DDR, this phase was not 
included in the original design and would only begin three years later with the inception 
of the ACR. The analysis of the ACR has shown that it certainly contributed to the 
reintegration of former combatants, but in capacities outside the expected ones. 
Crucially, although the literature on DDR tends to emphasise the incentives for 
economic reintegration, its impact in this research does not seem to be significant. On 
the one hand, the offers made by the government in terms of money and benefits appear 
only to have played a small part in the decision to lay down arms. On the other, despite 
enormous institutional effort, the demobilised tend to be reintegrated into poverty. 
Although the ACR developed strategies for both the short- and long-term economic 
reintegration, including initiatives targeting the private sector, unemployment or 
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informal economic activities remained the common lot of the demobilised. In 
combination, their educational disadvantages, their widespread rejection from 
workplaces and their unresolved legal position conspired to push them deeper into the 
poorest and most marginalised communities.  
Contrary to the economic incentives or the generation of income, there are other 
elements that seem more critical to preventing ex-combatant recidivism. First and 
foremost, participating in war is something that most people are not willing to do twice, 
given the risk it entails. Secondly, the emotional links inherent in raising or recovering a 
family are immensely valued and represent a more important incentive to enter and 
remain in the reintegration programme than money alone. Thirdly, demobilisation itself 
is perceived as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to be freed from the military order of 
the armed group.  Some of the demobilised even reported receiving potentially offers of 
millions of pesos against which the monetary incentives offered by the state could 
scarcely compete – but weighed up against their experiences of belonging to an armed 
group, these economic offers were adjudged to lose their subjective value when 
compared to the creation of social and emotional bonds.  
Reintegration hence goes beyond the need to simply replace the economic reward 
obtained in war-related activities with others in the legal civilian life. A DDR 
programme may, of course, offer money and other financial aid, but to effectively 
contribute to the reintegration it is of the utmost importance that they be properly linked 
to a clear strategy that defines goals and limits for the demobilised, as well a markers of 
personal achievement and progress. Remarkably, the standard technocratic approach, 
which focuses on the provision of educational and vocational training with which to 
secure a livelihood as civilians, does not necessarily have a substantial effect on their 
economic reintegration. As the ex-combatants tend to work into the informal sectors of 
the economy, their social and educational shortcomings are shared with the country‟s 
abundant poor and marginalised population.  
In analysing the links between the different dimensions of reintegration, it can be 
concluded that, rather than standing separate from other socialising processes, economic 
reintegration could act as an indicator of how competent the ex-combatant has become 
as a member of the society, whether democratic or not. However, as the Mayoralty of 
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Medellín has noted the economic dimension is not the starting point but the final 
element in the reintegration process (Alcaldía de Medellin, 2006:129). Alternatively, the 
social dimension of reintegration can be singled out as the organising element of the 
economic and political dimensions. 
The literature on DDR tends to understand this social dimension in terms of the 
dismantling of the military structures and the acceptance of the ex-combatants by their 
families and recipient communities. Certainly, family relationships invert the priorities 
once ensconced in the military order: emphasising personal and family wellbeing over 
the collective aims of the armed group. For both ex-guerrillas and ex-paramilitaries 
alike, tiredness of the war and the desire to reunite with or start a family were the 
primary motivation behind their demobilisation. 
Moreover, the relationships with the receiving communities are defined by the efforts of 
the demobilised to hide their status and their past in the armed groups. Although some 
community workshops and activities were implemented by the ACR, their effectiveness 
in addressing the problems of integration and acceptance by the communities requires 
further evaluation. It was found that the demobilised tend not to take part in these 
activities for a variety of reasons, including lack of time and interest, and for fearing of 
being identified as ex-combatants. Invisibilisation, then, is a strategy to avoid security 
problems and rejection by the society, especially in the workplace. However, for those 
who have disclosed their situation, there is an equal possibility of being accepted or 
rejected. Strikingly, the demobilised feel accepted by their receiving communities or the 
victims of violence but rejected by wealthier sections of society and by employers. 
Ultimately, both victims and perpetrators tend to belong to the same communities that 
share experiences of poverty and marginalisation, thus they end up living in the same 
deprived areas and requesting the same services from the government. Given the fact 
that the Colombian conflict does not follow ethnic or racial lines, it is also frequent to 
witness family links between them. As a consequence, when designing a DDR 
programme it is important to recognise that this problem of rejection is not spread 
evenly. There are sections of society that may reject the demobilised, but there are 
communities and people who are keen to accept them and even help them. It is also 
worthy of mention that, in the Colombian case, this rejection seems to be stronger 
246 
 
among areas of society that could potentially provide them with jobs, which has a direct 
effect on their capacity to secure formal, stable income. 
The ACR programme contributed to the creation and strengthening of these family and 
community links through its focus on psychological models that specifically addressed 
the cultivation of social fabric. Certainly, it could be argued that the former combatants 
will naturally seek out these family and community relationships, with or without the 
intervention of any state institution. It is important to bear in mind, too, that families 
and communities inevitably respond to their social and political context, and thus could 
be equally embedded in social relations that drive the individuals to accept or reject 
enrolment in or collaboration with the armed groups. Accordingly, it has been argued 
that the literature on DDR has placed too much of the responsibility for social 
reintegration on the willingness or capacity of the ex-combatants or the recipient 
communities. However, what clearly does trickle down from the state institutions is the 
critical responsibility for establishing democratic institutions and providing access and 
participation to the ex-combatants and the communities to which they belong.  
The demobilised also reported a third type of relationship developed with their 
reintegration officers and psychosocial tutors. Although in the DDR literature these 
psychological services typically address mental health problems, in the ACR 
reintegration programme the psychosocial approach foregrounded the social as the key 
to unlocking perceptible changes in the individuals‟ behaviours. The therapeutic bonds 
forged with their tutors were positively valued for the majority of the demobilised, 
thanks to their support in a range of topics such as personal development, the creation of 
life-projects, family relationship-building and problem-solving in their everyday and 
domestic lives. In addition, the psychosocial services may have helped the ex-
combatants to maintain stability and focus on their own personal social and 
psychological process of reintegration, particularly in the midst of a contested and 
uncertain political and legal context.  
The creation of the ACR brought about the development of a unified model of 
reintegration and an adjoining bureaucracy trained to implement it nationwide. 
Although the construction of social ties between the demobilised and the ACR 
bureaucracy – and the latter‟s capacity to establish links of its own with state 
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institutions – has been largely overlooked, this research has instead highlighted it as a 
an area of foremost importance. More to the point, the design of the DDR should also 
include questions over who will be in charge of its implementation and its real capacity 
to transform the ways in which the demobilised relate to other people and to the state 
institutions. This is not to say that an army of psychologists should be summoned in all 
cases, but simply that more attention should be paid to the quality of the relationships 
between the DDR officials and the ex-combatants.   
Finally, it was argued that the political dimension of reintegration has been largely 
neglected in the DDR literature. On the contrary, the political order is the essence of 
human nature: ultimately, we are “sempiternal citizens” (Spinoza, 2000:§2.15; Barbone 
and Rice, 2000:10). In this research, the usual approaches that highlight macro-level 
politics were found to have little relevance to this particular group of ex-combatants. 
Firstly, the transformation of paramilitary groups into political parties, or the incursion 
of paramilitary leaders into politics, proved unsuccessful due to a number of factors: 
their incapacity to consolidate a political platform; the continuation of criminal 
activities and the subsequent internecine struggles for power; their rejection at the 
national and international level due to the violence perpetrated against civilians; and the 
reaction of the judicial system against their criminal activities and their infiltration of 
the democratic institutions. In the case of the individually demobilised guerrillas, their 
position as deserters from the group left them with few possibilities of creating a macro-
political project. Similarly, the ex-combatants were reluctant to create or participate in 
grass-roots organisations, which inhibited their ability to voice or represent their needs 
as a group. Finally, there were only a few mentions of traditional participation in 
democracy such as voting or collaborating with political campaigns, such channels 
would not seem to have defined their political reintegration either.  
More significantly, political reintegration at the micro-level constitutes a crucial 
element in recalibrating loyalties to the armed group and shifting them towards the 
creation of links with the democratic institutions. Although there was widespread 
disappointment with the national authorities and near-constant complaints around the 
unfulfilled promises made by the government during the negotiation and demobilisation 
phases, the ex-combatants nonetheless retain a positive sense of their own personal 
reintegration process as well as high expectations regarding their own personal 
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development. Following Söderström‟s theory (2011), it was found that the ACR 
programme contributed to the creation of political subjectivity as citizens through the 
enabling of access to and interpretive mechanisms for democracy. On the one hand, the 
introduction of citizenship education as part of the workshops informed and trained the 
ex-combatants in a variety of democratic mechanisms and institutions that had not been 
previously available to them. In addition, their improvement in literacy and educational 
skills, and their migration to the cities, have also had a positive effect on their access to 
democracy. On the other, the replacement of vertical military hierarchies with 
horizontal and egalitarian relationships directly correlates to the internalization of social 
rules and the development of behaviours of self-control appropriate to a citizen identity. 
The practice of multilateral organisms – and their implementation of DDR programmes 
in the context of international relations – has too often taken precedence over the 
political nature of DDR processes in the field. It is assumed that combatants should be 
transformed into civilians (with a certain level of social and economic capacity for non-
military action), while the components needed to transform them into citizens 
(especially their building a workable relationship with the state) is often overlooked. If 
DDR programmes intend to contribute to the transformation of societies into democratic 
ones, the development of social and political links with the state must be prioritised. By 
contrast, in the absence of a democratic state that can guarantee the equality and 
protection of its citizens, the ex-combatants and their receiving communities are left 
with little option but to align themselves with the political and military forces that 
control the areas in which they live.  
This research has questioned the common assumption in DDR literature that the ex-
combatants have an innate tendency towards violence, as witnessed in their returning to 
the groups or in their entering into criminality. It has been argued that this assumption 
stems from the methodological individualism and the liberal doctrines that underpin the 
practice of the UN and the World Bank in their implementation of DDR programmes. 
Consequently, the former fighters are depicted as economically-motivated and utility-
maximising individuals who are likely to turn to violence and criminality as a means of 
making a living. 
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In the Colombian DDR process, the ex-combatants do not necessarily pose a direct 
security risk. In reality, the rate of recidivism among the demobilised seems relatively 
low by comparison: around 15 per cent by official data (US, 2008:56; FIP, 2010:3; 
Procuraduría, 2011:12; Policía, 2010; CNRR, 2010:156). Similarly, their involvement 
in BACRIM is estimated at 17 per cent, which makes up for only 2 per cent of the total 
number of collectively demobilised troops (Árias and Guáqueta, 2008:5). Furthermore, 
when Law 1424 made it compulsory to activate their status as participants in the ACR 
programme – nine years after the demobilisations started – 24,643 (93 per cent) of the 
expected ex-combatants voluntarily approached the regional officers to do so (El 
Tiempo 29/12/11).  
There are myriad reasons for people choosing to join paramilitary or rebel groups: 
including promises of money and employment; the allure of military life; and the 
prospect of social mobility, escaping from poverty and/or oppressive family 
structures
141
. However, once inside the group, these initial motivations may quickly 
fade away when confronted by the reality of the military life: the risk involved, the 
appalling living conditions and the strict military hierarchies. Withdrawal, however, is 
not an option as the armed groups have developed strategies to prevent mass desertion, 
threatening potential deserters and punishing those that do with death. In turn, although 
it is often assumed that the demobilised may look for a sense of continuity in the 
privileges enjoyed as a bearer of arms and power in front of the communities, this 
research posits, rather, that many ex-combatants perceived the demobilisations as a 
much sought-after opportunity to break away from the paramilitary or guerrilla 
structures and abandon the military life once and for all. 
Although the debate around whether or not the BACRIM constitutes the continuation of 
the paramilitary structures post-demobilisation remains open, there is a further need to 
analyse the creation of criminal groups by those paramilitary leaders who did not 
demobilise and their subsequent recruitment of new combatants (CNRR, 2007). It is 
worthy of note, indeed, that Los Urabeños, one of the largest and most dangerous of the 
BACRIM was actually led by two former EPL guerrillas: the Úsuga brothers. On the 
one hand, when the EPL demobilised in 1991, most of its leaders took an active role in 
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the democratic reforms that followed, and founded NGOs and think-tanks that have 
remained openly critical of the Colombian government for more than two decades
142
. 
On the other, however, in the area of Urabá the EPL entered into armed conflict with the 
FARC to gain power through the seizure of electoral positions and the mutual killing of 
members of the legal political parties formed by each group. In seeking protection 
against FARC military superiority, a number of EPL combatants chose not to 
demobilise and were instead recruited by the paramilitary groups formed at the time 
(Romero, 2004; Semana, 01/02/12). In particular, the Úsuga brothers held considerable 
sway over the paramilitary leadership, forging close ties to the drug barons from the 
Envigado Office in Medellín. They were also later involved in the internecine clashes 
among paramilitary groups, so that when the collective demobilisations began, they 
seized this opportunity to take control of those key drug-trafficking areas and corridors 
abandoned by their former allies.   
As explored in the introduction, Colombia has a tradition of successful demobilisation 
processes that nevertheless have not brought the conflict to an end. Further research is 
required to gather more accurate data and to analyse the dynamics of recidivism. The 
evidence is clear around some combatants who demobilize but relapsed into other 
armed groups or criminal bands, or those who still refuse to demobilise altogether. 
Nonetheless, the example of the Úsuga brothers, rather than encapsulating the security 
risk posed by a substantial proportion of ex-combatants, points more specifically to the 
continuation of specific individuals moving across a variety of outlawed groups – first 
the guerrillas, then the paramilitaries and finally in criminality – who participate in a 
cycle of creation and demobilisation of armed groups across the country.  
The analysis presented above casts a critical eye over the common assumptions in DDR 
literature and practice, which stem from principles rooted in economic models. 
Following the principles of social constructivism, this thesis has analysed DDR from the 
point of view of social and political relations, and has thus approached the problem of 
reintegration from the perspective of building a citizen identity. Rather than assuming 
the ex-combatants to be a source of insecurity in a post-conflict society, this thesis has 
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tried to understand the challenges they may face in becoming a member of a political 
community. It has found that the established “usual suspects” reasoning for the failure 
of reintegration – ex-combatant greed, rejection by the receiving communities – appears 
less significant when compared to the barriers imposed by the economic and political 
contexts that have traditionally marginalised the communities into which these fighters 
are born. Moreover, it is also important to reflect on the role that international 
organisations may themselves play in the perceived failure of reintegration, or of the 
DDR altogether: beneath their assumed technocratic facade there is in fact an element of 
entrenched political self-interest in the bargaining process of DDR design and 
implementation.  
Further research will be needed to understand the dynamics of recidivism in at least two 
areas: firstly the real participation of former combatants in the creation or continuation 
of political groups or criminality, and secondly the non-economic motivations for 
recruitment into the armed groups. Another area for further analysis is the dynamics of 
rejection, and differentiating the groups that reject the demobilised from those that are 
willing to accept them. A third crucial point is the creation of a political relationship 
between the government and the ex-combatants, and defining what role the DDR 
bureaucracy would play within it. Finally, further comparative studies may focus on the 
differences of reintegration between members of different groups, such as the guerrillas 
and the paramilitaries in the case of Colombia. Among the people who participated in 
this research, for instance, the differences in their answers were not obviously linked to 
one group or the other. 
 
Recommendations for the FARC peace process 
A matter of days before this thesis was completed, the Colombian government and the 
FARC guerrilla negotiated a resolution to the armed conflict in the country. The final 
peace settlement includes six points that address a wide range of problems, including 
both security and development goals. The first point responds to the agrarian issue and 
the appalling living conditions of the peasantry in rural areas, which also includes 
questions over land reform and land restitution. The second examines issues of political 
participation, not restricted to FARC members but open to an array of grass-roots 
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organisations and leaders from marginalised communities that have traditionally been 
targeted and killed for voicing their grievances. The third point – one of the last to be 
discussed – has three sections: the bilateral ceasing of hostilities and subsequent 
disarmament; the reincorporation to FARC members into civil life; and the guarantees 
of security, with particular reference to the fight against those criminal and paramilitary 
organisations responsible for attacks on human rights activists, political movements or 
social organisations. The fourth point looks at the drug-trafficking problem and the need 
to seek out alternatives to the prohibition policies that have thus far proved highly 
ineffective. The fifth explores how to recompense or mete out some form of justice to 
the victims from all sides of the conflict. The sixth point states the mechanisms for 
implementing and monitoring the agreements (Agreement, 2016). Returning to point 
three, this section presents recommendations specific to the reincorporation of the 
guerrillas into civil life.   
Two components of the final peace settlement are of particular significance in light of 
this thesis. Firstly, although the director of the ACR was always present around the 
negotiating table on the part of the government, the ACR has played no part at all in the 
settlement. Secondly, throughout the final document the term “reincorporation” has 
been preferred over “reintegration” or “reinsertion”, to the extent that a new institution – 
the National Council for Reincorporation (CNR)
143
 – will be formed, bringing together 
two representatives of the government and two of the FARC. The function of the CNR 
will be to define the schedule and activities of the reincorporation, as well as monitoring 
it for both minors and adults alike (point 3.2.2.3). At this time there is no clarity on the 
extent to which the CNR will replace or collaborate with the ACR, or if it will recognise 
the experience and knowledge base of the antecedent reintegration institutions: in 
education, vocational training and psychological intervention. Arguably, this reflects 
FARC‟s outright rejection of an institution and programme that, in their opinion, was 
designed for the benefit of the paramilitary groups
144
. Certainly, the FARC and the 
paramilitaries were opposing groups, and their negotiation process was completely 
different. Nevertheless, the experience and expertise of the ACR and its personnel 
                                                 
143
 Consejo Nacional de Reincorporación. 
144
 This issue arose in a conversation I held with Francisco Gutierrez, a close advisor to the negotiating 
table.   
253 
 
should not be ignored, especially bearing in mind its extensive work in reintegrating 
former guerrilla members.  
It is estimated that the FARC has less than 10,000 members. By contrast, the ACR has 
developed the capacity to attend to over 30,000 ex-combatants across 29 different 
regional offices. Clearly, then, the ACR has the resources and capacity to provide 
reintegration services to every FARC ex-combatant. Such nascent capability could 
readily be harnessed by the CNR, as the regional offices of the ACR retain their 
potential to make the state present in areas where other national and subnational 
institutions are absent or weak. Of course, the geography of the demobilisations would 
require some adjustment: while the paramilitary groups demobilised in the north-west, 
the traditional FARC strongholds are located in the south-east
145
. Nonetheless, the ACR 
could doubtless facilitate the opening of new regional offices, and train new staff, in 
those areas that have long stood at the margins of the state and in those communities 
that have long lived under FARC control.  
As another example, in May this year the FARC announced that they would demobilise 
all minors belonging to its troops
146
. The total number of minors given, however, was 
only 21. Though clearly an underestimation, and despite widespread criticism and a 
request for confirmation from the ICBF director (El Espectador 27/08/16), the FARC 
have rigidly stuck to this figure. Equally concerning, on the point of the reincorporation 
of minors (3.2.2.5), there has been no mention whatsoever of the ICBF or its 
reintegration programme. Hence, in spite of their efforts to differentiate themselves and 
their negotiation process from the prior experiences of the ex-paramilitaries, the FARC 
is repeating the same mistake of denying the existence of children and young people 
within their troops. It is now the responsibility of the government, and the relevant 
national and international institutions, to increase the pressure on the FARC to include 
these minors in their records, and to officially demobilise them. 
In addition, although the Mayoral Offices and other sub-national authorities are taking 
some part in the implementation of the agreements, more needs to be done to avoid the 
problems created by the demobilisations that took place during Uribe‟s government. In 
                                                 
145
 Departments of Arauca, Casanare, Meta, Caquetá, Putumayo, Cauca, Nariño, Huila and Tolima. 
146
 Public Statement No. 70. May 15 2016. https://www.mesadeconversaciones.com.co/ 
254 
 
the long term, it is essential that these institutions are seen to articulate, collaborate and 
coordinate with the FARC leadership and central government in the reintegration of 
former combatants.  
Regarding economic reintegration, it was established that a socioeconomic census will 
be conducted during the cantonment phase. It is hoped that the information gathered 
during the census will lead to improved business plans and more productive projects in 
future. In addition, each of the demobilised will be entitled to eight million pesos, to be 
invested either in a collective project (business associations) or in an individual project 
such as a small business or a house purchase (point 3.2.2.6). For the financial aid, a type 
of cooperative entitled ECOMUN will be created to foster economies based on 
solidarity and cooperation (point 3.2.2.1). Each ex-combatant will receive a lump sum 
of two million pesos immediately after the cantonment phase, and will be entitled to a 
monthly allowance – 90 per cent of the minimum wage – for a period of twelve months, 
after which the allowances will depend on their enrolment in and attendance of 
education courses (point 3.2.2.7). At first glance, then, these schemes resemble the 
financial management of the paramilitary economic reintegration; thus, the collective 
schemes need to be closely monitored and evaluated if they are to avoid the same 
problems that beset the Business Plans and the loss of Seed Capital that ensued.  
For social reintegration, development work with the families and the communities will 
be required in the traditional FARC strongholds. However, it is also important to 
remember that the FARC has a long history of regulating social relationships at many 
levels, including acting as the judiciary in small community problems, marriages and 
divorces, as well as the control of hunting and fishing to prevent the exhausting of 
resources. The state will therefore need to systematically replace traditional FARC 
regulation with democratic action from its institutions. Moreover, these are remote 
locations with significant security problems, and a chronic lack of state institutional 
representation. The founding of public offices to provide a broad range of public 
services, then, is of the utmost importance to bringing successful reintegration and long-
lasting peace to these areas. FARC members will also have to contend with strong 
attitudes of rejection, not necessarily from their communities of origin but from the 
middle and metropolitan classes. More work needs to be done to better connect the 
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demobilised with these sections of society, particularly with the private sector to 
mitigate their rejection from potential formal employment.  
The FARC has announced that it will hold its tenth and final Conference as a rebel 
group in mid-September. The Conference agenda includes their transformation into a 
political party (FARC webpage). In exchange, the government has committed to 
providing financial support and security guarantees to aid the FARC‟s participation in 
legitimate politics. Amid much controversy, the settlement states that FARC leaders 
will receive five seats in the Senate and five in the Chamber of Representatives, 
spanning two Congress periods from 2018 onwards. There is no doubt, then, that the 
FARC will be demobilising as a group with a strong political agenda, and a clear 
intention of formally entering into Colombian politics. Furthermore, the FARC appears 
determined to maintain their vertical hierarchy throughout the proposed transition to 
democracy, even refusing to use the term “demobilisation” to describe the process. As 
explained earlier, this model of military organisation does not sit well within an 
electoral democratic system. As a result, although the social relationships that emerge 
from the military structure may be critical in providing support to the ex-combatants 
during their reintegration, both the FARC and the government should foresee that many 
of the combatants may want to fully break away from the group, rather than retaining 
their links with it. The CNR must also contemplate the provision of access on an 
individual level to the interpretive mechanisms for democracy. Courses on citizenship 
education – together with an overarching emphasis on equality among citizens – could 
be implemented, but failing to learn from the recent experiences of the ACR in that 
regard would be a missed opportunity at best.  
Finally, although the peace settlement establishes a National Commission to Guarantee 
Security, and a corresponding scheme of security will be put in place (point 3.4.2), the 
security dilemma represents an important on-going issue specific to the demobilised. 
FARC demobilisation will inevitably change the balance of the political and military 
order in the areas in which they currently operate. As in the 1990s, protection for the 
demobilised requires a robust level of resource and capacity, both in the institutions and 
on the ground. Such an undertaking is also dependent on a full-bore shift in attitude by 
the armed forces in their commitment to provide security to those countrymen who were 
formerly their enemies.  
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Annex A. Interviews with reintegration officers  
 
REINTEGRATION 
OFFICER 
INSTITUTION DATE PLACE 
Villamizar, Dario PAPDRB former director 
15/05/2012; 
15/06/2012 
Bogotá 
Interview No. 16 ACR – SRU 21/10/2011 Bogotá 
Interview No. 17 ACR 09/11/2011 Bogotá 
Group Interview No. 18-
19* ACR – ERU 23/11/2011 Bogotá 
Interview No. 20 ACR – CWU 28/11/2011 Bogotá 
Interview No. 23 ACR 04/01/2012 Bogotá 
Group Interview No. 24-
25* ACR – RPAU 13/02/2012 Bogotá 
Police Liaison  Communitarian police 23/02/2012 Bogotá 
Interview No. 27 PAPDRB 10/11/2011 Bogotá 
Interview No. 28 PAPDRB 24/11/2011 Bogotá 
Interview No. 30 Director PAPDRB 22/12/2011 Bogotá 
Interview No. 31 PAPDRB 04/07/2012 Bogotá 
Interview No. 46 Peace and Reconciliation 12/01/2012 Medellín 
Interview No. 47 Peace and Reconciliation 19/01/2012 Medellín 
Interview No. 48 Peace and Reconciliation 16/01/2012 Medellín 
Group Interview No. 49-
51* Peace and Reconciliation 20/01/2012 Medellín 
Interview No. 53 Peace and Reconciliation 20/01/2012 Medellín 
Interview No. 54 Peace and Reconciliation 24/01/2012 Medellín 
Group Interview Teachers 
(x3)* CEPAR 22/01/2012 Medellín 
Interview No. 66 CEPAR 26/01/2012 Medellín 
Interview No. 73 Regional Office Cúcuta 14/03/2012 Cúcuta 
Group Interview No. 75-
77* Regional Office Cúcuta 14/03/2012 Cúcuta 
Interview No. 90 
Regional Office 
Bucaramanga 19/04/2012 Bucaramanga 
Interview No. 93 Regional Office 
Bucaramanga 18/04/2012 Bucaramanga 
Interview No. 94 
Regional Office 
Bucaramanga 17/04/2012 Bucaramanga 
Interview No. 95 
Regional Office 
Bucaramanga 20/04/2012 Bucaramanga 
Interview No. 96 
Regional Office 
Bucaramanga 20/04/2012 Bucaramanga 
Interview No. 97 
Regional Office 
Bucaramanga 19/04/2012 Bucaramanga 
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Interview No. 106 
Regional Office 
Cartagena 07/05/2012 Cartagena 
Interview No. 107 
Regional Office 
Cartagena 07/05/2012 Cartagena 
Interview No. 108 
Regional Office 
Cartagena 09/05/2012 Cartagena 
Interview No. 109 
Regional Office 
Cartagena 08/05/2012 Cartagena 
Interview No. 119 
Regional Office 
Barranquilla 11/05/2012 Barranquilla 
Interview No. 120 
Regional Office 
Barranquilla 10/05/2012 Barranquilla 
Interview No. 121 
Regional Office 
Barranquilla 10/05/2012 Barranquilla 
Interview No. 122 
Regional Office 
Barranquilla 10/05/2012 Barranquilla 
Interview No. 128 Regional Office Sincelejo 04/06/2012 Sincelejo 
Interview No. 129 Regional Office Sincelejo 05/06/2012 Sincelejo 
Interview No. 130 Regional Office Sincelejo 06/06/2012 Sincelejo 
Interview No. 131 Regional Office Sincelejo 04/06/2012 Sincelejo 
Interview No. 132 Regional Office Sincelejo 04/06/2012 Sincelejo 
Interview No. 141 Regional Office Montería 21/06/2012 Montería 
Interview No. 143 Regional Office Montería 21/06/2012 Montería 
Interview No. 144 Regional Office Montería 19/06/2012 Montería 
Interview No. 145 Regional Office Montería 19/06/2012 Montería 
Interview No. 146 Regional Office Montería 21/06/2012 Montería 
Interview No. 147 Regional Office Montería 21/06/2012 Montería 
Interview No. 148 Regional Office Montería 19/06/2012 Montería 
Interview No. 154 Regional Office Yopal 16/07/2012 Yopal 
Interview No. 155 Regional Office Yopal 17/07/2012 Yopal 
Interview No. 156 Regional Office Yopal 16/07/2012 Yopal 
Interview No. 157 Regional Office Yopal 16/07/2012 Yopal 
Interview No. 158 Regional Office Yopal 17/07/2012 Yopal 
Interview No. 159 Regional Office Yopal 17/07/2012 Yopal 
* The officers requested to answer my interview in group. 
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Annex B. Interviews and focus groups with the ex-combatants 
 
METHOD DATE PLACE MEN WOMEN 
Interview No. 1 09/07/2012 Bogotá 1 0 
Interview No. 2 11/07/2012 Bogotá 0 1 
Interview No. 28 14/07/2012 Bogotá 1 0 
Focus Group No. 30 07/07/2012 Bogotá 1 1 
Focus Group No. 31 11/07/2012 Bogotá 2 0 
Focus Group No. 32 07/07/2012 Bogotá 5 0 
Focus Group No. 1 19/01/2012 Medellín 4 0 
Focus Group No. 2 22/01/2012 Medellín 0 2 
Focus Group No. 3 22/01/2012 Medellín 3 0 
Focus Group No. 4 22/01/2012 Medellín 4 0 
Focus Group No. 5 22/01/2012 Medellín 5 0 
Interview No. 3 20/01/2012 Medellín 0 1 
Interview No. 4 26/01/2012 Medellín 0 1 
Focus Group No. 8 14/03/2012 Cúcuta 3 1 
Interview No. 5  
*False demobilised 15/03/2012 
Cúcuta 
1 0 
Focus Group No. 9 15/03/2012 Cúcuta 3 0 
Focus Group No. 10 15/03/2012 Cúcuta 2 1 
Interview No. 6 15/03/2012 Cúcuta 0 1 
Interview No. 7 16/03/2012 Cúcuta 1 0 
Interview No. 8 16/03/2012 Cúcuta 1 0 
Interview No. 9 16/03/2012 Cúcuta 1 0 
Focus Group No. 11 16/03/2012 Cúcuta 3 0 
Focus Group No. 13 16/04/2012 Bucaramanga 3 1 
Focus Group No. 14 17/04/2012 Bucaramanga 5 0 
Focus Group No. 15 18/04/2012 Bucaramanga 1 0 
Focus Group No. 30 16/04/2012 Bucaramanga 2 0 
Focus Group No. 16 19/04/2012 Bucaramanga 4 0 
Interview No. 10 07/05/2012 Cartagena 1 0 
 
Interview No. 11 07/05/2012 Cartagena 1 0 
 
Interview No. 12 07/05/2012 Cartagena 1 1 
 
Interview No. 13 07/05/2012 Cartagena 0 1 
 
Focus Group No. 17 08/05/2012 Cartagena 2 1 
 
Focus Group No. 18 08/05/2012 Cartagena 3 1 
 
Interview No. 14 08/05/2012 Cartagena 1 0 
 
Interview No. 15 08/05/2012 Cartagena 1 0 
 
Focus Group No. 19 10/05/2012 Barranquilla 3 1 
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Focus Group No. 20 11/05/2012 Barranquilla 4 0 
 
Interview No. 16 11/05/2012 Barranquilla 1 0 
 
Focus Group No. 21 11/05/2012 Barranquilla 3 0 
 
Interview No. 17 11/05/2012 Barranquilla 1 0 
 
Interview No. 18 04/06/2012 Sincelejo 1 0 
 
Interview No. 19 04/06/2012 Sincelejo 1 0 
 
Interview No. 20 04/06/2012 Sincelejo 0 1 
 
Interview No. 21 04/06/2012 Sincelejo 0 1 
 
Interview No. 22 04/06/2012 Sincelejo 1 0 
 
Interview No. 23 04/06/2012 Sincelejo 0 1 
 
Focus Group No. 22 05/06/2012 Sincelejo 6 0 
 
Focus Group No. 23 05/06/2012 Sincelejo 9 0 
 
Interview No. 24 19/06/2012 Montería 1 0 
 
Interview No. 25 20/06/2012 Montería 1 0 
 
Focus Group No. 24 20/06/2012 Montería 5 0 
 
Focus Group No. 25 21/06/2012 Montería 3 0 
 
Focus Group No. 26 21/06/2012 Montería 2 0 
 
Focus Group No. 27 16/07/2012 Yopal 2 0 
 
Interview No. 26 17/07/2012 Yopal 0 1 
 
Interview No. 27 18/07/2012 Yopal 1 0 
 
Focus Group No. 28 18/07/2012 Yopal 4 2 
 
Focus Group No. 29 18/07/2012 Yopal 7 0 
 
Grass-roots No. 1 
Líderes de Paz 27/02/2012 
Bogotá 1 0 
 
Grass-roots No. 2 
Fundacion Andes 04/07/2012 
Bogotá 1 0 
 
Grass-roots No. 3 
Mesa de Trabajo  04/07/2012 
Bogotá 1 0 
 
Grass-roots No. 4 
Mesa de Trabajo  09/07/2012 
Bogotá 0 1 
 
Grass-roots No. 5 
Escuela Deportiva 19/04/2012 
Bucaramanga 1 0 
 
Grass-roots No. 6 
Semillas de Paz 18/04/2012 
Bucaramanga 1 0 
 
Total 
  
131 22 
 
                * Interview No. 5 not included in the total or in the analysis 
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Annex C. Interviews with IOM contractors and experts 
 
CONTRACTOR/ 
EXPERT 
INSTITUTION DATE PLACE 
Interview No. 87 IOM 16/03/2012 Cúcuta 
Interview No. 88 IOM 11/04/2012 Bogotá 
Interview No. 91 IOM 17/04/2012 Bucaramanga 
Interview No. 92 IOM 17/04/2012 Bucaramanga 
Luis Miranda MAPP 11/04/2012 Bogotá 
Arturo Zea CNRR 09/05/2012 Cartagena 
Markus Schultze Sussex University  15/08/2011 UK 
Camilo Echandía Externado University 06/03/2012 Bogotá 
Álvaro Villarraga Democratic Culture 
Foundation 
04/07/2012 
 
Bogotá 
 
José Armando Cárdenas Independent Researcher 15/07/2012 Bogotá 
Víctor Negrete Sinu University 07/06/2012 Montería 
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Annex D. Instruments.  
 
 
Focus groups and interviews of ex-combatants 
 
Date:   
Place:  
Type of Demobilisation:  Individual   Collective 
Gender:  
  
1. Personally, what do you expect from the reintegration process? 
2. What kind of problems have you faced during the reintegration process? 
3. What is your opinion of the psycho-social workshops? 
4. What is your opinion of other workshops (economic or community-based)? 
5. Have you participated in any associations of demobilised? 
6. Have you had any political participation? Are you interested in taking part in 
politics? 
7. When you have a complaint about the reintegration programme, who do you talk to? 
8. Why did you decided to demobilise?  
9. What was the reason you joined that particular group in the first place? 
10. Why do you think other people, or you yourself, would rejoin an armed group?  
11. What do you expect from the authorities (municipal or national) regarding the 
reintegration process? 
12. Have you received any help from other institutions, such as NGOs? 
13. Do you feel accepted by the recipient communities? Have you had any problems?  
14. Have you faced any security issues due to the demobilisation? 
15. What do you value the most about your new life as a civilian?  
16. Did you learn something in the groups that is useful to you now? Is there anything 
you miss?  
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Interview of reintegration officers 
 
Date:   
Place:  
To/from:  
Position:  
1. What is the formal process you follow to provide services to the ex-combatants? 
2. What problems do you find are more common among the demobilised?  
*Focusing on your field of expertise (psycho-social, economic, community 
reintegration) 
3. How do you assess the progress of the ex-combatants in the programme? 
4. Of the people you have worked with, how many would you estimate have had a 
successful reintegration process, and what factors have you found contributed to 
their success? 
5. How do you deal with the hierarchies the demobilised had in the armed groups? 
6. Do you find differences in the reintegration process between collective and 
individual demobilisations? 
7. What is the level of political participation among ex-combatants? 
8. Do they participate in political parties? Or grass-root organisations? 
9. How does the ACR promote the use of citizen rights or democratic mechanisms? 
10. Do the recipient communities accept or reject the demobilised? 
11. Does this Regional Office outsource work to third parties to provide services to the 
demobilised?  
12. How are the relations between this Regional Office and other public offices 
(Mayor‟s  or Governor‟s Offices)? 
13. How are the relations between this Regional Office and the ACR central office? 
14. How do you deal with those who are not real combatants, or those from the false 
demobilisations? 
15. How do you deal with the security problems that come with the demobilised?  
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Annex E. Timeline of the negotiations and the demobilisation process. 
 
DATE EVENT 
May 2001 
Carlos Castaño resigns from the AUC (but this is only made known in 
June). 
10/09/2001 
AUC is included in the list of "foreign terrorist organisations" by the 
US. 
07/02/2002 
Letter from the AUC to the presidential candidates asking to negotiate 
with the winner of the presidential elections. 
03/05/2002 
AUC is included in the list of terrorist organisations by the European 
Union. 
July 2002 Carlos Castaño resigns from the AUC for the second time. 
05/08/2002 
Colombia signs the Rome Treaty. However, it will not be 
implemented for another seven years.  
07/08/2002 Alvaro Uribe takes the oath as President. 
01/09/2002 
Extradition orders by the US for Carlos Castaño and Salvatore 
Mancuso. 
04/09/2002 
The AUC is re-established in order to negotiate with government. 
Letter from the AUC to Luis Carlos Restrepo, Monseñor Pedro 
Rubiano, Ann Paterson, Kofi Annan.  
16/10/2002 Military Operation Orion in Medellín, Comuna 13. 
October 
2002 
Agreement to start dialogues between the Colombian government and 
the paramilitary leaders. 
November 
2002 
Beginning of the negotiations. 
29/11/2002 
Letter by the AUC announcing the cessation of hostilities, to start on 
1st December, 2002. 
December 
2002 
Central Bolivar Bloc announces hostilities will cease as of 5th 
December, 2002. 
08/12/2002 
The Western Alliance calls halt to hostilities from December 2002. 
This includes the Peasant Self-Defenses of Casanare and of Meta and 
Vichada. 
23/12/2002 
Law 782 is enacted. Rules to allow the government to pursue 
dialogues and agreements with illegal armed groups in order to 
achieve their demobilisation and reconciliation and peace among 
Colombians.  
23/12/2002 The government appoints the Exploratory Commission. 
22/01/2003 
First meeting between government and paramilitary leaders. Elmer 
Cárdenas Bloc withdraws from the negotiating table. 
13/02/2003 
The paramilitary leaders sign an agreement of mutual enforcement to 
not abandon the negotiations, for fear the other leaders will gain 
control over their territory and troops. 
21/03/2003 End of the third round of dialogs. Public Communicate. 
03 to 
27/06/2003 
Paramiltary groups demobilise 69 minor combatants and hand them 
over to the ICBF. 
25/06/2003 
The Exploratory Commission publishes a report recommending the 
pursuit of negotiations with the paramilitary groups. The exploratory 
phase finishes and the negotiation phase starts.  
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15/07/2003 
Ralito Agreement (Ralito I). Demobilisation of Cacique Nutibara 
Bloc.  
21/08/2003 
Bill of Alternative Penalty is introduced by the government to 
Congress.  
08/11/2003 
Central Bolivar Bloc and Vencedores de Arauca Bloc agree to 
demobilise and concentrate their troops. 
25/11/2003 Cacique Nutibara Bloc demobilises. 
04/12/2003 
Peasant Self-Defenses of Magdalena Medio agree to concentrate their 
troops.  
07/12/2003 Ortega Peasant Self-Defenses demobilise. 
10/12/2003 
La Ceja Agreement sets out the rules for the reinsertion of Cacique 
Nutibara Bloc. 
23/01/2004 
The OAE and the Colombian government sign the agreement for the 
creation of the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia 
(MAPP/OEA). 
29/01/2004 
Agreement with the Western Alliance, named the "South Casanare 
Agreement". 
31/03/2004 The four negotiating tables are unified. 
16/04/2004 Carlos Castaño disappears. 
13/05/2004 
Fátima Agreement defines the Concentration Zones as of 15 June 
2004; also known as Ralito II. 
28/05/2004 
Carlos Fernández (aka Double 0; aka Rodrigo Franco), leader of 
Metro Bloc, is murdered. 
01/06/2004 
Senator Jorge Gnecco is kidnapped by Rodrigo Tovar Pupo (aka Jorge 
40). 
15/06/2004 Bill of Alternative Penalty is withdrawn. 
15/06/2004 The negotiations are enacted. 
01/07/2004 
Opening of the Concentration Zone in Ralito. The negotiations 
formally begin.  
29/07/2004 
Speech before Congress by the paramiltiary leaders Salvatore 
Mancuso, Iván Duque and Ramon Isaza. 
30/07/2004 Last negotiation with the Western Alliance finishes in no agreement.  
12/08/2004 
Letter by the AUC announcing the demobilisation of the Western 
Plains and the North and Bananero Blocs.  
08/09/2005 Elmer Cárdenas Bloc declares ceasefire and accepts the negotiation. 
01/09/2004 New rules for the economic benefits given to the demobilised. 
16/09/2004 
The Supreme Court authorises the extradition to the US of 
paramilitary leader Juan Carlos Sierra. 
19/09/2004 Miguel Arroyave, leader of Centauros Bloc, is murdered. 
25/09/2004 
Secret recordings of the negotiations are leaked by the political journal 
Semana. 
26/09/2004 Uribe authorises the extradition of Juan Carlos Sierra. 
07/10/2004 
Public Letter by the AUC, "An act of faith in the peace", announcing 
future demobilisations.  
24/11/2004 
The Supreme Court authorises the extradition of paramiltiary leaders 
Carlos Castaño, Salvatore Mancuso and guerrilla leader Simon 
Trinidad. 
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25/11/2004 Bananero Bloc demobilises. 
10/12/2004 Catatumbo Bloc demobilises, led by Salvatore Mancuso. 
01/11/2004 Congress members visit Ralito. 
25/11 to 
18/12/2004 
Demobilisation of five structures: Bananero Bloc, Self-Defenses of 
Magdalena e Islas de San Fernando, Cundinamarca Bloc, Catatumbo 
Bloc and Calima Bloc. 
03/02/2005 
Bill of Truth, Justice and Reparation introduced by members of 
Congress. 
09/02/2005 Bill of Justice, Peace and Reparation introduced by the government. 
18/01 to 
23/12/2005 
Demobilisation of 16 paramilitary structures. 
18/02/2005 Bill of Restorative Justice introduced by Congress members. 
11/04/2005 Politician Orlando Benitez is murdered close to Ralito. 
22/05/2005 
Warrant of arrest for Don Berna. He surrenders to the authorities on 
27 May.  
15/06/2005 Héroes de Tolová Bloc demobilises, led by Don Berna. 
22/06/2005 Law 975 of Justice and Peace is approved by Congress.  
16/11/2005 
FARC structure Front Milicias Urbanas Norma Patricia Galeano 
demobilises (24 members). 
20/01 to 
15/08/2006 
Demobilisation of 14 paramilitary structures. 
07/03/2006 
False FARC structure Compañia Cacica Gaitana demobilises (the 
group was not discovered to be false until 2011). 
12/04/2006 Elmer Cárdenas Bloc demobilises. 
18/05/2006 
The Supreme Court declares Law 975 constitutional, but makes 
significant amendments.  
07/08/2006 Alvaro Uribe takes the oath for his second term as President. 
14/08/2006 Uribe orders the paramilitary leaders to surrender to prison sentences. 
15/08/2006 Last paramilitary demobilisations of Elmer Cárdenas Bloc troops. 
16/08/2006 
Paramilitary leaders enter a recreational centre adapted as a jail in La 
Ceja, Antioquia. 
September 
2006 
High Commission for Reintegration is created (ACR). 
23/11/2006 Paramilitary leaders request a Truth Commission. 
01/12/2006 
Paramilitary leaders are transferred from La Ceja to a high-security 
prison in Itagui. 
14/02/2007 
The reintegration process is extended, but no time limits are 
established. 
04/06/2007 FARC members in jail demobilise. 
24/08/2007 
Paramilitary leaders Don Berna and aka Macaco are transferred to 
Cómbita jail. 
20/09/2007 FARC structure Milicias Urbanas de Florida demobilises. 
13/05/2008 14 paramilitary leaders are extradited to the US. 
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Annex F. Present situation of the paramilitary leaders 
 
NAME AKA 
DEMOBILISED 
STRUCTURE  
DATE OF 
DEMOBILISATION 
PRESENT 
SITUATION  
Carlos Castaño   None   Killed 
Giovanni Jesús 
Marín Zapata  Comandante R Bloc Cacique Nutibara  
25/11/2003 
Jail   
Fabio Orlando 
Acevedo Don Fabio Bloc Cacique Nutibara  
25/11/2003 
Jail 
Ruvinder and 
Lizardo Jair 
Becoche   
Peasant Self-Defenses of 
Ortega 
07/12/2003 
Law 975 
Ever Veloza 
García HH Bloc Bananero, Bloc Calima   
25/11/2004 
Extradited 
José María Barrera 
Ortíz Chepe Barrera 
Self-Defenses of South 
Magdalena and San Fernando 
Island 
04/12/2004 
Extradited 
Luis Eduardo 
Cifuentes El Aguila Bloc Cundinamarca 
09/12/2004 
Law 975 
Salvatore Mancuso Triple 0 
Bloc Catatumbo, Bloc 
Córdoba 
10/12/2004 
Extradited 
Alcides de Jesús 
Durango Rene Bloc South-East Antioquia 
30/01/2005 
Jail 
Eder Pedraza Peña Ramon Mojana Bloc Mojana 02/02/2005 Extradited 
Diego Fernando 
Murillo Bejarano 
Don Berna, 
Adolfo Paz 
Bloc Héroes de Tolová; Bloc 
Libertadores del Sur 
15/06/2005 
Extradited 
Édwar Cobos 
Téllez Diego Vecino Bloc Montes de María 
14/07/2005 
Law 975 
Carlos Mario 
Jiménez Naranjo 
Javier Montañez, 
Macaco Bloc Central Bolivar  
30/07/2005 
Extradited 
Rodrigo Pérez 
Alzate Julian Bolivar 
Bloc Libertadores del Sur, 
Front Vichada del BCB   
30/07/2005 
Law 975 
Daniel Alberto 
Mejía Ángel Danielito Bloc Héroes de Granada 
30/07/2005 
Law 975 
José Baldomero 
Linares Guillermo Torres 
Peasant Self-Defenses of 
Meta and Vichada 
01/08/2005 
Law 975 
Luis Eduardo 
Echavarria 
Durango Jhonatan Bloc Pacific 
23/08/2005 
Killed 
José Vicente 
Castaño Gil El Profe Bloc Centauros  
03/09/2005 
Killed 
Luis Arnulfo 
Tuberquia Memin Bloc North-East Antioquia 
11/09/2005 
Jail 
Diego José 
Martínez 
Goyeneche Daniel  Bloc Tolima  
22/10/2005 
Killed 
Miguel Mejía 
Múnera 
El Mellizo, Pablo 
Arauca Bloc Vencedores de Arauca 
23/12/2005 
Extradited 
Ramiro Vanoy 
Murillo Cuco Vanoy Bloc Mineros  
20/01/2006 
Extradited 
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Arnubio Triana 
Mahecha Botalón 
Peasant Self-Defenses of 
Puerto Boyacá 
28/01/2006 
Law 975 
Hernán Giraldo 
Serna El Patrón Front Resistencia Tayrona  
03/02/2006 
Extradited 
Ramón Isaza 
Arango El Viejo 
Peasant Self-Defenses of 
Magdalena Medio 
07/02/2006 
Law 975 
Juan Francisco 
Prada Juancho Prada Front Julio Peinado Becerra 
04/03/2006 
Law 975 
Rodrigo Tovar 
Pupo Jorge 40 Bloc North 
08/03/2006 
Extradited 
Manuel de Jesús 
Piraban Pirata 
Fronts Héroes del Llano and 
Héroes del Guaviare  
11/04/2006 
Law 975 
Pedro Oliverio 
Guerrero Castillo Cuchillo 
Fronts Héroes del Llano and 
Héroes del Guaviare  
11/04/2006 
Killed 
Fredy Rendón 
Herrera El Alemán 
Front Costanero; Fronts 
Pavarandó and Dabeiba; 
Front Norte Medio Salaquí  
12/04/2006 
Law 975 
 
*Those in jail are being judged by criminal law, meaning they will not be released in the 
near future 
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Annex G. What kind of problems have you faced during the reintegration process? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What kind of problems 
have you faced during the 
reintegration process? 
ANSWERS 
Unemployment 
Clashes with attending the ACR workshops. 
Rejection and discrimination in the workplace. 
Unresolved judicial situation or lack of legal 
documents. 
Low levels of education. Lack of training. 
Poor general economic situation. 
Government‟s Management 
of the Reintegration 
Programme  
Seed Capital: they lost the money in the scams; 
the money was too little; the new requirements 
are impediments; there was constant change in 
the policy. 
Administrative or bureaucratic problems with 
the ACR. 
Low standards in the aid given. 
Low standards in healthcare. 
The government never fulfilled its promises of 
jobs, the Seed Plan and housing. 
No problem They have never encountered any problems. 
Problems in adapting  Getting used to life in the city is difficult.  
Abuses from ex-
combatants 
There were abuses from other demobilised in 
the use of reintegration aid. 
Security issues 
They have received death threats. 
Their families live in unsafe areas, so they 
cannot meet.  
May be in risk of be killed if confessing crimes  
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Annex H. Motivation for no recidivism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
They do not want to join 
again an armed group 
because… 
ANSWERS 
Family They want to stay with their families. 
War was a negative 
experience 
War was a negative experience and they 
wanted a change. 
They do not want to lose their freedom. 
Being a combatant is a hard life. 
Security reasons They can be killed or imprisoned. 
Their families may be targeted by their 
enemies. 
They do not want to go to jail for breaking the 
law, they know they will lose any legal favour. 
Group loss of ideals The group lost its ideology and became a 
purely economic enterprise. 
Reintegration programme The psicosocial workshops or the ACR have 
convinced them of not going back. 
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Annex I. Motivation for recidivism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other demobilised may join 
back the armed group 
because… 
ANSWERS 
Unemployment or 
Economic reasons 
Unemployment or economic needs drive 
people back to the armed groups. 
Allure of criminal life They like the lifestyle in the criminal groups.  
They do not want to make the effort to change 
their way of life.  
Unfulfilled promises The government made promises that were 
never fulfilled. 
Law 1424 Fear of going to jail under law 1424. 
Security reasons They may have death threats due to 
“unfinished business”, thus laying down arms 
puts them at risk .    
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Annex J. Did you learn something in the groups that is useful to you now? Is there 
anything you miss? 
 
 
 
 
 
Did you learn something in 
the groups that is useful to 
you now? Is there anything 
you miss? 
ANSWERS 
Negative experience/ 
Nothing 
It was a negative experience. They learned 
nothing that can be used in their life as 
civilians. 
They feel better out of the group, they enjoy 
freedom and prefer their new style of life. 
They learned some 
discipline or other skills.  
They learned some discipline or other skills.  
They learned to handle weapons. 
Positive experience 
They had some privileges or did not have to 
worry about their daily expenditure. 
They had a salary or some privilieges.  
They still sympathise to a degree with the 
ideology. 
Social networks They miss people who they meet in the group. 
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Annex K. Motivations for demobilising (Paramilitaries). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why did you decided to 
demobilise?. 
ANSWERS 
Commander‟s orders  The commanders gave them the order.  
Fatigue from the war  
Commanders gave them the order, but they 
also were tired of the war, they already wanted 
to leave. 
Family  
They wanted to settle down and stay with their 
families.  
They wanted to create a family. 
They missed a family member . 
Commander‟s threat   The commanders threatened them and made 
demobilise. 
Government promises  The government promised jobs, money and 
houses. 
Captured They were captured and opted for the 
reintegration programme to avoid jail. 
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Annex L. Motivations for demobilizing (Guerrillas) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why did you decided to 
demobilise?.  
ANSWERS 
Tiredness of the war  Disappointment from the group or problems 
inside the guerrilla. 
Family  
They wanted to settle down and stay with their 
families.  
They wanted to create a family. 
They missed a family member . 
Sick 
He was ill and decided to demobilise. 
Captured 
They were captured and opted for the 
reintegration programme to avoid jail. 
Women – Forced 
abortion 
Forced abortions for unauthorised pregnancies 
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Annex M. What do you value the most? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What do you value the 
most about your new life as 
civilian?  
ANSWERS 
Family and community 
bonds 
They have created a family or established  
community bonds. They have learned to 
respect other people. 
They have re-connected with family. 
Personal development 
They have improved their quality of life or 
achieved education and woking skills. 
They have learned self-control and self-esteem. 
They are grateful for having the opportunity to 
change their lives. 
Freedom 
They are now free from the rules and 
hierarchies of the group.  
Free from the harshness of life in the forest. 
Life  
They are grateful to be alive.  
They value the lives of other people.  
Negative 
Unfulfilled promises from the government: 
they were promised jobs, the Seed Plan and 
housing that never came to reality.  
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Annex N. Do you feel accepted by the recipient communities?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do you feel accepted by the 
recipient communities? 
Have you had any 
problems with them?   
ANSWERS 
Hiding their past 
They hide their past for security reasons or to 
avoid being fired at work.  
They feel accepted by their immediate 
community, but people are unaware they are 
ex-combatants. 
Acceptance  
They feel accepted by their immediate 
community and people know they are ex-
combatants. 
Rejection 
They feel rejected by their immediate 
community  because they are ex-combatants. 
Acceptance depends on 
Depends on their own behaviour. 
Some people accept them knowing their past in 
the armed groups, others do not. 
Depends on their location: acceptance comes 
differently in the countryside to cities and non-
immediate communities. 
Forgiveness iniatives 
They have organized public events to ask for 
forgiveness. 
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Annex O. When you have a complaint about the reintegration programme, who do you 
talk to? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When you have a 
complaint about the 
reintegration programme, 
who do you talk to? 
ANSWERS 
The tutor Talk to the tutor 
Regional Office Go to the ACR regional office 
Tutor or ACR Regional 
Office vs. ACR national 
office 
Positive perception of the tutor, negative 
perception of the Regional Office 
Positive perception of the Regional Office, 
negative of the ACR 
Do not have any Does not have any complaint so far 
No one listens There is no point in complaining. 
Fiscal Office They filed a complaint with the Fiscal Office 
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Annex P. How do you find the psychosocial services? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How do you find the 
psychosocial services? 
ANSWERS 
 Positive  
Changing mentality. 
Improving socialising skills. 
Providing guidance in their new life experience 
and help them in improving their personal 
situation. 
Telling them how to behave.  
Overcoming PSTD or mental illness. 
 Negative  
Are boring. 
Did not help. 
There was a lack of empathy or they had 
problems with the psychologist. 
Disagreements 
Had discussions or disagreements with the 
psychologist. 
It depends on   
On the attitude you have or on the personal 
relationship with the tutors. 
Control 
Attendance of the workshops is compulsory in 
order to control them. 
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Annex Q. Have you had any political participation? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Have you had any political 
participation? Are you interested 
in taking part in politics? 
ANSWERS 
They do not want to participate in 
politics at the national level 
Politics is corrupt. 
Better to avoid being visible. 
Unresolved legal situation.  
Lack of leadership. 
There is some participation at the 
grass-roots level or in JACs or 
JALs 
In Local or Community Committees 
(JACs or JALs). 
Association of demobilised population. 
They participate as citizens 
Demonstrate some interest in citizenship 
mechanisms and voting.  
Participating in political campaigns. 
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Annex R. What expectations do you have of the authorities? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What expectations do you 
have of the authorities? 
ANSWERS 
Promises from the 
government 
The government did not satisfy the 
expectations created for obtaining economic 
aid, the productive projects and the Seed 
Capital. 
 They were promised more help to get houses 
and jobs. 
 Judicial situation 
They want the government to solve their legal 
situation so they can finish the reintegration 
process and be freed from attending the ACR. 
Negative perception 
The authorities are corrupt. 
They have had problems with the authorities or 
they have a negative perception. 
They expect nothing from the authorities 
To continue the 
reintegration programme 
They ask the authorities to continue helping 
them and other demobilised with the 
programme reintegration.  
To provide welfare to the 
citizens 
Authorities should provide health, education 
and security to the citizens 
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Annex S. What do you expect from the reintegration process? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What do you expect from 
the reintegration process? 
ANSWERS 
Personal development 
To improve the quality of life for them and 
their families. 
Promises from the 
government 
Aid to get jobs or education. 
Aid from the government in buying a house.  
Increase in the money of the monthly 
payments. 
To obtain Seed Capital. 
Judicial situation 
To resolve their legal issues and gain 
independence from the ACR. 
Social acceptance 
To achieve acceptance from the community or 
from society in general. 
To repair or do community 
work 
They have participated or want to participate in 
activities regarding reparation to victims or 
social and community work. 
Have no expectations No hope in improving their quality of life. 
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Annex T. Their experience on the reintegration process has been… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Their experience on the 
reintegration process has 
been 
ANSWERS 
Positive 
Their mentality has changed. 
They have gained freedom. 
They were able to study or pursue further 
training. 
They are grateful to the ACR for the 
reintegration programme. 
It meant a second opportunity in life. 
Negative 
The government lied to them. 
Self-reintegration was better than being part of 
the programme. 
It was better inside the group, they may want 
to go back. 
Problems in adapting  
They have had problems adapting to civilian 
life or to the city. 
Government controls them 
The ACR programme is a form to control the 
ex-combatant‟s life. 
The government did not 
fulfill its promises but… 
The government did not fulfill its promises but 
they do not regret their reintegration or they 
will not go back to their groups. 
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